Modal Logics of Topological Relations

Logical formalisms for reasoning about relations between spatial regions play a fundamental role in geographical information systems, spatial and constraint databases, and spatial reasoning in AI. In analogy with Halpern and Shoham's modal logic of time intervals based on the Allen relations, we introduce a family of modal logics equipped with eight modal operators that are interpreted by the Egenhofer-Franzosa (or RCC8) relations between regions in topological spaces such as the real plane. We investigate the expressive power and computational complexity of logics obtained in this way. It turns out that our modal logics have the same expressive power as the two-variable fragment of first-order logic, but are exponentially less succinct. The complexity ranges from (undecidable and) recursively enumerable to highly undecidable, where the recursively enumerable logics are obtained by considering substructures of structures induced by topological spaces. As our undecidability results also capture logics based on the real line, they improve upon undecidability results for interval temporal logics by Halpern and Shoham. We also analyze modal logics based on the five RCC5 relations, with similar results regarding the expressive power, but weaker results regarding the complexity

An interval logic for higher-level temporal reasoning

Prior work explored temporal logics, based on classical modal logics, as a framework for specifying and reasoning about concurrent programs, distributed systems, and communications protocols, and reported on efforts using temporal reasoning primitives to express very high level abstract requirements that a program or system is to satisfy. Based on experience with those primitives, this report describes an Interval Logic that is more suitable for expressing such higher level temporal properties. The report provides a formal semantics for the Interval Logic, and several examples of its use. A description of decision procedures for the logic is also included

Incompleteness of a first-order Gödel logic and some temporal logics of programs

It is shown that the infinite-valued first-order Gödel logic G° based on the set of truth values {1/k: k ε w {0}} U {0} is not r.e. The logic G° is the same as that obtained from the Kripke semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic with constant domains and where the order structure of the model is linear. From this, the unaxiomatizability of Kröger's temporal logic of programs (even of the fragment without the nexttime operator O) and of the authors' temporal logic of linear discrete time with gaps follows