An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions

Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.Combinatorial Auction, Market Design Methodology, Market Architecture Design, Auction Rule Design, Winner Determination Design, Agent-Based System

Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Demand

We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market, there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in a line such as a banner on a website. Each buyer desires a particular number of {\em consecutive} slots and has a per-unit-quality value $v_i$ (dependent on the ad only) while each slot $j$ has a quality $q_j$ (dependent on the position only such as click-through rate in position auctions). Hence, the valuation of the buyer $i$ for item $j$ is $v_iq_j$. We want to decide the allocations and the prices in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker. A key difference from the traditional position auction is the advertiser's requirement of a fixed number of consecutive slots. Consecutive slots may be needed for a large size rich media ad. We study three major pricing mechanisms, the Bayesian pricing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and an envy-free solution model. Under the Bayesian model, we design a polynomial time computable truthful mechanism which is optimum in revenue. For the market equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial time algorithm to obtain the maximum revenue market equilibrium solution. In envy-free settings, an optimal solution is presented when the buyers have the same demand for the number of consecutive slots. We conduct a simulation that compares the revenues from the above schemes and gives convincing results.Comment: 27page

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

A Shapley-value Mechanism for Bandwidth On Demand between Datacenters

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Learning on a Budget Using Distributional RL

Agents acting in real-world scenarios often have constraints such as finite budgets or daily job performance targets. While repeated (episodic) tasks can be solved with existing RL algorithms, methods need to be extended if the repetition depends on performance. Recent work has introduced a distributional perspective on reinforcement learning, providing a model of episodic returns. Inspired by these results we contribute the new budget- and risk-aware distributional reinforcement learning (BRAD-RL) algorithm that bootstraps from the C51 distributional output and then uses value iteration to estimate the value of starting an episode with a certain amount of budget. With this strategy we can make budget-wise action selection within each episode and maximize the return across episodes. Experiments in a grid-world domain highlight the benefits of our algorithm, maximizing discounted future returns when low cumulative performance may terminate repetition

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Solving Multi-Mode Resource-Constrained Multi-Project Scheduling Problem with Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

[[abstract]]This study solves a multi-project, multi-mode, and resource-constrained project scheduling problem. Multi-mode means that the activities in a project can be accomplished in one out of several execution modes, each of which represents an alternative combination of resource requirement of the activity. The present study considers the case that the resources need to be allocated first to individual projects by the upper-level manager, and then the project manager of each project schedules the project to optimize its outcome. In view of such a hierarchical decision-making structure, this study uses bi-level decentralized programming to model the problem. The proposed solution procedure employs combinatorial auction mechanisms to determine resource allocations to projects. A regular combinatorial auction and a fuzzy combinatorial auction are used, respectively, for cases of hard and soft capacity constraints. The proposed solution procedure is evaluated by comparison with the results reported in the literature.[[notice]]補正完

Pricing the Cloud: An Auction Approach

Cloud computing has changed the processing and service modes of information communication technology and has affected the transformation, upgrading and innovation of the IT-related industry systems. The rapid development of cloud computing in business practice has spawned a whole new field of interdisciplinary, providing opportunities and challenges for business management research. One of the critical factors impacting cloud computing is how to price cloud services. An appropriate pricing strategy has important practical means to stakeholders, especially to providers and customers. This study addressed and discussed research findings on cloud computing pricing strategies, such as fixed pricing, bidding pricing, and dynamic pricing. Another key factor for cloud computing is Quality of Service (QoS), such as availability, reliability, latency, security, throughput, capacity, scalability, elasticity, etc. Cloud providers seek to improve QoS to attract more potential customers; while, customers intend to find QoS matching services that do not exceed their budget constraints. Based on the existing study, a hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism, which consists of subscription and dynamic auction design, is proposed and illustrated to cloud services. The results indicate that our hybrid pricing mechanism has potential to better allocate available cloud resources, aiming at increasing revenues for providers and reducing expenses for customers in practice

Soft-Error Resilience Framework For Reliable and Energy-Efficient CMOS Logic and Spintronic Memory Architectures

The revolution in chip manufacturing processes spanning five decades has proliferated high performance and energy-efficient nano-electronic devices across all aspects of daily life. In recent years, CMOS technology scaling has realized billions of transistors within large-scale VLSI chips to elevate performance. However, these advancements have also continually augmented the impact of Single-Event Transient (SET) and Single-Event Upset (SEU) occurrences which precipitate a range of Soft-Error (SE) dependability issues. Consequently, soft-error mitigation techniques have become essential to improve systems\u27 reliability. Herein, first, we proposed optimized soft-error resilience designs to improve robustness of sub-micron computing systems. The proposed approaches were developed to deliver energy-efficiency and tolerate double/multiple errors simultaneously while incurring acceptable speed performance degradation compared to the prior work. Secondly, the impact of Process Variation (PV) at the Near-Threshold Voltage (NTV) region on redundancy-based SE-mitigation approaches for High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems was investigated to highlight the approach that can realize favorable attributes, such as reduced critical datapath delay variation and low speed degradation. Finally, recently, spin-based devices have been widely used to design Non-Volatile (NV) elements such as NV latches and flip-flops, which can be leveraged in normally-off computing architectures for Internet-of-Things (IoT) and energy-harvesting-powered applications. Thus, in the last portion of this dissertation, we design and evaluate for soft-error resilience NV-latching circuits that can achieve intriguing features, such as low energy consumption, high computing performance, and superior soft errors tolerance, i.e., concurrently able to tolerate Multiple Node Upset (MNU), to potentially become a mainstream solution for the aerospace and avionic nanoelectronics. Together, these objectives cooperate to increase energy-efficiency and soft errors mitigation resiliency of larger-scale emerging NV latching circuits within iso-energy constraints. In summary, addressing these reliability concerns is paramount to successful deployment of future reliable and energy-efficient CMOS logic and spintronic memory architectures with deeply-scaled devices operating at low-voltages