The Probably and the Provable. By Jonathan L. Cohen

  Sight: Långholmen, Stockhomen ”Långholmensmarinstad” består av tre delar. En båtuppställningslada ett bostadsområde och en restaurang. Båtuppställningsladan har även en dubbel funktion som teater under sommar halvåret då Stockholmstads Parkteater får en fast spelplats och båtarna ligger i vattnet. Restarangen ligger i anslutning till båt huset och har en stor glas vägg som öppnar sig in mot Båtarna/teatern som skapar ett tydligt marint tema.   Bostadsområdet består av nio stycken radhus som vilar mot den befintliga Q-märkta fängelsemuren likt små japanskavillor med ljusgård. Det centralt placerade bostadshuset med sina fem våningar är lika högt som de gamla fängelsebyggnaderna. En lugn lummig innergård skapas emellan radhus och bostadshuset. Den lokala segel skolan får även husera i den nedre våningen av bostadshuset.      Sight: Långholmen, Stockhomen ”Långholmensmarinstad” consists of three parts. These are a large boathouse housing complex and a restaurant. The boathouse also has a double function as theatre space during the summer months when the Stockholm Parkteatern needs its seasonal venue. The restaurant is in direct adjacent to the Boathouse/theatre with a large glass wall which gives the restaurant a natural marina vibe. The housing complex consists of nine townhouses adjacent to the old heritage labelled prison wall, with small Japanese courtyards and one housing block. The housing block rises five story’s and has the same metric height as the surrounding historical prison buildings.   This creates a green peaceful inner courtyard in-between the townhouses and the housing block. The locale yachting club is given a natural haven in the ground floor space in the housing block

Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

A Generalised Quantifier Theory of Natural Language in Categorical Compositional Distributional Semantics with Bialgebras

Categorical compositional distributional semantics is a model of natural language; it combines the statistical vector space models of words with the compositional models of grammar. We formalise in this model the generalised quantifier theory of natural language, due to Barwise and Cooper. The underlying setting is a compact closed category with bialgebras. We start from a generative grammar formalisation and develop an abstract categorical compositional semantics for it, then instantiate the abstract setting to sets and relations and to finite dimensional vector spaces and linear maps. We prove the equivalence of the relational instantiation to the truth theoretic semantics of generalised quantifiers. The vector space instantiation formalises the statistical usages of words and enables us to, for the first time, reason about quantified phrases and sentences compositionally in distributional semantics

A comprehensive theory of induction and abstraction, part II

This is part II in a series of papers outlining Abstraction Theory, a theory that I propose provides a solution to the characterisation or epistemological problem of induction. Logic is built from first principles severed from language such that there is one universal logic independent of specific logical languages. A theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed which provides the basis for the dissolution of the `grue' problem and problems of the non-uniqueness of probabilities in inductive logics. The problem of counterfactual conditionals is generalised to a problem of truth conditions of hypotheses and this general problem is then solved by the notion of abstractions. The probability calculus is developed with examples given. In future parts of the series the full decision theory is developed and its properties explored

Truth and Probability

Contains two other essays as well: Further Considerations & Last Papers: Probability and Partial Belief.

Metaphysical Explanation and the Inference to the Best Explanation (BA thesis)

Inference to the Best Explanation, roughly put, appeals to the explanatory power of a theory or hypothesis (relative to some data set) as constituting epistemic justification for it. Inference to the Best Explanation (henceforth IBE) is a tool widely employed among all reasoners alike, from the empirical sciences to ordinary life. Philosophical discussions do not differ in the usualness of explanatory appeals of this kind during serious argument. Often enough, the appeal is dialectically blocked, as many of our epistemic peers in philosophy offer reasons to be skeptical of IBE. Our aim with this monograph is to assess one worry that have been raised about this mode of inference: That explanatory power is not truth-conducive. We begin by discussing general features of inferences and then formulating IBE in detail. Afterward, we explicate and apply a canonical understanding of what an explanation is. This will lead to a certain understanding of explanatory power. We undergo a case study to defend the thesis that this kind of explanatory power is indeed epistemically irrelevant – unless, perhaps, when combined with other theoretical virtues. Our conclusion is that the measure what explanations are best requires taking other theoretical virtues into account, such as simplicity and unification. In this case, a complete assessment of IBE requires examining if, when, and how these alleged theoretical virtues are indeed truth-conducive

An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs

In this paper, I develop an essentialist model of the semantics of slurs. I defend the view that slurs are a species of kind terms: Slur concepts encode mini-theories which represent an essence-like element that is causally connected to a set of negatively-valenced stereotypical features of a social group. The truth-conditional contribution of slur nouns can then be captured by the following schema: For a given slur S of a social group G and a person P, S is true of P iff P bears the “essence” of G—whatever this essence is—which is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features associated with G and predicted of P. Since there is no essence that is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features of a social group, slurs have null-extension, and consequently, many sentences containing them are either meaningless or false. After giving a detailed outline of my theory, I show that it receives strong linguistic support. In particular, it can account for a wide range of linguistic cases that are regarded as challenging, central data for any theory of slurs. Finally, I show that my theory also receives convergent support from cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics