11 research outputs found
A Bound of the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games
In a generic ïŹnite normal form game with 2(α) + 1 Nash equilibria, at least alpha of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria (that is, they involve randomization by some players)
A Bound of the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games
In a generic finite normal form game with 2(alpha) + 1 Nash equilibria, at least alpha of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria (that is, they involve randomization by some players).Normal form, mixed strategy, game theory
On Sustainable Equilibria
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined an
equilibrium of a game as sustainable if it can be made the unique equilibrium
of a game obtained by deleting a subset of the strategies that are inferior
replies to it, and then adding others. Hofbauer also formalized Myerson's
conjecture about the relationship between the sustainability of an equilibrium
and its index: for a generic class of games, an equilibrium is sustainable iff
its index is +1. Von Schemde and von Stengel (2008) proved this conjecture for
bimatrix games. This paper shows that the conjecture is true for all finite
games. More precisely, we prove that an isolated equilibrium of a given game
has index +1 if and only if it can be made unique in a larger game obtained by
adding finitely many inferior reply strategies
A Continuation Method for Nash Equilibria in Structured Games
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models
for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most
commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact
algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in structured game representations,
including both graphical games and multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The
algorithms are derived from a continuation method for normal-form and
extensive-form games due to Govindan and Wilson; they follow a trajectory
through a space of perturbed games and their equilibria, exploiting game
structure through fast computation of the Jacobian of the payoff function. They
are theoretically guaranteed to find at least one equilibrium of the game, and
may find more. Our approach provides the first efficient algorithm for
computing exact equilibria in graphical games with arbitrary topology, and the
first algorithm to exploit fine-grained structural properties of MAIDs.
Experimental results are presented demonstrating the effectiveness of the
algorithms and comparing them to predecessors. The running time of the
graphical game algorithm is similar to, and often better than, the running time
of previous approximate algorithms. The algorithm for MAIDs can effectively
solve games that are much larger than those solvable by previous methods
Strategic Equilibrium
An outcome in a noncooperative game is said to be self-enforcing, or a strategic equilibrium, if, whenever it is recommended to the players, no player has an incentive to deviate from it.This paper gives an overview of the concepts that have been proposed as formalizations of this requirement and of the properties and the applications of these concepts.In particular the paper discusses Nash equilibrium, together with its main coarsenings (correlated equilibrium, rationalizibility) and its main refinements (sequential, perfect, proper, persistent and stable equilibria).There is also an extensive discussion on equilibrium selection.noncooperative games;equilibrium analysis
Essays on conventions in games and anticipation-dependent preferences
This thesis consists of three chapters. Two chapters fall into the field of game theory and one into the field of decision theory. In the first chapter, I study strategic interaction when people are familiar with the setting they interact in. In such situations, social conventions often emerge and tend to dictate how people behave. Conventions in which people disregard alternatives outside of the convention not only help people coordinate their interactions but also simplify their decision-making. Motivated by this, I develop a novel game-theoretic concept that captures outcomes that are consistent with the existence of such self-enforcing conventions. The resulting solution concept is operational and allows for decomposing games into smaller self-contained games that can be studied in isolation. In the second chapter, I ask whether behavior consistent with the just-described conventions can be given evolutionary interpretations. In such interpretations, the convention is the resulting pattern of behavior in a large population of individuals after they have interacted for some time, with their behavior adjusting over time in response to the payoffs that their actions have given in the past. These interpretations differ from the standard justification of solution concepts based on the assumption of rational individuals that have correct expectations about othersâ behavior. I find that indeed these conventions admit such interpretations, and, moreover, standard notions of evolutionarily stable behavior are often consistent with the adherence to such conventions. In the last chapter, I develop a model of a decision-maker who evaluates outcomes as gains and losses relative to her recent expectations. The decision-maker forms her expectations of an uncertain future outcome by trading off the joy from anticipating a higher outcome with the risk of being disappointed by the outcome. These expectations are then taken as given when the outcome nears. Moreover, the decision-maker is loss averse in the sense that losses relative to these expectations are felt worse than same-sized gains are felt good. The main result is a complete description of the observable choices that are consistent with this behavior. More specifically, I provide necessary and sufficient conditions on choices in the form of axioms such that it is as-if the decision-maker acts as described by the model.Cette thĂšse se compose de trois chapitres. Deux chapitres relĂšvent du domaine de la thĂ©orie des jeux et un autre du domaine de la thĂ©orie de la dĂ©cision. Dans le premier chapitre, jâĂ©tudie des interactions stratĂ©giques dans un contexte oĂč les agents connaissent le cadre dans lequel ils interagissent. Souvent dans de telles situations, des conventions sociales Ă©mergent et tendent Ă dicter comment les agents se comportent. Les conventions dans lesquelles les gens ne tiennent pas compte des alternatives hors de convention aident les agents non seulement Ă coordonner leurs interactions mais aussi Ă simplifier leur prise de dĂ©cision. MotivĂ© par cela, je dĂ©veloppe un nouveau concept en thĂ©orie des jeux qui capture des rĂ©sultats compatibles avec lâexistence de conventions qui sâenforcent par eux-mĂȘmes. Le concept de solution qui en rĂ©sulte est opĂ©rationnel et permet de dĂ©composer des jeux en jeux autonomes plus petits qui peuvent ĂȘtre Ă©tudiĂ©s isolĂ©ment. Dans le deuxiĂšme chapitre, je me demande si un comportement conforme aux conventions qui viennent dâĂȘtre dĂ©crites peut recevoir des interprĂ©tations Ă©volutionnaires. Dans une telle interprĂ©tation, la convention est le modĂšle qui rĂ©sulte du comportement dâindividus dans une grande population, aprĂšs quâils ont interagi pendant un certain temps, leur comportement sâajustant au fil du temps en rĂ©ponse au paiement que leurs actions ont gĂ©nĂ©rĂ© dans le passĂ©. Ces interprĂ©tations diffĂšrent de la justification standard des concepts de solution basĂ©e sur lâhypothĂšse dâindividus rationnels qui ont des attentes correctes sur le comportement des autres. Je prouve dans ce chapitre quâen effet ces conventions admettent de telles interprĂ©tations, et les notions standard de comportement stable sur le plan de lâĂ©volution sont souvent compatibles avec lâadhĂ©sion Ă de telles conventions. Dans le dernier chapitre, je dĂ©veloppe un modĂšle de dĂ©cideur qui Ă©value les rĂ©sultats comme des gains et des pertes par rapport Ă ses anticipations rĂ©centes. Le dĂ©cideur forme ses anticipations dâun rĂ©sultat futur et incertain, en Ă©changeant la joie dâanticiper un rĂ©sultat plus Ă©levĂ© avec le risque dâĂȘtre déçu par le rĂ©sultat. Ces anticipations sont alors considĂ©rĂ©es comme donnĂ©es lorsque la rĂ©alisation du rĂ©sultat approche. De plus, le dĂ©cideur est averse aux pertes dans le sens oĂč les pertes par rapport Ă ces attentes sont ressenties pire que les gains de mĂȘme taille. Le rĂ©sultat principal est une description complĂšte des choix observables qui sont cohĂ©rents avec ce comportement. Plus prĂ©cisĂ©ment, je fournis des conditions nĂ©cessaires et suffisantes sur les choix sous forme dâaxiomes, comme si le dĂ©cideur agissait comme dĂ©crit par le modĂšle