Permissionless and Asynchronous Asset Transfer

Most modern asset transfer systems use consensus to maintain a totally ordered chain of transactions. It was recently shown that consensus is not always necessary for implementing asset transfer. More efficient, asynchronous solutions can be built using reliable broadcast instead of consensus. This approach has been originally used in the closed (permissioned) setting. In this paper, we extend it to the open (permissionless) environment. We present {Pastro}, a permissionless and asynchronous asset-transfer implementation, in which quorum systems, traditionally used in reliable broadcast, are replaced with a weighted Proof-of-Stake mechanism. {Pastro} tolerates a dynamic adversary that is able to adaptively corrupt participants based on the assets owned by them

Optimal strategies for selecting coordinators

We study optimal election sequences for repeatedly selecting a (very) small group of leaders among a set of participants (players) with publicly known unique ids. In every time slot, every player has to select exactly one player that it considers to be the current leader, oblivious to the selection of the other players, but with the overarching goal of maximizing a given parameterized global (“social”) payoff function in the limit. We consider a quite generic model, where the local payoff achieved by a given player depends, weighted by some arbitrary but fixed real parameter, on the number of different leaders chosen in a round, the number of players that choose the given player as the leader, and whether the chosen leader has changed w.r.t. the previous round or not. The social payoff can be the maximum, average or minimum local payoff of the players. Possible applications include quite diverse examples such as rotating coordinator-based distributed algorithms and long-haul formation flying of social birds. Depending on the weights and the particular social payoff, optimal sequences can be very different, from simple round-robin where all players chose the same leader alternatingly every time slot to very exotic patterns, where a small group of leaders (at most 2) is elected in every time slot. Moreover, we study the question if and when a single player would not benefit w.r.t. its local payoff when deviating from the given optimal sequence, i.e., when our optimal sequences are Nash equilibria in the restricted strategy space of oblivious strategies. As this is the case for many parameterizations of our model, our results reveal that no punishment is needed to make it rational for the players to optimize the social payoff

Null Messages, Information and Coordination

This paper investigates the role that null messages play in synchronous systems with and without failures, and provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of protocols for information transfer and coordination there. We start by introducing a new and more refined definition of null messages. A generalization of message chains that allow these null messages is provided, and is shown to be necessary and sufficient for information transfer in reliable systems. Coping with crash failures requires a much richer structure, since not receiving a message may be the result of the sender's failure. We introduce a class of communication patterns called {\em resilient message blocks}, which impose a stricter condition on protocols than the {\em silent choirs} of Goren and Moses (2020). Such blocks are shown to be necessary for information transfer in crash-prone systems. Moreover, they are sufficient in several cases of interest, in which silent choirs are not. Finally, a particular combination of resilient message blocks is shown to be necessary and sufficient for solving the Ordered Response coordination problem

Topological Characterization of Consensus Solvability in Directed Dynamic Networks

Consensus is one of the most fundamental problems in distributed computing. This paper studies the consensus problem in a synchronous dynamic directed network, in which communication is controlled by an oblivious message adversary. The question when consensus is possible in this model has already been studied thoroughly in the literature from a combinatorial perspective, and is known to be challenging. This paper presents a topological perspective on consensus solvability under oblivious message adversaries, which provides interesting new insights. Our main contribution is a topological characterization of consensus solvability, which also leads to explicit decision procedures. Our approach is based on the novel notion of a communication pseudosphere, which can be seen as the message-passing analog of the well-known standard chromatic subdivision for wait-free shared memory systems. We further push the elegance and expressiveness of the "geometric" reasoning enabled by the topological approach by dealing with uninterpreted complexes, which considerably reduce the size of the protocol complex, and by labeling facets with information flow arrows, which give an intuitive meaning to the implicit epistemic status of the faces in a protocol complex