DO FIRMS BENEFIT FROM THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MANDATE IN TAIWAN?

我國於2010年11月通過證券交易法第十四之六條，規定股票已在證券交易所上市或於證券商營業處所買賣之公司應設置薪資報酬委員會。主管機關冀望藉此規定強化經理人薪酬資訊透明度、抑制肥貓現象以及讓經理人薪資與公司經營績效連結。因此，本文分成兩部分，檢視強制設置薪酬委員會是否真能達成此預期效果？ 第一部分先探討強制設置薪酬委員是否有利於提升經理人薪酬績效敏感度，以及影響因素為何。為了檢視此研究議題，本文以臺灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，樣本期間為規定實施前後兩年(即2009年至2010年與2012年至2013年)，並將薪酬委員會的獨立性與專業能力視為強制設置薪酬委員會有效性之決定因素。其中獨立性係以現任獨立董事衡量之，專業能力則是委員的人力與社會資本，即服務董事會年資和擔任董監事家數。實證結果顯示設置薪酬委員會確實能增進經理人薪酬績效敏感度，且主要是透過薪酬委員會之獨立性與專業能力達成此功效。 第二部分探討強制設置薪酬委員會對規定實施前有超額薪資現象或較差經營績效的公司(統稱為焦點公司)是否更為有利，以及其薪酬委員會特性在此之中的作用。針對此研究議題，本文比較焦點公司與標竿公司經理人薪酬績效敏感度之差異，其中標竿公司是指規定實施前較無不合理薪資水準或有較佳經營績效的公司。實證結果顯示相較於標竿公司，規定實施後超額薪資公司薪酬績效敏感度增加幅度較大，而績效差公司卻較小。另外，現任獨立董事或擁有較多人力及社會資本的委員在不同公司會扮演著不同的角色。具體而言，當他們擔任社會大眾所關注的超額薪資公司委員時，傾向於提高薪酬績效敏感度，反之，一旦擔任績效差公司委員時，則較無此傾向。Article 14-6 of the amended Securities Exchange Act of Taiwan was passed in November of 2010 and mandated that a firm whose stock is listed on the stock exchange or traded over-the-counter shall establish a compensation committee. Regulators in Taiwan claim that this mandate can enhance the transparency of executive compensation, mitigate the “fat cat” phenomenon, and pay executives in line with firm performance and shareholder interests. Thus, this dissertation is divided into two parts to investigate whether this optimistic expectation of the regulators occurs as expected. Part I of this dissertation examines whether this mandate can benefit firms by enhancing pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation as a whole and what are the channels of this mandate. To address the research questions, this dissertation uses Taiwanese-listed firms during the periods 2009 to 2010 and 2012 to 2013 as the sample. The independence and the competence of the compensation committee are considered to be the two channels which make the compensation committee mandate efficacious. The independence of the compensation committee is estimated by the compensation committee with incumbent independent directors. The competence of the compensation committee is estimated by the human and social capital of the members (i.e., long board service and multiple directorships). The empirical results show that this mandate indeed increases pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. This effect is mainly via the independence and the competence of the compensation committee. Part II of this dissertation examines the extent to which firms that previously had overpayment or poor performance (generically called focal firms) benefit from this mandate and how compensation committee composition plays a role in this benefit. To address the research questions, this dissertation compares the change in the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation between focal firms and benchmark firms. Benchmark firms were less likely to overpay or to underpay or which had good performance before the mandate. The empirical results show that, compared to benchmark firms, the positive effect of this mandate on the pay-for-performance sensitivity is larger for overpaying firms and is smaller for poor-performing firms. This dissertation also finds that compensation committee members with more human and social capital and incumbent independent directors perform diverse functions in different firms. When they serve on overpaying firms that receive public scrutiny, they are more effective at increasing pay-for-performance sensitivity. Conversely, once they serve on poor-performing firms, this function vanishes

The Establishment of Remuneration Committee in a TSEC/GTSM Listed Company toward the Impact of Corporate Performance and Director Compensation

根據公開資訊觀測站「公司治理專區」揭露上市公司2011年度稅後虧損，惟董監事酬金卻反而增加之相關資訊，共有智寶、誠創、茂矽等28家上市公司2011年度虧損，但平均每位董監事酬金卻不減反增；另外，全台、龍邦董事酬金則高過2011年全公司總獲利。2011年03月18日，行政院金融監督管理委員會證券期貨局依據增訂證券交易法第十四條之六條文，正式訂定發佈「股票上市或於證券商營業處所買賣公司薪資報酬委員會設置及行使職權辦法」，規定上市／櫃、興櫃公司實收資本額100億元以上者，須於2011年9月30日前設置薪酬委員會（Remuneration Committee）；未達100億元者則須於2011年12月31日前設置完成。本研究主要探討強制設置薪酬委員會對企業經營績效與董事薪酬水準之影響。設置薪酬委員會有助於企業績效之提升；在薪酬委員會監督下則會降低董事薪酬水準；且經營績效越高的企業，設置薪酬委員會對降低董事薪酬水準的影響也越大

The Impact of Compensation Committee on the Relationship between Family Firms

為強化公司治理，我國強制上市(櫃)公司須於2011年底前設置薪酬委員會，本研究首先探討公司自願在2011年底前設置薪酬委員會之因素。因為法令還未強制設置薪酬委員會前，我國已自願設置薪酬委員會之公司約2%，無法使用差異中之差異法(Difference-in-difference)，故本研究以我國家族企業為研究對象，探討相較於非家族企業，薪酬委員會設置對家族企業之公司價值的影響。 本研究結果顯示產業龍頭公司有設置薪酬委員會、公司規模、股東權益報酬率及董事會之獨立性與自願設置薪酬委員會呈現正相關。另外，家族企業相較於非家族企業而言公司價值較低，設置薪酬委員會後公司價值差距變小，但是未達統計上的顯著，亦即，設置薪酬委員會對家族企業的效益及非家族企業的效益沒有顯著差異。In order to enhance corporate governance, the R.O.C. Securities and Exchange Act was amended in 2010 to force listed companies to establish a Compensation Committee by the end of 2011. First, this study is to investigate which determinants may encourage companies to voluntarily establish the compensation committee. Then, we investigate whether setting compensation committee or not can increase firm value in family firms more than non-family firms. Because of few volunteers, we can’t use difference-in-difference. The results implicate that voluntary formation of compensation committee is associated with leading enterprise in industry which establishes compensation committee, greater size of the firms, higher return on equity and higher independence of the board of directors. In addition, on comparing Compensation Committees established or not, there appears to be no significant correlation with firm value between family firms and non-family firms