PREPARED OR PRECARIOUS? U.S. GOVERNMENT READINESS IN THE FACE OF BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

Abstract

The threat of biological terrorism is constantly evolving, and concerns about biological threats were heightened by the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. This thesis argues that while U.S. biodefense strategies and policies have significantly improved since the Bush administration, vital gaps remain and the U.S. government is unprepared to defend against future attacks. Through an analysis of three case studies, the 1984 Rajneeshee Salmonella attacks, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attacks, and the 2001 Anthrax attacks, this thesis identifies shortcomings in past biodefense strategies and highlights ongoing weaknesses in interagency coordination and partnerships, education and training, and investment in biodefense. The research further examines the biodefense strategies of post-9/11 presidential administrations, analyzes current biodefense readiness and response capabilities, and reviews the challenges and limitations that U.S. biodefense strategies face. This thesis also discusses the potential effect the COVID-19 pandemic may have on the biothreat landscape. The findings indicate that the lessons from past incidents remain relevant today and can inform efforts to close existing gaps in the nation’s biodefense. This thesis concludes with proposals for future research aimed at enhancing national preparedness and improving strategies to prevent, detect, and respond to future biothreats.Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release: Distribution is unlimited.Lieutenant, United States Nav