Statutes and Special Interests

Abstract

Who really decides what statutes say? Most Americans think that special interests play an outsized role in our lawmaking processes. Yet empirical studies have produced little evidence that special interests get everything, or even most of, what they ask for from Congress. This Article takes an innovative new approach to tackling the difficult question of how advocates influence legislation. It presents the first comprehensive empirical study of how advocates influence the law through amendments in the legislative process. The Article analyzes an original dataset of 2,137 witnesses and their testimony at referral hearings on 108 Indian-related bills in the 97th and 106th Congresses. The analysis identifies amendments as an important yet previously undocumented way in which advocates influence legislation. It uncovers a rarely observed relationship between legislative advocates and sitting members of Congress. Comparison of advocates’ testimony on bills to amendments proposed by members of Congress reveals similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that advocacy groups persuaded legislators to introduce amendments valued by the group. The analysis also demonstrates how advocate influence at the hearing stage of the legislative process frequently shapes the law by dramatically increasing the likelihood of legislative enactment. These findings reveal an important mechanism advocates can use to change the law. Further, they challenge prevailing narratives about power by demonstrating how underrepresented groups can leverage the legislative process in their law reform efforts