Global Problems in Domestic Courts

We face an increasing number of problems that are essentially global in nature because they affect the world in its entirety: global cartels, climate change, crimes against humanity; to name a few. These problems require world courts, yet world courts in the institutional sense are largely lacking. Hence, domestic courts must function, effectively, as world courts. Given the unlikelihood of effective world courts in the future, our challenge is to establish under what conditions domestic courts can play this role of world courts effectively and legitimately

A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts

A growing number of criminal courts nationwide handle domestic violence cases on separate calendars, termed domestic violence courts. There are now 208 confirmed domestic violence courts across the U.S. (Center for Court Innovation 2009). More than 150 similar projects have been established internationally. Some domestic violence courts emerged in the context of the broader "problem-solving court" movement and share characteristics with other specialized courts, such as separate dockets and specially trained judges. However, the origins of domestic violence courts are also distinct, growing out of the increased attention afforded domestic violence matters by the justice system over the past 30 years. With funding from the National Institute of Justice, this study explores how criminal domestic violence courts have evolved, their rationale, and how their operations vary across the U.S. This study does not test whether domestic violence courts reduce recidivism, protect victims, or achieve other specific effects -- although we provide a thorough literature review on these points. Rather, our aim is to present a comprehensive national portrait of the field as it exists today, laying the groundwork for future information exchange and research

Bankrupt Estoppel: The Case for a Uniform Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel as Applied Against Former Bankruptcy Debtors

This Note examines the role judicial estoppel plays in supporting the U.S. federal bankruptcy regime. Though once considered an obscure doctrine, the use of judicial estoppel to bar pursuit of previously undisclosed claims by former bankrupts has grown apace with burgeoning bankruptcy filings over the last decade. While the doctrine’s application in federal courts has evolved toward a common standard of application, state courts’ application remains idiosyncratic. The Note argues that under the established laws of judgment recognition and in light of federal courts’ sophisticated application of the doctrine, state courts should apply federal judicial estoppel standards to further national uniformity in bankruptcy practice

Empiricism and the Misdemeanor Courts: Promoting Wider, Deeper, and Interdisciplinary Study

Since 1956, there have been three waves of scholarly attention on the misdemeanor courts. Despite this attention, misdemeanor courts remain understudied and overlooked. The object of this paper is to summarize the empirical research conducted over the last sixty years and identify the scholarly work that should be undertaken on the processing of misdemeanor offenders in our courts. Buoyed by the current interest in studying the misdemeanor courts, scholars should widen and deepen their study by replicating the work of others in a variety of jurisdictions, observing court proceedings, interviewing defendants and the courtroom workgroup, and assessing whether constitutional ideals are being upheld by our misdemeanor courts

Transnational Judicial Dialogue and Evolving Jurisprudence in the Process of European Legal Integration

European legal integration can be envisioned as containing two dimensions of legal integration: vertical and horizontal. Vertical legal integration is a top down process where the establishment of a hierarchical legal order of courts and laws causes national courts to make more similar decisions over time as they increasingly come under the formal authority of a higher court. The European legal integration literature speaks mainly to vertical, formal, legal integration where the ECJ and EU law have asserted themselves as a formal authority over the national courts of the member states and compel the integration of the national courts. Horizontal legal integration involves national courts making more similar decisions over time because the national courts interact, borrow, and imitate each other informally. Vertical legal integration can compel national courts to take into account EU law and ECJ precedent, but it cannot control for variances in interpretation. The focus of this paper is not just on how the power dynamics of courts and laws have changed in Europe, but also how the legal realm of Europe has shifted to a greater frequency of shared legal outcomes. There have been hints in the European integration literature about horizontal legal integration in many vertical integration studies (See Jupille and Caporaso 2009; Burley and Mattli 1993; Mattli and Slaughter 1995). This paper will pursue further the notion that there are distinct dynamics of horizontal and informal legal integration and that horizontal legal integration in conjunction with vertical legal integration can contribute to a more complete understanding of the process of European legal integration. In this paper I argue that the historical progression of increasingly autonomous and powerful national courts (court empowerment) in Western Europe has allowed a process of transnational judicial dialogue to occur. Transnational judicial dialogue is composed of horizontal, transnational interactions between national high courts judges, where judges across countries voluntarily draw upon each other‟s rulings, logics, and academic writings and incorporate them into their own logics and rulings. I argue that this process of transnational judicial dialogue has furthered legal integration through the transmission of jurisprudence and legal concepts between different member state national judiciaries through informal, horizontal legal integration

The Court of Appeals as the Middle Child

It’s said that middle children are most likely to be forgotten in the chaos of family life. The same could be said of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, which in 2016, mark their 125th anniversary, and which are the middle child of the federal judicial family. As too few people, even academics, know, the courts of appeals were created in 1891 by the Evarts Act, more than a century after the Constitution and the First Judiciary Act. The history of the courts of appeals has accordingly hovered somewhat uneasily next to that of the U.S. Supreme Court and the district courts. Setting aside the rare times when an appellate court strikes down or stays an important national statute or program, our work remains largely below the radar of American public debate. In contrast to our sibling Article III courts, district and Supreme, our intermediate appellate character is stunted in three different ways

Courts and Executives

William Howard Taft was both our twenty-seventh president and the tenth Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court -- the only person to have ever held both high positions in our country. He once famously commented that presidents may come and go, but the Supreme Court goes on forever (Pringle 1998). His remark reminds us that presidents serve only four-year terms (and are now limited to two of them), but justices of the Supreme court are appointed for life and leave a legacy of precedent-setting cases after departing the High Court. Of course, presidents also leave a legacy of important decisions, not the least of which being their appointment of federal judges. [excerpt

Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts

Carrington notes that because judges in trial and intermediate courts are accountable to highest courts, it is the latter that are responsible for keeping the faith with democratic traditions

Critical race theory in a swedish context

Race has been a term avoided in the Swedish debates, while at the same time, protections with respect to unlawful discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origins have not been vigilantly upheld by the courts. This paper looks at the treatment of race by the Swedish legislature, as well as the treatment by the courts, specifically the Labour Court, with respect to claims of unlawful discrimination in employment on the basis of ethnic origins, against the background of Critical Race Theory. The disparities between the intent of the legislature and the outcome of the cases brought to the Swedish courts can be in least in part explained through the lens of Critical Race Theory, particularly with respect to the liberal approach taken by the courts when applying the law