The EU and China: sanctions, signals, and interests. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 145 May 2021.

Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either. The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province. That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so

Elections in Russia – a measure for nothing or relevant after all? Egmont Commentary 14 September 2021.

Russians go to the ballot box on 17 to 19 September. Most commentators consider the election as a non- event as all indicators point to the continuation of the present regime. Although major shifts in the parliamentary set up are unlikely it can be argued that small changes are not necessarily insignificant. Even though the present regime has made the emergence of significant opposition close to impossible, the changes in Russian society cannot but manifest itself in the election results. Even small changes may have an impact on the Kremlin balance of power

The cost of a police state: Belarus’s economic problems. OSW Commentary Number 392 11.05.2021.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic did trigger a recession in Belarus, the greatest blow to the country’s economy has been its deep political crisis. This was caused by the authorities rigging the results of the presidential election, which in turn provoked mass opposition from the citizens. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, focused on remaining in power, resorted to unprecedented repression, which over the following months completely shattered many years of efforts to improve the investment climate and to achieve a partial liberalisation of the economy. These efforts included a flagship initiative to develop the Belarusian IT sector. 2020 revealed the Belarusian economy’s great sensitivity to the global economic slump and the regime’s inability to launch free-market reforms. As a consequence, although in 2020 Belarus’s GDP fell just 0.9%, the country found itself in an extremely difficult situation due to the magnitude of other threats to its economic stability. Belarus’s inability to effectively refinance its foreign debt using funds offered by Western institutions, its significant budget deficit (approximating the level recorded in the crisis years of the 1990s) and the state sector’s largely unpayable debt to the local banks will all result in continued aggravation of the economic crisis. Alongside this, they will provoke a rise in Russia’s importance as the only ally and lender to an internationally isolated Belarus. Without Russia’s assistance, the risk of the Belarusian economy collapsing will increase significantly in 2021

A durable state. The 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence. OSW Commentary Number 404 24.08.2021.

On 24 August 1991, Ukraine proclaimed independence, and a few months later (together with Russia and Belarus) it brought about the dissolution of the USSR. At the time of its foundation, the Ukrainian state was a continuation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on the one hand, this delayed the de-Communisation of the organisational and legal system, but on the other, it saved the country from having to build up state institutions from scratch. After nearly a quarter of a century, the hour of its greatest trial arrived – revolution and war with Russia. Ukraine passed this test: it did not unilaterally implement the political part of the Minsk agreements which posed a direct threat to it, nor has it fallen into the group of ‘failed states’. The main threat to its future is not so much the ongoing conflict in the Donbas or the weakness of the economy, but rather demographic collapse: during its nearly thirty years of independence, it has lost a fifth of its population

Hospital admission probability and length of stay among Covid-19 confirmed cases. ESRI Report February 2021.

The volumes of Covid-19 confirmed cases and hospital admissions have varied across the course of the pandemic in Ireland. Three broad waves can be identified; March through July, August through November, and December onwards. The majority of confirmed cases and hospital admissions have been recorded since December. This briefing note examines how the relationship between cases, hospital and critical care admissions, and hospital length of stay, may have varied over the course of the pandemic. Particular attention is paid to variation in age-specific distributions of admission probabilities and average length of stay across waves of the pandemic

Zelensky’s Ukraine: the mechanisms of power are failing. OSW Commentary Number 372 22.01.2021.

President Volodymyr Zelensky gained full power under a year and a half ago, but it is already becoming increasingly difficult for him to implement his declared political goals. This is due to the increasingly weak control he wields over his own Servant of the People party, his incompetent choice of collaborators and, more broadly, his lack of a comprehensive vision of reforms. Since the government reshuffle in March 2020, Zelensky has abandoned his plan to carry out a comprehensive reconstruction of Ukraine’s political elite by replacing its main figures with untainted ‘new faces’. This is what he had promised to his voters. However, he has failed to find an effective mechanism for selecting suitable candidates for key positions, which negatively affects the process of reforms being implemented. Servant of the People de facto losing its parliamentary majority, which had previously enabled it to independently enact laws, forces this party’s representatives to constantly strive to reach agreements with other parliamentary groups and groups of influence. This is yet another factor undermining the effectiveness of actions carried out by the Ukrainian leadership. Moreover, there are constantly more indications that corruption is being tolerated and there has been a return to the direct control of law enforcement bodies. This, in turn, reinforces the feeling that in his governance style and practice, ‘anti-system’ Zelensky is increasingly resembling his ‘pro-system’ predecessors. Although he continues to be a popular politician, his level of support has constantly been on the wane and the prospects for his presidency bringing a breakthrough in Ukraine’s modernisation process are becoming increasingly illusory

The Caucasus deregulated. The region on the anniversary of the end of the second Karabakh war. OSW Commentary Number 418 26.11.2021.

A year after the end of the second Karabakh war, the situation in the South Caucasus evades simple definition. On the one hand, it seems relatively stable: most of the provisions of the tripartite Statement[1] that gave rise to the end of the fighting are being implemented. Moreover, apart from a defeated and weakened Armenia, all the actors involved in the war have reasons to be satisfied: Azerbaijan has regained control of most of the disputed territories and has proved its strength; Turkey, which supported Baku, has reaffirmed and expanded its influence in the region; Russia has strengthened its position as a regulator of the conflict, as mediator and guarantor of the agreement. On the other hand, however, the region is much more ‘deregulated’ and unstable than it was before the war: the ceasefire on the Karabakh front is based on a document of low formal status, as the real peace process is still frozen; the sense of satisfaction among all the participants (especially Baku and Ankara) is at an unsatisfactorily low level in relation to the ambitions awakened within their societies. Finally, the impression that the entire regional order is being undermined is not waning as the Turkish-Russian rivalry grows and – on the other hand – the role of the West and Iran, which played practically no role during the conflict or the year since its end, is marginalised. It is therefore unlikely that the current state of suspension will persist for much longer. It seems to be in Russia’s interest to revive the political process that it favours (in which Moscow has a much stronger position, and which moreover would allow it to consolidate its gains) and marginalise Turkey; Azerbaijan and Turkey, in turn, may return to the politics of force and facts on the ground achieved at Armenia’s expense, in line with their incompletely realised ambitions. At the same time, the situation around the conflict may be influenced much more now than before 2020 by tensions between Russia and Turkey in other areas (Syria, Libya, Ukraine and the Black Sea region), and by developments in the Iranian crisis

Is the EU's building renovation wave 'fit for 55'? EPC Policy Brief June 2021.

The European Commission's recent Renovation Wave Strategy aspires to be a turning point in the European Green Deal. If successful, it will speed up the renovation of buildings while also making them more energy-efficient and less carbon-intensive over their entire lifecycle. Ideally, the renovation wave and the Commission's new Fit for 55 package, a set of policy proposals to reduce net emissions by 55% by 2030, would work in tandem. Buildings are responsible for about 40% of the EU's total energy consumption and 36% of carbon dioxide emissions. The Fit for 55 package deals with energy efficiency, electrification and the integration of renewables, which are crucial for making buildings more carbon-neutral. But is the renovation wave 'fit for 55'? In this Policy Brief, Thijs Vandenbussche analyses the status of and legislative framework for energy efficiency and electrification in the EU's building stock. He argues that the reviews in the Fit for 55 package should go beyond merely adjusting existing targets. They should also scrutinise and improve the governance framework to increase energy efficiency and electrification in the buildings sector and add more incentives for consumers to renovate smartly and sustainably. To fully realise the emission reduction potential of buildings, the EU should, when reviewing the relevant Fit for 55 legislation, take the following steps: strengthen the Energy Efficiency Directive's monitoring and control by the European Commission to achieve the national energy efficiency targets; add carbon reduction aspects to the Energy Efficiency Directive and/or Energy Performance of Buildings Directive; and prioritise the Energy Taxation Directive review, rather than an extension of the Emissions Trading System to the buildings sector, to encourage the integration of renewables and electrification in buildings and disincentivise fossil fuels. Aligning the Fit for 55 package and Renovation Wave Strategy in this way will help achieve cost-effective renovation efforts that are parallel to the EU's climate neutrality objectives while keeping in mind the needs of its most vulnerable citizens. The Commission should furthermore have a more substantial monitoring role over member states' energy efficiency plans. Incentives for consuming fossil fuels in buildings should be displaced towards renewables and electrification. If the EU and its member states do not move in this direction, they risk failing to reach their targets – reducing emissions from the buildings sector, and their climate goals more generally

“Una casa para todos”: Observations from the first European Citizens’ Panel of the Conference on the Future of Europe. EPC Report 24/09/2021.

Last weekend, 180 citizens from all over the European Union gathered in Strasbourg for the first European Citizens’ Panel of the Conference on the Future of Europe. EPC analysts Johannes Greubel and Corina Stratulat were there to observe. They share their first impressions in a special report for the Conference Observatory. Besides a comprehensive description of the process and the overall atmosphere in Strasbourg, the report assesses the chosen methods and procedures. It also highlights a few kinks that could – and should - be ironed out in the course of the Conference. Despite some of the shortcomings mentioned in the report, the authors saw signs of hope and optimism. The organisers went to great lengths to design a process that considers fundamental elements of deliberative exercises. This ECP also confirms the potential of such activities to actively engage participants, broaden their perspectives and knowledge, and leave a long-lasting impression on them. The mood of the citizens in the final plenary of this first ECP session was overwhelmingly positive. They were excited about the experience they had lived through over the weekend, all the people they met, everything they learned, and the opportunity they were offered to make their voices heard

SME investment determinants and financing constraints: A stochastic frontier approach. ESRI Working Paper 699 April 2021.

In this paper, we explore the link between SME investment, firm economic characteristics, and the presence of financing constraints during the post-2008 crisis recovery period in Ireland. We use novel survey data between 2016 and 2018, which disaggregates investment by asset type and allows a granular assessment typically not present in the existing literature. Our approach links investment to the marginal product of capital using a stochastic frontier model to explore, and measure, the presence of constraints. We also test whether liquid assets, indebtedness and investment dissatisfaction impact SMEs investment. We find a clear link between investment and its marginal product with elasticities of between 0.55 and 0.65; a one per cent increase in marginal product leads to a 0.55-0.65 per cent increase in investment. The investment efficiency estimates obtained show the presence of financing constraints. We find evidence of both internal and external finance constraints explaining the investment efficiency of small fixed assets. Higher collateral availability contributes to improve investment efficiency for all fixed assets