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Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 4 Article 9Book ReviewsFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted forinclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contactsmccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationBook Reviews, 1 Md. L. Rev. 362 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss4/9Book ReviewsTAXABI INCOM. By Roswell Magill. New York. TheRonald Press Company 1936. Pp. ix, 437.To most of us income taxes mean an annual headacheand a period of horror. They give us some of the few mo-ments in life when we feel richer than we are and wish weweren't.This may be likened to the worm's eye view of the in-come tax and is the antithesis of the panorama spread beforeus by Mr. Magill's excellent book.Few people, if any, are as well fitted by training andaptitude as Mr. Magill to bring order out of the seemingmaze of our income tax laws. Both as a practicing lawyerand as a professor of law he has been for years one of theleading analysts and expositors of our tax laws and espe-cially of the income tax. In addition, he has occupied suchimportant government positions as Adviser to the TaxCommission of Porto Rico, Chief Attorney of the U. S.Treasury Department, and Assistant to the Secretary ofthe Treasury on taxation, and is now Undersecretary of theTreasury.In his present book, therefore, Mr. Magill blends theagility of a practicing lawyer whose problem is to escapepaying, the detachment of a professor, and the graspingscrutiny of a government official whose job is to produce thecash. He also brings to the task a brilliant and inquiringmind that is not satisfied to know what the law says anddoes but must also know why.One theory of modern education is to let the pupil pickthe subject that most interests him and, by allowing con-centration on this, to encourage the absorption of otherfields of knowledge which, if offered in separate bottles,might repel him. A student interested in geography isbound to acquire a knowledge of mathematics, history, sci-ence, etc. in order to satisfy his enthusiasm for geography.With many people more useful and intelligently arrangedknowledge will be acquired in this way than by repeateddosings of labelled learning.One is reminded of this theory in reading Taxable In-come. As implied by its title the main theme of the bookis the discovery and analysis of what constitutes "taxableincome" under the various Revenue Acts and the SixteenthMARYLAND LAW REVIEWAmendment. Mr. Magill first whets the desire of answer-ing this and then when enthusiasm is aroused uses it as alens through which to examine the entire field.The advantages of such an approach are obvious. Thereis probably no branch of the law in which it is so easy to failto see the forest for the trees. Not only does the inquirersoon become lost in a maze of exceedingly complicated stat-utes, regulations and rules, but the very guideposts thatare employed by lawyers accentuate the difficulty. Bymeans of voluminous services one can usually find the sec-tion, paragraph or decision which most nearly fits hisfactual situation, but it is a burrowing process and evenwhen the particular tree is found its position in the forestis frequently lost.As a consequence of Mr. Magill's method, furthermore,there is a refreshing minimum of reference to the law bychapter and verse. To one accustomed to the usual taxliterature it scarcely seems like a book on taxation and hasa sacrilegious feel about it similar to that of a Bible fromwhich some profane person had pruned all the genealogicalreferences. It has a life and vigor which tax treatises arenot supposed to have. In fact, if a thorough work on any-thing as naturally ponderous as taxation can be made inter-esting to the normal reader, this is it.It should be pointed out in this respect that Mr. Magillis no shrinking violet. He does not hesitate to pass judg-ment on the decisions of the Supreme Court in a mostparental manner. On the other hand this is not overdone,and one of the most refreshing aspects of the book is itssomewhat dogmatic character.Like Gaul, Taxable Income is divided into three parts.In the first, one learns what an enormous word "income"i! and also learns more fully to appreciate HumptyDumpty's comforting rule that a word means "what Ichoose it to mean". As usual the judges are the masters-the word "income" is weaned away from the definitionof the economists and acquires new and more practicalcharacteristics in the hands of the Supreme Court.In part two are catalogued and analyzed the character-istics of income, that is to say the "benefits" which aretaxable as income, and in part three are discussed limita-tions dependent upon the source from which things soughtto be taxed as income are derived. Finally there is a shortand delightful summary in which are pointed up the bolderfeatures of the entire concept.BOOK REVIEWSDon't try Taxable Income in the drowsy hours afterlunch, but if you enjoy touring difficult terrain under theguidance of a stimulating and incisive mind, don't fail totry it.-H. H. WALKER LEWIS.*MARYLAND ANNOTATIONS TO THE AMERICAN LAW INSTI-TUTE 'S RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS.Prepared by G. Kenneth Reiblich, under the auspices of theMaryland State and Baltimore City Bar Associations.Published by the American Law Institute Publishers, St.Paul, Minn., 1937, pp. 214.When, a year ago, it was suggested that the then newlyorganized Maryland Law Review might carry reviews ofthe Maryland Annotations to the Restatements promulgatedby the American Law Institute as they appeared, a face-tious colleague of the present reviewer's remarked that itwould be equally appropriate to review the telephone direc-tory or a mail order catalogue. But it was soon demon-strated that these local annotations provide sufficientmaterial for a reviewer's pen to dissect. The first numberof the REvEW carried a review' of the earlier publishedMaryland Annotations to the Restatement of Agency, whichcompilation, like the one now under discussion, was pre-pared by a member of the Law School faculty under BarAssociation auspices. In this earlier review a member ofthe local bar, himself active both in the work of the Amer-ican Law Institute nationally and in the Maryland annota-tion work, took occasion to describe the nature of the In-stitute, the scope of its work, and the significance of thelocal annotations.It is thus not necessary so soon to repeat the descriptionof what the Restatements are and why they were promul-gated. Suffice it to say that the Restatement of Conflict ofLaws was prepared by Professor Joseph H. Beale of theHarvard Law School as Reporter and, naturally, reflectsthe decided views of that pre-eminent authority in the field.Publication of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws hasbrought to a head the growing controversy over the generaldesirability of "restating" the law at all. A respectablylarge group of thinkers on matters legal hold to the viewthat the whole idea of restating the law is mistaken becauseOf the Baltimore City bar.1 Howard, review of Casner, Maryland Annotations to the American LawInstitute's Restatement of the Law of Agency (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 99.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWit will tend unnecessarily to "straight-jacket" the law.2Then there are those who believe that the Conflict of LawsRestatement's choice of doctrine too often reflects theReporter's own views rather than either the majority ruleor that which is the most desirable one. Considerable con-troversy has arisen, for instance, over one section' whereinthe Restatement adopts the view of the Reporter' ratherthan that of the Supreme Court of the United States5 on apoint where that Court has the final and only say in thematter.But it is not proposed to go further into this. To reviewa book devoted to local annotations of a general Restate-ment is to accept, for the sake of the argument at least, thepropriety of attempting and the validity of the executionof the general project which is annotated. Regardless ofwhat one thinks about the validity of the general idea ofRestatements, it cannot be denied that they have had thebeneficent influence of stimulating the production of theseorderly summaries of local materials on topics which, other-wise, would not have been so soon thus covered.Professor Reiblich (aided by a group of student andrecent graduate research assistants) prepared these anno-tations under the auspices (financial and otherwise) of theMaryland State and Baltimore City Bar Associations. Inmaking possible the production of such local annotations,the co-operating groups have made a double contributionto the legal scene. They have, in the first place, providedthemselves and their fellow lawyers with a means of accessto local materials which will facilitate the task of advisingclients and arguing cases. But they have, further, made acontribution the significance of which should not be under-estimated. This concerns the utility of the annotations inlaw teaching. Not only has the task of preparing themmade it possible for the group of research assistants to gainvaluable experience in legal research (akin to that affordedto student editors on the REvimw) but the finished productprovides for future generations of students an efficient2 A recent series of articles taking part in the controversy includes:Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (1935)83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 555; Goodrich, Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers(1936) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 449; Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Ob-servers: A reply to Dean Goodrich (1936) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 811.3 Sec. 113.' In connection with this see McClintock, Fault as an Element of DivorceJurisdiction (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 564, and Bingham, The American LawInstitute vs. The Supreme Court: In the matter of Haddock v. Haddock(1936) 21 Corn. L. J. 393.5 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867, 26 S. Ct. 525 (196).BOOK REVIEWSmeans of access to the Maryland materials. Such publica-tions make it possible effectually to present local materialswith a minimum of trouble. Thus there is easily left timefor the thorough indoctrination in the general common lawof the various subjects which is necessary if the graduatelawyer is to have more than a provincial viewpoint.The reviewer can testify both to the pedagogical utilityand the intrinsic merit of Professor Reiblich's compilationinasmuch as he was permitted access to the manuscript ofthese annotations as an aid in teaching the course tempo-rarily during the annotator's recent leave of absence fromthe Law School. The annotations proved invaluable inpresenting the local materials.That the Bar Associations have made such annotationspossible represents a commendable contribution which theleaders of the bar have made to the cause of legal educationand one which would justify the project even if there weredisregarded the equally significant fact that such annota-tions are extremely useful in the practice. Co-operationbetween the Bar Associations and the Law School in thismanner accomplishes an effectual liaison between the prac-tice of law and the training of neophytes-an end more thanever desirable of being attained now that the growing com-plexity of legal materials has forced legal education hitothe hands of specialists. A similarly appropriate contacthas been achieved through the co-operation of the Associa-tions and the Law School in the publication of the REVIEW,a contact which it is hoped will prove valuable both to theBar and to the School.Examination of Professor Reiblich's finished productshows how completely he has executed his task. Whenevera Maryland case or a statute has dealt with a propositioncovered by the Restatement, it is appropriately listed. Buthe did not stop with a mere counting of noses pro and con.On points where there was no square ruling of our Court besought out analogies from or hints given in cases or statuteswhich might, conceivably, be used as bearing on the pointannotated.Thus he points out6 that there is no Maryland case de-ciding whether or not to exercise the option allowed by theHaddock7 case to recognize all divorces granted at the6Sec. 113, pp. 64-5.' Supra note 5. It should be remembered that Sec. 113 of the Restate-ment takes a different view of the situation from the rule of the Haddockcase. See supra note 4. Mr. Reiblich's suggestion thus implies that Mary-land would recognize certain foreign divorces in situations where the Re-statement rule would not.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWdomicil of only one of the spouses. But he suggests thatthe Maryland courts should probably do so inasmuch asthey themselves will grant a divorce when only one of thespouses is domiciled locally. Then, again, in handling thetopic of territorial jurisdiction to annul marriages, it ispointed out8 that the Court of Appeals has never yetsquarely ruled what factors are necessary to confer suchjurisdiction although it has, in given cases, considered onthe merits cases for annulment where at least one spousewas domiciled in Maryland although the marriage was con-tracted elsewhere, or where, conversely, the marriage wasperformed in Maryland but neither spouse was here domi-ciled. From this his conclusion is that Maryland couldpossibly entertain annulment suits either on the basis ofdomicil or that of place of marriage, and even on the basisof personal jurisdiction. To do this would go farther thanthe Restatement rule which, in requiring the same basis asfor jurisdiction to divorce, calls for the domicile of at leastone party.These indirect methods of working out the Marylandrule were rendered inevitable by the paucity of the localmaterials on some points. They also attest the thorough-ness of the research which underlay the annotation and thecare used in handling the materials. They give one confi-dence in the completeness of the execution of the project.This is further bolstered by the fact that the annotatortook occasion to make careful analyses of local cases whichseemed to reach undesirable or aberrant results. There isa pointed treatment of the problem of local suits for foreignwrongful deaths,' a topic recently noted in this REvIEw,1and also recently subjected to statutory reform."' In treat-ing of the Corder2 and Elfont 8 cases he points out 4 that ineach case the Court of Appeals refused an opportunity tomake a square ruling on the matter of territorial jurisdic-tion to annul marriages, in the one instance by confusingthe plea to the jurisdiction with the matter of equitablejurisdiction to annul generally, and in the other by rulingthat the objection had been raised too late.Sec. 115, pp. 65-7.Secs. 391, 392, pp. 154-6.10 Note, Action in Maryland for Wrongful Death Caused and OccurringElsewhere (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 162.11 Acts, 1937, Ch. 495."Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 At. 119 (1922).MElfont v. Elfont, 161 Md. 458, 157 AtI. 741 (1932).2, p. 66.BOOK REVIEWSThe readers should share Mr. Reiblich's expressedgratitude to the New York annotators for granting theirpermission to use their collection of the United StatesSupreme Court materials which are applicable. Thus un-necessary duplication of effort was avoided and at the sametime these highly relevant materials were presented."Conflict of Laws is now so largely tending to become abranch of Constitutional Law that decisions of the SupremeCourt are of the highest importance in a local annotation.Cases from the Supreme Court are as much local law asthose from our own Court of Appeals and they were, quiteappropriately, included.With the outline already provided by the Restatement,and because of the disjointed text form involved in annota-tion matter, little opportunity was given to display traits oforganization and style. On the other hand the work doesdemonstrate qualities which may be involved in an annota-tion, viz., sound use of legal logic in analyzing the materials,accurate classification, and, through it all, an obviouslyvery thorough survey of all applicable authorities.-JOHN S. STRAHOR1, 'J1 It might have been well to have added a case from the Supreme Courtwhich is of local interest. Stewart v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 42L. Ed. 537, 18 S. Ct. 105 (1897) would have been relevant in connectionwith Davis v. Ruzicka, 183 AtI. 569 (Md. 1936), treated at Sections 391,392, pp. 154-6. As mentioned in the casenote cited supra note 10, 1 Md. L.Rev. 162, 163, Davis v. Ruzicka held that the wrongful death statutes ofMaryland and the District of Columbia were too dissimilar to permit anaction in Maryland for a death occurring in the District. In the Stewartcase, on the other hand, the Supreme Court, while adhering to the doctrineof similarity, held that the respective statutes were sufficiently similar topermit an action in the converse case of death in Maryland and suit in theDistrict. The Stewart case was cited under a neighboring section (See.395) but without reference to the point mentioned herein.* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. FacultyEditor of the Review.368

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Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 4 Article 7Annulment of Marriage for Duress Where Pre-marital Relations Have Occurred - Lurz v. LurzFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Family Law CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationAnnulment of Marriage for Duress Where Pre-marital Relations Have Occurred - Lurz v. Lurz, 1 Md. L. Rev. 348 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss4/7CASENOTES AND COMMENTSan active market value is shown, the average prices at whichsales are consummated, whether above or below asset value,cannot properly be ignored.A rule definitely fixing either asset value or marketvalue as the test to determine fair value clearly fails torecognize that value when applied to stocks is a combina-tion of many elements none of which can be ignored. Theultimate result must be an analysis of all existing elementsnot as entities but as relationships. The closer a court ap-proaches establishing a specific test the farther it will havestrayed from establishing the correct general test.ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR DURESS WHEREPRE-MARITAL RELATIONS HAVE OCCURRED-LURZ V. LURZ1Plaintiff-appellee-husband, through his father and nextfriend, filed a bill of complaint in equity against defendant-appellant-wife, seeking an annulment of their marriage.The bill alleged that, at a time when plaintiff was fifteenyears of age and defendant twenty, the latter "by solicita-tion and womanly arts" induced plaintiff frequently to co-habit with her with the result that, after about two years,she became pregnant; that after discovering this the de-fendant "threatened and coerced by deceit and fraud" theplaintiff into marrying her, the threats including a threatto have him arrested if he failed to support the child; thatthe plaintiff and defendant went to Ellicott City where thedefendant caused the plaintiff to "wait outside of a buildingin said city as he looked too young to have a marriagelicense issued" while she went into said building and pro-cured the license by perjured testimony as to plaintiff'sage; that before a minister in said city the parties wentthrough a "form of ceremony which the complainant nowunderstands and believes to have been the usual marriageceremony." The child was born seven or eight monthslater and the plaintiff's parents first learned of the mar-riage about a month and a half after the birth. The billwas filed six days after that and sought both an annulmentand that the infant child be maintained by plaintiff in ahome to be selected by the Court. From an order over-ruling her demurrer to the bill and directing her to answer,defendant appeals. Held, Affirmed and cause remanded1170 Md. 428, 184 AtI. 906, 185 AtI. 676 (dissenting opinion) (1936).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWfor further proceedings. The case was heard by all eightof the judges of the Court of Appeals. One judge fileda concurring opinion and two dissented, one of these byopinion. The Court held that while the burden of proofon the plaintiff may be high, yet the allegations of the billwere sufficient to require an answer and to permit of a trialon the merits.Jurisdiction to grant an annulment of marriage for theso-called "contract impediments" exists in a court of equitywithout the aid of any statute expressly conferring it, as anincident of the equitable jurisdiction to reform and rescindcontracts.2 Thus, upon appropriate proof, annulments maybe granted for lack of contractual intention,8 for insanity,"intoxication,5 fraud,6 and duress.7 The theory is that novalid marriage exists, either for lack of actual contractualintention, for lack of capacity to give a valid consent, orbecause the apparent consent was induced by fraud orduress and is, hence, no real consent at all. This last factorexplains annulments for fraud and/or duress.8 While thebill in the principal case alleged a combination of fraud and2 Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland 479, 483 (1828) ; Le Brun v. Le Brun, 55Md. 496, 502-503 (1881) ; Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 298, 29 Atl. 597 (1894).a Madden, Domestic Relations, See. 5; II Schouler, Domestic Relations,Sec. 1075; Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524 (1883) where the annulment wasdenied on the facts; Owings v. Owings, 141 Md. 416, 118 Atl. 858 (1922);Samuelson v. Samuelson, 155 Md. 639. 142 Ati. 97 (1928).'Madden, Domestic Relations, 23; II Schouler, Domestic Relations, Sees.1102-1104; Elfont v. Elfont, 161 Md. 458, 183 Atl. 555 (1931) ; see alsoAlexander's British Statutes, 1014, 15 Geo. II, c. 30 (1742), which as inter-preted provides that where a lunatic whose insanity has been establishedby inquisition marries before he shall be declared sane, "Every such mar-riage shall be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever." See38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818n, mental capacity to marry; 28 A. L. R. 641, 649n,mental capacity to marry; 40 L. R. A. 737, 744n, marriage of person whileinsane, L. R. A. 1916C, 703n, Marriage of mental incompetent as void orvoidable.' Madden, Domestic Relations, 27; II Schouler, Domestic Relations, Sec.1105; Montgomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md. 200, 122 At. 357 (1923).0 Madden, Domestic Relations, 13-22; II Schouler, Domestic Relations,Ch. X; Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 Atl. 114, 22 A. L. R. 810 (1922) ;Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 Atl. 119 (1922). See also Oswald v.Oswald, 146 Md. 313, 126 Ati. 81 (1924). As to what misrepresentationswill constitute fraud, see: 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 302 (disposition or generalcharacter) ; 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 997 (physical or mental condition) ; 11 A. L.R. 931 (existing pregnancy of wife).7Madden, Domestic Relations, 10-11; II Schouler, Domestic Relations,Sees. 1149-1150; Harlan, Domestic Relations, 32-33; Owings v. Owings, 141Md. 416, 118 Ati. 858 (1922); Wimbrough v. Wimbrough, 125 Md. 619, 94Atl. 168 (1915). As to what will constitute duress, see 27 L. R. A. (N. S.)803; 43 L. R. A. 816. As to whether such marriages are void or voidable,see L. R. A. 1916C, 706. As to whether marriage entered into to escapeprosecution for seduction may be annulled, see 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938.For cases where duress was exercised by a third party, see 62 A. L. R. 1482.II Schonller, Domestic Relations, See. 1187.CASENOTES AND COMMENTSduress, as a technical matter the latter is the more im-portant legal element in the case.With respect to duress generally, the Court of Appealshas said9 "the duress must exist at the time of the actualceremony, so as to disable the one interested from actingas a free agent, and protest must be made at that time"and1" "the force or duress must be also the directly induc-ing cause of entering into the marriage, and if a person, al-though threatened with violence, refuse to enter into themarriage by reason of such threats, and only consents tothe marriage after an appeal has been made to his honor,the marriage is valid."Where pre-marital relations have occurred between theparties (as in the principal case) the Court has stated thatthe burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff to prove theduress is very high. Quoting from two New Jersey cases,the Court has said" that if "ante-nuptial incontinence hastaken place, the charge of threat or menace unlawful, orfraud or duress, must be most fully and satisfactorily estab-li shed before the Court will annul the marriage," and thata complainant who seeks to bastardize "the fruit of the un-lawful communion . . . must prove his case with the ut-most strictness."This rule of the higher burden of proof where pre-marital relations had occurred might be paraphrased intohomelier language to the effect that "where the partiesought to be married they stay married." No doubt therule exists because of the equity in favor of a woman who,after being seduced and becoming pregnant, "shames" theman into marrying her. Most cases of annulment whereduress is charged involve the husband as plaintiff and theincident of pre-marital relations between the parties.Whether the higher burden of proof would be imposedsimply because of pre-marital relations not followed bypregnancy, or where the wife was plaintiff, is hard to esti-mate, for the reason that all of our reported cases have in-volved the husband as plaintiff and the pregnancy of thedefendant. Thus it cannot be determined whether the highburden of proof exists to protect a woman who has simplybeen betrayed or to protect the child of the union frombeing bastardized. The language of the cases seems to in-dicate that it would be imposed in either event.I Owings v. Owings, 141 Md. 416, 419, 118 AtI. 858, 859 (1922).10 Ibid, 141 Md. 419, 118 At. 860.12 Ibid, 141 Md. 420, 118 AtI. 860.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWNo doubt the plaintiff in the principal case stressed thefactor of his having been seduced by the woman as a cogentfact to put her in a bad light and deprive her of the normalsympathy existing in favor of a seduced woman who is latersued for annulment for duress. It was probably contem-plated that the fact of her womanly wiles and the plaintiff'simmaturity would serve to put the parties on a par withrespect to the equities of the case and the problem of proof.The dissenting opinion disposed of the plaintiff's allegationthat he had been "seduced" by the "womanly arts of thedefendant" by saying that such an "excuse" had "been inconstant use since Eve tempted Adam with the apple andis quite threadbare." 2 Be that as it may, both the major-ity and the concurring opinions indicated no lessening ofthe usual high burden of proof in cases of duress involvingpre-marital relations. The concurring opinion was spe-cifically put on the difficulty of proof of the allegations.One point of difference between the majority and thedissenting opinions was whether the threat to have plaintiffarrested if he did not support the expected child constitutedan actionable duress. While the majority opinion did notspecifically rule that it would be duress, yet it said: "Theaverment as to her threat of sending the plaintiff to jail,which could not have been enforced at the time of the mar-riage (citing the Allen case'" and the applicable statute 4 )was sufficiently definite to apprise the defendant as to theground of the alleged fraudulent coercion." The dissent-ing opinion aptly disposed of this point by pointing out that"he could not support the child until after it was born, sothat her statement was in entire accord with the statutorylaw of this state."It would seem that a threat to do that which the law per-mits could not be considered an actionable duress in thelight of the language of the Wimbrough case to the effectthat "where a man marries to escape arrest or imprison-ment for seduction or bastardy he cannot avoid the mar-riage on the ground of duress, nor is a marriage inducedby threats of lawful prosecution, arrest or imprisonment,to redress or punish a wrong, open to impeachment on thatground."' 5  Unless we treat the majority's point as in-12 170 Md. 435, 185 At. 678.1s Allen v. State, 128 Md. 265, 97 Atl. 362 (1916).1' Md. Code and Md. Code Supp., Art. 12.1 This rule seems to be in accord with the weight of authority, see Mad-den, Domestic Relations, 12; II Schouler, Domestic Relations, Sec. 1150;16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938.CASENOTES AND COMMENTSvolving the possibility that the defendant fraudulently per-suaded the plaintiff to believe that he could immediately(during the pregnancy) have been arrested, it would seemthat the dissenting opinion the better reflects the law on thepoint. While fraudulent representations as to matters oflaw are usually held not actionable, yet the Corder case16had decided that fraudulent representations as to theparties being old enough to obtain a marriage license,among other things, were sufficient for an annulment forfraud.The majority and the dissenting opinions also disagreedon the matter of laches. The majority held the defenseof laches not to be sustainable in the case while the dis-senting opinion contended that the husband's wait for al-most a year was entitled to consideration as showing hisacquiescence. The dissenting opinion said that the dili-gence of the parents could not compensate for the infanthusband's delay. This makes one wonder if it be the law ofMaryland that an infant may, at one and the same time, beincapable of litigating in his own right and yet be capableof committing laches therein?The dissenting opinion doubted the relevancy of theCorder case, which the majority opinion cited. It wouldseem that the Corder case has little application. In thatcase the annulment was granted for false representationsas to past moral character and as to the capacity of theparties to get a marriage license without parental consent.There were no such representations of the former type inthis case and there could have been none of the latter typefor the reason that plaintiff knew he was too young to geta license without parental consent as he alleged that hewaited outside while defendant got the license, for fearthat his appearance would excite suspicion.This latter fact would also seem aptly to dispose ofplaintiff's contention that he did not understand the natureof the marriage ceremony." The dissenting opinion wentinto an aspect of this by saying: "His statement that hedid not understand what the ceremony was is wholly in-consistent with his statement that he was induced to gothrough it by threats of imprisonment."The dissenting opinion indicates a view that plaintiff hasplaced himself in an unfavorable light by asking for the an-'e Corder v. Corder, supra note 6.As to mistake as to the nature of the ceremony, see Madden, DomesticRelations, 9. Samuelson v. Samuelson, atupra note 3.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWnulment, which would bastardize the child, and then askingto have it remain in his custody. But quaere, does the billspecifically ask that plaintiff have the custody of the childlIt asks that it be placed in a home to be selected by theCourt, where plaintiff may maintain it. This is susceptibleof the construction that plaintiff is willing to support thechild while in the custody of another. If so, this puts himin a slightly more favorable light than the dissent indicates.One wonders if it be the law of Maryland that the only waythe father of an illegitimate child may show interest in itswelfare is by marrying and staying married to the mother ?One inconsistency appears in the dissenting opinion.The marriage license was allegedly secured by perjury asto plaintiff's age, he being under the age as of which heshould have obtained a license without parental consent."8The dissenting opinion pointed out that this fact would notof itself affect the validity of the marriage performed underthe license, however secured. While no Maryland case hasyet squarely decided that the fact of one of the parties beingbelow the age for parental consent (18 for females"0 and 21for males) does not affect the validity of the marriage, yetit has been assumed in Maryland, because of the similarrule in Anglo-American jurisdictions generally, that therequirement of parental consent is directory rather thanmandatory (lay belief to the contrary) so that if partiesunder that age actually are married by a proper ceremonythe marriage is valid.2 ° This would seem to follow fromthe Feehley" case which decided that a marriage (ofadults) without any license at all was nevertheless valid.2If a marriage without any license may be valid, so shouldone with a license that had been improperly secured withoutrequisite parental consent and by perjury as to the ages ofthe parties. Thus it is that the fact of one of the partiesbeing under the age for parental consent does not affectthe marriage. This would also seem to follow from theCorder case, where the annulment was granted, not becauseMd. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 7.1 9 Another Maryland statute Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 363, enacted beforethe statute requiring parental consent for the issuance of a marriagelicense to those under age, punishes a minister who marries a female under16 or a male under 21 without parental consent.2 0 Madden, Domestic Relations, 65; Payne v. Payne, 295 Fed. 970 (Ct. ofApp. of D. C. 1924).21 Feehley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 99 Atl. 663, L. R. A. 1917C, 1017(1916).2 Consider Madden's comment on the Feehley case, Madden, DomesticRelations, 65,CASENOTES AND COMMENTSthe parties were actually below the age for parental consent(which was lacking), but on the basis of the defendant'sfraudulent representations that they could secure the li-cense without the parental consent. Surely the Courtwould not have gone to the trouble of putting the case onthe more difficult ground of fraud if the law were that non-age as such affected the validity of the marriage.But then the dissenting opinion in the principal casewent on to say that "the only possible ground for an annul-ment would be the non-age of the complainant, Albert, whichwould make the marriage not void, but voidable."23 It isbard either to see the consistency of this statement withthe former one, or to find authority for it.2" The only ruleof "non-age" affecting the validity of marriages is thecommon law one setting up the ages of 12 for girls and 14for boys, above which marriages otherwise properly per-formed (in Maryland by religious ceremony) are completelyvalid.25  To the knowledge of the writer, no Maryland caseor statute has altered this common law rule. Both partiesat the time of the marriage were well above these ages andso it would seem that there is no ground of non-age avail-able when we remember, as the dissenting opinion did, thatthe statutory ages for parental consent of 18 and 21 havereference only to whether the license ought to issue and notto the validity of the marriage performed under the licenseor without one.If we view the bill of complaint as a whole, it might besaid that the dissenting opinion represents the preferableview, i. e., that no case for an annulment is made out. Onthe other hand if we visualize the possibility of sufficientproof being adduced under the bill to make a case of fraudu-lent coercion, then it would seem that the majority was cor-rect in ordering the case to be tried on its merits.28 170 Md. 438, 185 Atl. 679.24 Occasional statements in cases and texts seemingly holding that thefact of one of the parties being below the age defeats the validity of themarriage turn out, on examination, to involve statutory rules raising thecommon law "ages of consent" from 12 for females and 14 for males tohigher ages, rather than setting up a requirement of parental consent forthe issuance of the license, as is the Maryland situation. To be sure, clearcut expression by the legislature of an intention to have parental consentmandatory would make the rule otherwise than is the situation now inMaryland.15 See Long, Domestic Relations (3rd Ed.), Sec. 27 for a treatment of thecommon law ages.

Annulment of Marriage for Duress Where Pre-marital Relations Have Occurred - Lurz v. Lurz

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 3 Article 8Need for Corroboration of Plaintiff in a Suit forAlimony Without Divorce. Roeder V. RoederFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Family Law CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationNeed for Corroboration of Plaintiff in a Suit for Alimony Without Divorce. Roeder V. Roeder, 1 Md. L. Rev. 266 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss3/8CASENOTES AND COMMENTSNEED FOR CORROBORATION OF PLAINTIFF IN ASUIT FOR ALIMONY WITHOUT DIVORCE.ROEDER V. ROEDER'Plaintiff-appellee-wife filed suit against defendant-ap-pellant-husband, alleging abandonment and desertion, andasking for alimony without divorce. The trial court foundthe allegations proven and, by two separate decrees,awarded the wife alimony. The husband appealed fromboth decrees, basing his'appeals on an alleged lack of cor-roboration of the plaintiff-wife's testimony. The Court ofAppeals affirmed both decrees. Held: Where permanentalimony without divorce is sought the same requirements asto proof, including corroboration, are necessary as whereeither type of divorce is sought, but where there is noappearance of collusion, little corroborative evidence isrequired to satisfy the statute.In Maryland a wife may be awarded alimony withoutdivorce whenever she wotild be entitled either to a divorcea mensa et thoro or one a vinculo matrizonii' Further it1 170 Md. 579, 185 Ati. 458 (1936).2 A statement in the principal case gives the impression that alimonywithout divorce may be obtained only for grounds for an a mcna di-vorce: "In this case the allegations of the bill, in order to support a de-mand for alimony or separate maintenance, there being no prayer fordivorce, must be such as would entitle the plaintiff to a divorce a inensaet thoro, if such relief had been prayed .. " 170 Md. 579, 581, 185 Atl. 458,459. This statement was so summarized in the syllabi by the reporters bothfor the Maryland Reports and Atlantic Reporter versions of the case asto give the impression that the case holds that separate maintenance maybe obtained only for grounds for partial divorce. If this be a correct in-terpretation of the case then It is inconsistent with a long line of earliercases either holding or stating that grounds for either type of divorcewill suffice for alimony without divorce.Stewart v. Stewart, 105 Md. 297, 66 Atl. 16, (1907), held that while adul-tery (there ruled to be a ground only for absolute divorce) could not beused as a ground for partial divorce, yet it could be a ground for alimonywithout divorce.In Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 Ati. 605 (1936), separate mainte-nance was sought for impotency, which Is a ground only for an a vinculodivorce. While the Court denied the relief sought on another point, yetit was taken for granted that impotency could be, in a proper case, aground for separate maintenance. The Court expressly said that sepa-rate maintenance could be secured for any grounds sufficient for eithertype of divorce.In Cohen v. Cohen, 170 Md. 630, 187 Ati. 104 (1936), the grounds allegedfor alimony were grounds for partial divorce, yet the Court said thatgrounds for either type of divorce would suffice. While most of the otherMaryland cases on separate maintenance have, so it happens, involvedallegations of grounds for partial divorce, yet numerous statements incases both before and after the Roeder case have indicated that alimonyalone may also be obtained for grounds which are grounds only for ab-solute divorce. A similar careless statement limiting alimony to groundsMARYLAND LAW REVIEWis provided by Article 35, Section 4 of the Code that nodivorce shall be granted upon the testimony of the plaintiffalone, without corroboration. Thus the question ariseswhether, in a suit for alimony alone without divoice, reliefmay be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony of theplaintiff. Such a suit is not a suit for divorce in the strictsense and yet it must be based on a situation entitling theplaintiff-wife to a divorce, should she elect to sue for it.The question is whether the requirement of corroborationis a mere procedural matter, applying only to nominaldivorce suits, or is a matter of substance, affecting the rightto the divorce, with the result that it impliedly carries overinto suits for alimony alone (separate maintenance). Thereis no express mention of the need for corroboration in thestatute governing separate maintenance suits.The Maryland cases prior to the Roeder case were atloggerheads on the instant point. In Heinmuller v. Hein-muller, it is said: "when the whole case precludes . . . anypossibility of collusion, the corroboration need be slight."In Silverberg v. Silverberg,- it is said:" . . . the wife mustbear . . . the obligation imposed by the statute that her owntestimony will not be sufficient without corroboration." InWiegand v. Wiegand,5 it is said: " . . . the rule prescribedby Art. 35, Sec. 4, Code, it not applicable to a proceeding forseparate maintenance. . . ." In Engelberth v. Engelberth,it is said: "If Code, Art. 35, Sec. 4, requiring corroborationof the husband's or wife's testimony is applicable to a pro-ceeding by a wife for separate maintenance, the corrobora-tion need be but slight, the nature of the proceeding beingsuch as to exclude the idea of collusion."Thus the Roeder case is seen to follow and mingle thepronouncements in the Heinmuller and Silverberg casesand, in fact, quotes from the latter case. The Roeder casediffers entirely from the Wiegand case and slightly from theEngelberth case in that the Engelberth case assumes thatcollusion is impossible in any separate maintenance casewhereas the Roeder case purports to find an absence offor partial divorce only appears in Wiegand v. Wiegand, 155 Md. 643, 648,142 Atl. 188, 190 (1928) to the effect that ". . . the grounds for relief insuch a proceeding are the same as those required for a divorce a mensaet thoro."In general on the question, see Md. Code, Art. 16, See. 14; and Outlawv. Outlaw, 118 Md. 498, 84 At. 743 (1912).o 133 Md. 491, 494, 105 Atl. 745, 746 (1919).'148 Md. 682, 690, 130 Atl. 325, 328 (1925).155 Md. 643, 648, 142 Atl. 188, 190 (1928).* 159 Md. 700, 150 AtI. 271 (1930) (Memo. op.-quotation from syllabusin Maryland Reports).267CASENOTES AND COMMENTScollusion from a subjective examination of the evidence inthe case. ("The evidence in this case shows that there wasno appearance whatsoever of collusion." 7) Thus it assumesthat there might be, in a given case, a collusive suit forseparate maintenance.If the rationale of the rule of corroboration is solely theavoidance of collusive divorces then it would seem that theproper rule should be one which goes even farther than thatof the Engelberth case and to the extreme of the Wiegandcase, viz., to dispense entirely with the need for corrobora-tion of the plaintiff in separate maintenance suits. For it ishard to conceive of there ever being a collusive suit for ali-mony alone without divorce. Collusion implies that bothplaintiff and defendant want the relief sought. In absolutedivorce cases collusion implies a desire for the right to re-marry. But in a separate maintenance case the defendantis subjected to monetary liability without gaining the rightto re-marry. Thus it would seem unfortunate to attempt toresolve the dilemma in terms of a subjective investigationof the evidence in each case to find out if collusion was pres-ent. Such a step is, of course, appropriate in suits for abso-lute divorce, as such, where the prospect of the defendant'sremarrying affords him an incentive for collusion.But the question next arises whether the sole or prin-cipal basis of the rule of corroboration is the avoidance ofcollusion. Our Court of Appeals has assumed this to be soboth in divorce cases and in separate maintenance cases,including the Roeder case, where it is said :8 . . . the Act...was intended principally to prevent collusion... "But it can be argued that there is a parallel and equallyimportant basis for the rule of corroboration in divorcecases which throws more light on the problem of the Roedercase than does the policy of avoiding collusion. This is thepolicy of avoiding perjured or "framed" suits for divorceand/or alimony where the defendant, far from colluding inthe case, is being imposed on wrongfully and resists com-pletely. The social problem of the collusive divorce is nomore serious than that of the obtaining of divorces byperjury against the wishes of the defendants, where nogrounds for divorce exist. On the alimony side there is theproblem of the "gold digger" type of wife who wishes to besupported in ease without having to live with the husbandwho provides the support..170 Md. 579, 584, 185 A. 458, 461.s Ibid.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWIt would seem that the rule of corroboration in divorcecases as well seeks to avoid the plaintiff's imposing aperjured case on the defendant as to avoid both partiesimposing a collusive case on the court. If this be so, therule of corroboration of divorce plaintiffs could be com-pared to the Statute of Frauds which, by another device--that of requiring a writing-seeks to avoid "framed" cases.As further indicating that the rule in divorce cases has thissecond policy we should consider that it is found in theCode in the same Article and Section, and even in the samesentence and clause, with two other rules of corroborationwhere the sole danger sought to be avoided is that of theperjured or "framed" case. The corroboration statuteprovides, in that order, that the plaintiff must be corrobor-ated in cases of adultery, divorce, and breach of promise ofmarriage. Thus the divorce rule is sandwiched betweentwo others where the sole danger is the trumped up case,viz., suits for criminal conversation and suits for breach ofpromise.9The gravity of the danger of trumped up suits of thelatter two types is well illustrated by the fact that a fewAmerican states have abolished such causes of action, be-cause they have been so frequently used as devices of black-mail.10 That the rule in divorce cases is found groupedalong with these other two rules would seem to indicatethat the Legislature intended the avoidance of "framed"divorce and alimony cases to be one of the objects of theAct.It would seem that cases of alimony without divorce lendthemselves readily to trumped up charges whereby unscrup-ulous wives may be enabled to secure comfortable supportwithout performing any marital duties and without losingtheir rights in the husband's property. If one may believethe popular journals, alimony is tending to become a"racket" in America. If this be so, the strict applicationof the rule of corroboration would seem to be one way ofavoiding this.' Then, too, the corroboration statute immediately adjoins in the Codeanother statutory rule of evidence, Md. Code, Art. 35, Sec. 3, which alsoseeks to avoid the danger of a trumped up case. This is the statute, some-times called the "Dead Man Statute", which with certain exceptions ex-cludes the testimony of interested survivors as to transactions with de-ceased persons or with persons incompetent to testify because of mentaldisability.10-A move toward the same end in the Maryland Legislature of 1935failed of enactment.269CASENOTES AND COMMENTSIf the rule of corroboration in divorce cases has these twoalternative policies it would seem that the one to emphasizein the separate maintenance cases is the one involving thedanger that is likely to be present, i. e., a trumped upcharge, rather than the one involving a danger impossibleof being involved, viz., collusion.Thus it would seem that, rather than to grant relief tothe wife on but slight corroboration, as the Heinmuller,Engelberth and Roeder cases permit, or to require no cor-roboration, as does the Wiegand case, the rule should be togive full and vigorous effect to the statement in the Silver-berg case, standing alone, and to require corroboration tothe utmost, in view of the fact that one of the two dangerssought to be avoided by the rule is present in separate main-tenance cases as much as is ever likely. If the requirementof corroboration is generally sound it would seem appro-priate to demand it to the utmost in separate maintenancecases where collusion is entirely unlikely but where moti-vated false accusations are very likely. It does not disposeof the problem to repeat the shibboleth, appropriate enoughfor divorce cases as such, that if the nature of the case pre-cludes collusion the corroboration need be but slight. Thereis more to the problem than the danger of collusion.FURTHER CONCERNING THE DOUBLE LIABILITYOF BANK STOCKHOLDERS. STOCKHOLDERSOF PEOPLE'S BANKING CO. V. STERLING(GHINGHER V. BACHTELL)'In a case' previously noted in the REVIEW8 the Court ofAppeals of Maryland reversed the trial court and held itproper to assess "double liability" against bank stock-holders for debts of the bank incurred prior to their becom-ing owners of the stock. The stockholders appealed to theSupreme Court of the United States alleging that the applic-able statute, as interpreted by the Maryland Court, im-1 57 S. Ct. 386 (1937). The companion case of Stockholders of Hagers-town Bank and Trust Co. v. Sterling was decided in the same opinion.9 Ghingher v. Bachtell, 169 Md. 678, 182 Atl. 558 (sub nom. Ghingher v.Stockholders of People's Banking Co.) (1936). The companion case in theMaryland Court of Appeals was Ghingher v. Kausler, 169 Md. 696, 182 Atl.566 (sub norm. Ghingher v. Stockholders of Hagerstown Bank and TrustCo.) (1936).8 Note, Double Liability of a bank stockholder for a debt of the bank in-curred before his ownership of the stock (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 95.

Need for Corroboration of Plaintiff in a Suit for Alimony Without Divorce. Roeder V. Roeder

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 3 Article 6Effect of Bankruptcy Discharge on Revocation ofMotor Vehicle Operator's License for Failure toSatisfy Judgment. Ellis V. Rudy, CommissionerFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Bankruptcy Law CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationEffect of Bankruptcy Discharge on Revocation of Motor Vehicle Operator's License for Failure to Satisfy Judgment. Ellis V. Rudy, Commissioner,1 Md. L. Rev. 259 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss3/6MARYLAND LAW REVIEWstockholders are readjusted, by amendment, consolidationor otherwise, to the advantage of a controlling group orclass, it is believed that a court of equity may inquire intothe fairness of the proposed change and whether it servesthe interests of the corporation as a whole.20 Clearly, ifthe unfairness of the plan is so gross and apparent as toconstitute fraud, the courts will interfere in spite of theadoption of the plan in strict accordance with statutory andcharter provisions."EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE ON REVO-CATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR'SLICENSE FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY JUDG-MENT. ELLIS V. RUDY, COMMISSIONER.1The petitioner-appellant's license to operate a motorvehicle in the State of Maryland was suspended by the ap-pellee-Commissioner of Motor Vehicles because he failed"to satisfy a final judgment against him for damages onaccount of personal injury resulting from the ownership,maintenance, use or operation of a motor vehicle," within30 days after it became final, as required by the MarylandFinancial Responsibility Law. Later the petitioner wasadjudicated a bankrupt and was granted a discharge inbankruptcy. This was admittedly a defense to any fur-ther action on the judgment. Petitioner applied for reissueof his license on furnishing proof of financial responsibility.The Commissioner refused on the ground that the statuterequires the license to remain suspended while the judg-ment is "unstayed, unsatisfied and subsisting and until" it"is satisfied or discharged and until proof of ability to re-spond in damages for future accidents is furnished" andheld that a discharge in bankruptcy is not a satisfaction ofthe judgment within the contemplation of the Act. Thepetitioner brought a proceeding for a writ of mandamusto compel the reissue of the license. The trial court sus-tained a demurrer to the petition and petitioner appealed.HELD: Reversed and remanded for issuance of writ.20 See authorities cited Brune, op cit., p. 82.*1 See Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 88, 141 Atl. 425(1928) ; Mortgage Bond Assn. v. Baker, 157 Md. 809, 145 Atl. 876 (1929);Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 155 Md. 549, 142 Atl. 885 (1928).2- Md. -, 189 AtI. 281 (1937).$Md. Code Supp., Art. 56, Sees. 187 to 18TR, Inel.CASENOTES AND COMMENTSThe Court expressly reserved its opinion on the generalvalidity of the statute, because upon their construction of itthe petitioner was entitled to his license. In view of theCourt's reservation of opinion, the validity of any provisionin the financial responsibility laws relating to motoristsmay be subjected to future judicial scrutiny.Apart from the question of bankruptcy, the validity ofa statute requiring a judgment debtor motorist to satisfya judgment within certain limits on condition of forfeitureof his license to operate or permission to own a motorvehicle is usually upheld as a valid exercise of the state'spolice power and authority over the public highways.' So,too, statutory provisions requiring proof of financial abilityto respond in damages as a condition to receipt of a licenseto operate or register a car have been favorably reviewedin advisory opinions of the highest courts of Massachusettsand New Hampshire' and seem not to have been attacked.The question of financial responsibility of motorists torespond in damages to the public has received the attentionof several state legislatures.5 Some States require proofof financial responsibility only of those persons deemedmost likely to be involved in accidents. Others requireproof of financial responsibility both from such personsand those who have caused motor vehicle accidents withoutsatisfying judgments based thereon. Maryland" and NewYork' are in this class. In addition, these statutes providethat the judgment debtor must "satisfy" a prior judgmentarising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. Still otherjurisdictions (Massachusetts and England 9) have gone theentire way by requiring proof of financial ability to re-spond in damages of every motorist before he is permittedto drive a motor vehicle. In the principal case the court3 See Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481(1931) ; Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680 (1925). Munzv. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1933) ; Garford Trucking, Inc.,v. Hoffman, 177 Atl. 882 (N. J. 1935) ; State v. Price, 63 Pac. (2) 653 (Ariz.1937) ; Sheehan v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 140 Cal. App. 200, 35 Pac.(2) 359 (1934).1 Opinion of the Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 AtlI. 117, 39 A. L. R. 1023(1925) ; Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680 (1925) ; andsee Opinion of the Justices, 171 N. E. (Mass.) 294, 69 A. L. R. 388 (1930):Commonwealth v. Funk, 186 At. 65 (Pa. 1936).5 See Heyting, Automobiles and Compulsory Liability Insurance (1930)16 A. B. A. J. 362.6 See e. g. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) Sees. 1561, 1590, 1609, as amendedby Conn. Pub. Acts 1931, Sees. 294a-300a; N. J. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1930),Sees. 135, 119, 128, as amended by N. J. Laws 1930, c. 267, id. 1931, c. 169.'Md. Code Supp., Sees. 187A, 187B.8 N. Y. Cons. Laws, c. 71, "Vehicle & Traffic Laws," Sec. 94-B.* Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 90, Sees. 84A44J; id. c. 175, See. 118A;20 and 21 Geo. V., c. 48, Sees. 85-88 (1930).260-MARYLAND LAW REVIEWholds that construing the statute so as to require the sus-pension of license to continue after discharge in bankruptcywill frustrate the purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.This purpose is to release the bankrupt from all of hisprovable debts1 ° and to relieve the honest debtor from theweight of oppressive indebtedness in order to enable himthereafter to begin afresh free from obligations and liabili-ties that have become heavier than he could discharge.The Court construed the act so as to avoid the conflict sincethere was no unequivocal expression of a different intentionby the legislature.An act of the General Assembly12 now awaiting the Gov-ernor's approval specifically declares that "discharge inbankruptcy or under insolvency proceedings shall not re-lieve such person . . . from the obligation to satisfy suchjudgment before having his license renewed." If ap-proved, its validity under the Federal Constitution 8 maybe questioned, in view of the policy of the Congress asdeclared in the Bankruptcy Act. There is a conflict in thedecisions of the federal district courts of New York on thevalidity of a similar provision in the Laws of New York.14In Re Perkins," a decision by a single judge sitting in bank-ruptcy, restrained a judgment creditor from transmittingai copy of an unsatisfied judgment to the Commissioner ofMotor Vehicles. Munz v. Harnett" in which a three judgecourt convened pursuant to Section 266 of the JudicialCode17 refused to restrain the Commissioner from suspend-ing the plaintiff's chauffeur's license and owner's registra-tion certificate upon receipt of properly certified copies ofa judgment record showing that an unsatisfied judgmentarising out of a motor vehicle accident was outstandingagainst him.A discharge in bankruptcy has never been regarded as asatisfaction of a judgment, but only bars the judgmentcreditor's civil remedies to collect.18  The Financial Re-10 Bankruptcy Act, Sees. 1 (12), 17 (U. S. 0., Title 11, Sees. 1 (12), 35).11 Williams v. U. S, F. & G., 236 U. S. 549, 59 L. Ed. 713, 35 S. Ct. 289(1915).12 Md. Laws, 1937, Ch. 30; Md. H. B. 20, 1937 Session.Is "The Congress shall have the power . . . to establish a uniform ruleof naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies through-out the United States." U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8.1 4 N. T. Vehicle & Traffic Law, Sec. 94B.15 3 F. Supp. 697 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1933).166 F. Supp. 158 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1933).17 U S. C., Title 28, Sec. 380.18 Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U. S. 559, 29 L. Ed. 994, 6 S. Ct. 855(1886) ; and see cases cited by Parke, J. in Ellis v. Rudy, 189 Atl. 281, note3, p. 283.CASENOTES AND COMMENTSsponsibility statute does not require the judgment debtorto pay in spite of his discharge, but provides that he shallnot drive or own a car unless he does pay. It is defendedon the ground that it will tend to cause owners and oper-ators of motor vehicles to take pains to avoid having judg-ments for negligent driving entered against them. This isexpected to reduce casualties on the road.1" The statutehas a tendency to require persons of inadequate means totake out insurance, without going to the ultimate extremeof requiring compulsory insurance of everyone, regardlessof his financial responsibility. This policy, too, is re-garded as proper.20 A decision21 holding invalid a cityordinance requiring dismissal of any employee who failedto pay a judgment outstanding against him, irrespectiveof a discharge in bankruptcy, is clearly distinguishable,because "the ability to pay debts in general has no relationto the qualifications of the bankrupt as a fireman. Thestatute does not say that no discharged bankrupt shall drivean automobile. " 2 2Compare the decision of the Supreme Court holding in-valid a state law enforcing an assignment of future wagesto secure a debt after the debtor has been discharged ofthat debt in bankruptcy.3 The pending statutory provi-sion purporting to change the rule of the principal case isprobably constitutional.24  But quaere if the present addi-tional requirement that the motorist must also furnishproof of financial responsibility if he satisfies the judgmentafter 30 days, but not if he does so within 30 days,25 is valid.Perhaps reasonable promptness in satisfying judgmentsis as good a tangible manifestation of ability to do so aswould be the filing of a policy of liability insurance.19 Munz v. Harnett, 8upra note 16 at 160.20 Supra note 3.21 In Re Hicks, 133 Fed. 739 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1905).2 Patterson, J. in Munz v. Harnett, supra note 16 at 161.23 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 78 L. Ed. 1230, 54 S. Ct. 695(1934). Reviewed In (1934) 21 Va. L. Rev. 220.1'See (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 870; (1933) 43 Yale L. J. 344; (1934) 19Cornell L. Q. 278; (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 277.Is Md. Code Supp., Art. 56, Sec. 187B.262

Effect of Bankruptcy Discharge on Revocation of Motor Vehicle Operator\u27s License for Failure to Satisfy Judgment. Ellis V. Rudy, Commissioner

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 2 Article 10Book ReviewsFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted forinclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contactsmccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationBook Reviews, 1 Md. L. Rev. 181 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss2/10Book ReviewsUNCOMMON LAw. By A. P. Herbert. Doubleday Doran& Co. 1936. Pp. xvii, 298.A shocking blast of fresh air is brought into the stuffyatmosphere of legal procedure (and substance) by this keen,scholarly, and satirical volume by A. P. Herbert. Mr.Herbert, now Member of Parliament for the University ofOxford, has for years engaged in the pleasant task of writ-ing "Misleading Cases" for publication in Punch, and thesecases have been collected into one volume under the title"Uncommon Law".No lawyer, however fundamentally he may believe, withMr. Gilbert, that"The law is the embodimentOf everything that is excellent",can fail to be both stimulated and amused by the skill withwhich Mr. Herbert parodies the opinions of the learnedjudges of England in deciding fictitious cases, the facts ofwhich he has invented in order to draw attention to someparticularly ridiculous, obsolete, or unjust doctrine of thelaw, or to assert the rights of the citizen against the manytentacled-monster known in England as the "Crown" andin this country as the "Government ".The American lawyer, having for years had dinned intohis ears the (probable and/or possible) truths that in mat-ters of procedure the English courts are far in advance ofour own, and in matters of substance Parliament enactslegislation that is far more logical, sensible and workablethan the horrid product of our statesmen in Congress as-sembled, cannot fail to rejoice when he reads a passage suchas the following from the opinion of the Lord Chancellor inSparrow v. Pipp:"Nearly all the laws recently enacted by Parliamentare vexatious and foolish, yet we are expected to en-force them as jealously as if they were necessary andgood. My Lords, we are venerable, dignified and wise,superior in almost every respect to the elected legis-lators of the House of Commons, yet like the rest of HisMajesty's judges, we find ourselves in the position ofhired dispensers, compelled continually to dispense theprescriptions of a crazy doctor, which they know to beineffective and even poisonous."BOOK REVIEWSThe principal theme of the book is stated by his Lordshipearlier in the same case:"I am not willing to be bound hand and foot by theobservations of Lord Mildew made in the year 1834....So long as I sit upon the Woolsack, whenever an appealdiscloses a divergence between the Common Law andcommon sense, it will be my practice to be guided by thelatter."The character who bears the burden of this struggle isone Albert Haddock, described by Mr. Justice Radish, as "apertinacious litigant whom we are always glad to see."Besides Mr. Haddock's difficulties with his neighbors, trafficpolicemen, and the public generally, his principal grievancesare against the Income Tax Commissioners. Mr. Haddockis an author, and, believing that his brains and nervous sys-tem constitute his manufacturing plant, no less than do thefactory and equipment of a soap manufacturer, he appliesto the court for an order requiring the Commissioners notonly to allow him an annual deduction from his gross incomefor depreciation upon them, but also to allow him, as ex-penses of his business, sums expended on doctor's accounts,sunlight treatment, nourishing foods, and champagne, andupon necessary holidays at Monte Carlo:"If. it is proper", argues Mr. Haddock, "for thesoap manufacturer to be relieved in respect to the wearand tear of his machinery and the renewal thereof(which money can easily buy) how much more consid-eration is owing to the delicate and irreplaceable mech-anism of the writer."The Court (Radish, J.) allows Mr. Haddock's appeal,and, as in another case, states that:"The nation has to thank Mr. Haddock, not for thefirst time, for his enterprise and public spirit."In the opinion of this reviewer, the decision is sound andapplies equally well to lawyers.On another occasion, again in dispute with the IncomeTax Commissioners, Mr. Haddock received a formal "De-mand and Final Notice" for payment of a disputed item,which notice concluded with the statement that if the amountshould not be paid within seven days, steps would be takenfor its recovery by distraint, with costs. Mr. Haddock wasadvised that a statute of Queen Elizabeth punishes as afelon, guilty of blackmail:MARYLAND LAW REVIEW"A person, who, knowing the contents, sends ordelivers a letter or writing demanding, with menacesand without reasonable cause, any chattel, money orother property."He therefore immediately instituted criminal proceedingsagainst the Collector (Rex v. Puddle) and was triumphantlysuccessful. The jury eagerly found the Collector guilty,whereupon Trout, J. sentenced him to penal servitude forlife and congratulated Mr. Haddock.Mr. Haddock's most remarkable exploit, again in con-troversy with the Income Tax Commissioners, was to paya disputed item by means of a check consisting of writingupon the back of a cow. Obtaining no satisfaction from hismany complaints for relief, Mr. Haddock finally purchaseda white cow, and had clearly stenciled in red ink upon herback and sides the following words:"To the London & Literary Bank, Ltd.,"Pay the Collector of Taxes, who is no gentleman, ororder,The sum of Fifty Seven Pounds (and may he rot!)ALBERT HADDOCK. "He thereupon affixed the statutory revenue stamp for nego-tiable instruments to her horn, cancelled the stamp, led thecow through the streets of London, and tendered her to theCollector in full payment of his tax. Mr. Haddock arguedthat there was nothing requiring a check to be written ona piece of paper of specified size, and since he had oftenwritten checks on the back of menus, upon napkins, or on thebacks of labels of wine bottles, why not upon the back of acow?The discussion and decision relative to the juridicalstatus of this alleged negotiable cow may be left to thosesufficiently interested to delve further into this reconditequestion.That the learned author is alive also to the realities ofmodern law practice is illustrated by the following quotationfrom an opinion of Juice, J.:"This dispute, as is usual at the present time, isonly nominally between the parties named, the real liti-gants being two insurance companies. If it were notfor the insurance companies there would be very littlelitigation of any kind today, and members of the legalprofession owe to them a debt which we can only repayby careful labour and clear decisions."IBOOK REVIEWSMr. Herbert deserves our thanks for providing mostamusing reading, the flavor of which can only be appreciatedto the full by lawyers; he has shown up in pointed andsatirical language a number of unreasonable and absurdjudicial and legislative doctrines and practices. The opin-ions of his judges abound in wisdom which culminates in theadmirable, as well as profound words of Lord Mildew onthe construction of statutes, that:"If Parliament does not mean what it says, it oughtto say so."-EMoRY H. NILES.*THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS. By Ed-ward S. Corwin. The Princeton University Press. 1936.Pp. xiv, 276.Two years ago, in concluding his somewhat unfortun-ately entitled little book "The Twilight of the SupremeCourt", Professor Corwin said: "Certain people have re-cently raised the cry 'Back to the Constitution'. Just howfar back would they like to go?" Now it is ProfessorCorwin himself who-beginning upon the very title page-raises that same cry. Nor is he at all doubtful as to howfar back he would like to go.His call is for a return to Gibbons v. Ogden and to whathe views as the concept of national power over interstatecommerce there enunciated or implied by Marshall. A con-cept, that is to say, which would recognize "that the powerto regulate commerce among the States is the power togovern it, and hence the power to restrain it; that thispower, like all other powers of the National Government, isnot limited by State power, but overrides any State powerwith which it comes into collision; that this power, more-over, is reposed by the Constitution in Congress and not inthe Court, and so may be exercised for such objectives asCongress may select to promote, whether the Court likesthem or not; that Congress has, in short, precisely the samepower to prohibit any branch of commerce among the Statesas it has to prohibit any branch of foreign commerce, in fur-therance of what it deems to be the general welfare."Such a return is regarded as necessary because theSupreme Court, particularly in recent years, has wanderedinto "by-paths of contradictory doctrine and speculation* Of the Baltimore City bar. Lecturer on Admiralty, University of Mary-land School of Law.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWregarding the relation of national and State power," andbecause, as a result of its aberrance, the very existence ofFederal power, in the field of interstate commerce, at least,is thought endangered. The "by-paths" are identifiedunder six propositions, which the author argues have nosupport in the Constitution or in the intention of its framers,and which are inconsistent with Marshall's broad treatmentof the commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden. Four of thesepropositions are particularly challenged, viz., that the na-tional power to regulate interstate commerce is less broadin scope than that as to foreign commerce; that the reservedpowers of the States constitute a limitation upon the na-tional power over interstate commerce and consequentlywithdraw certain matters from the jurisdiction of the latterpower; specifically, that production, being a subject withinthe field of State power, is totally beyond the reach ofnational power; and, finally, that the purpose of Congress,in enacting a regulation of interstate commerce, is a judi-cially enforceable test of the validity of such a regulation, ifit invades the ordinary field of State power.It is interesting to compare Professor Corwin's presentreaction to the trend of Supreme Court decision with hisreaction before the court had acted upon the New Deallegislation. At that time, quoting from Dean Clark's fore-word to "The Twilight of the Supreme Court," he senseda "growing recognition (by the Court) that our presenteconomic and social life cannot be compressed into separatestate units." Now, he says, "we find ourselves confrontedwith the paradox that, with the country an economic andindustrial unit, the prevailing trends of constitutional inter-pretation envisage it, so far as governmental control ofbusiness is involved, as a confederation."His quarrel, then, is primarily with the doctrines ofsuch recent cases as Butler v. United States and Carter v.Carter Coal Co.; and, to the reviewer, it seems that his six"by-paths" of Supreme Court wanderings reduce them-selves to one-to wit, that the reserved powers of the Statesconstitute a limitation upon the national power over inter-state commerce, so as to exclude matters within the field ofState power from the operation of the National power toregulate. His rather passionately expressed convictions asto the fallaciousness of this proposition would seem toderive, in large part, at least, from the result which its asser-tion by the Supreme Court seems to him to entail-theresult, in brief, that effective regulation of large scale busi-ness is not possible by either the States or the NationalBOOK REVIEWSgovernment. The Supreme Court, he says, has created forbusiness a "realm of no-government."Professor Corwin is never, of course, a dispassionateobserver of the constitutional scene. He is calling here foran overruling of what he conceives to be erroneous doctrinesof constitutional construction-for a return to doctrineswhich he regards as fundamental in our scheme of govern-ment. His call, however, is not for a stripping of powerfrom the Supreme Court, nor for an amendment to theConstitution extending powers of the National government.He is speaking primarily to the Supreme Court itself, askin-for action by the Court alone. While deploring the recenttrend of Supreme Court decision, he nevertheless is contentto leave the problem of a return to correct doctrines as onewith which the Court is itself competent to deal.His convictions with respect to such controversial sub-jects as the proper relationship of the State and Nationalgovernments and the correctness of recent Supreme Court'doctrines, will not, of course, be accepted by all who mayread his little book. This should not alter the fact that thebook is well worth reading,-and particularly by those whomay not agree with all its conclusions.Certain minor inaccuracies might be mentioned. Atpage 96, in discussing Champion v. Ames, the author speaksof the debate between Mr. Carter and Mr. Beck, although onpage 89 Mr. William D. Guthrie is correctly stated as havingargued the case against Mr. Beck; Mr. Carter, of course,appeared in the earlier case of In re Rapier, in which Attor-ney General Miller and Assistant Attorney General Mauryrepresented the Government. The case of Whitfield v.Ohio is throughout cited as Whitefield v. Ohio. Also,-pre-sumably in an effort to prove the errors of the Court'srecent doctrines out of the mouth of the Court itself,-Professor Corwin quotes so largely from the cases that, tothis reviewer, it somewhat impairs both the effect of hisargument and the readability of his book.-ROGER HOWELL.** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

Brune, Herbert M., Jr.

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 2 | Issue 1 Article 5Constitutional Aspects of Reduction in StateProperty TaxHerbert M. Brune Jr.Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Taxation-State and Local CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationHerbert M. Brune Jr., Constitutional Aspects of Reduction in State Property Tax, 2 Md. L. Rev. 49 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/5Comments and CasenotesCONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF REDUCTION INSTATE PROPERTY TAXBy HERBERT M. BRUNE, JR.*Reduction or repeal of the State property tax appearslikely to rank as one of the vital questions in State affairs.1Apart from reasons of political or economic policy, for dis-cussion of which the REVIEW would not be the proper forum,two legal or constitutional grounds have been advanced forthe view that early repeal of the tax cannot be accomplished.These are, first, that the State has contracted with its bond-holders not to repeal the tax until outstanding bonds areretired, and, second, that the taxes on certain gross receiptsof utilities depend for their validity on the fact that they aresubstitutes for a State property tax, so that repeal of thegeneral property tax would render these taxes unconstitu-tional.State Constitutional ProvisionAll bonds of the State issued since the Constitution of1851 have been authorized by laws calling for the levy oftaxes to cover interest and amortization on such bonds.Apart from road bonds which are serviced by the gasolinetax2a and certain recent issues which are serviced by in-heritance taxes, the outstanding funded indebtedness of theState' has been issued under legislation calling for the levyof State property taxes, the maximum rate of 23.35 centsto be reached in 1939."The Constitutional provision authorizing and requiringsuch legislation reads as follows:* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1922, Williams College; LL.B., 1925.Harvard University; Associate Professor of Law, University of MarylandSchool of Law; Assistant Editor of the REiw.1 Editorial, "State Realty Tax," Baltimore Sun, Nov. 13, 1937.Md. Const., Art. III, Sec. 34 (as amended by Acts, 1924, Chap. 327, rati-fied November 4, 1924) ; Const. 1851, Art. III, Sec. 22; Const. 1864, Art. III,See. 33.2a Not issued on the general credit of the State.Expected to be about $52,000,000 as of the close of the year 1937.According to the Budget submitted by Governor Nice to the 1937 regularsession of the Assembly, "loan taxes" on property in the amount of$5,288,662.50 were to be required in 1939 to service outstanding bonds.Additional bonds in the amount of $10,052,000 were authorized by theAssembly in 1937; $3.971,000 in principal amount of bonds were retired.MARYLAND LAW REVIEW"No debt shall be hereafter contracted by the Gen-eral Assembly unless such debt shall be authorized bya law providing for the collection of an annual tax ortaxes sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as itfalls due, and also to discharge the principal thereofwithin fifteen years from the time of contracting thesame; and the taxes laid for this purpose shall not berepealed or applied to any other object until the saiddebt and interest thereon shall be fully discharged." 'It is matter of public record that diversions of the an-nuity bond fund, as it is called, to general purposes haveoccurred on several occasions during the recent difficultyears in State finances.' Presumably these diversionswere unconstitutional,7 but no proceedings were undertakento enjoin them. The fund has subsequently been restored,'and, according to latest reports, is now intact.It is plain that outright repeal of the tax would be aviolation of the terms of the Constitutional provision, evenif coupled with the levy of a sufficient substitutional tax. If,however, the tax is not repealed, but the levy is merely sus-pended, conditional on revenue from substitutional taxesproviding an equivalent sum, a more difficult question is pre-sented. No direct authority has been found bearing on thescope and effect of similar constitutional provisions.' Undersuch circumstances reference may be made to the evidentpurpose of the Constitutional provision in consideringwhether a conditional suspension of the levy would violatethe prohibition against repeal.The provision was adopted in the course of a programfor reorganizing the State's finances, after bitter experi-ences following overextensions of the public credit. ° Pur-poses which may be gathered from the provision in the lightof this background are that it was designed (1) to affordspecific protection to bondholders of the State; (2) to im-prove the credit of the State thereby; (3) to furnish a checkagainst large and constant increases in the State debt." Nopurpose to favor one form of taxation over another can beMd. Const., Art. III, See. 34.o See Reports of Comptroller, 1934, p. 38; 1935, p. 22; 1936, p. 20.See State v. Hendrickson, 15 Md. 205 (1860).Acts, 1937, Ch. 515 (p. 1224), the Budget Act of 1937.o Aside from a recent decision permitting use of general funds of theState to pay early installments of interest before the loan taxes are col-lected and thus saving the constitutionality of the State office building loan.Bickel v. Nice, 192 Atl. 777 (Md., 1937).10 Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law, 186-188.11 The object is "to require the Assembly, when incurring an obligation,to meet the problem of punctual payment". Bickel v. Nice, supra, note 9.STATE PROPERTY TAXgathered from the provision, since the Assembly was givenfreedom to determine the form of taxation adopted to ser-vice any bond issue.,a Accordingly, bond issues serviced bygasoline taxes 12 and by inheritance taxes, 18 as well as thoseserviced by the real estate tax, have been authorized.Unless particular State revenues have been provided fora bond issue, the holder of a State bond has no legal meansof compelling its payment. 4 If, in addition to the revenuesoriginally appropriated, other sources of revenue are pro-vided, it seems clear that the position of the bondholder hasbeen materially improved rather than the reverse. The en-actment of a new or other form of tax applicable to out-standing bond issues, coupled with a direction to State andlocal officials to suspend the property levy only to the extentthat other funds are actually realized, 5 gives the bondholdertwo sources out of which his bonds are payable. Thus itadequately protects him, safeguards the credit of the State,and does not affect or impair the State policy against issu-ing bonds without providing funds for their payment.The suggested conclusion that the purposes of the Con-stitutional provision are in no substantial degree impairedby conditional suspension of the property tax is fortified byconsideration of the meaning of the word "repeal". Repealhas been authoritatively defined as "the abrogation or de-struction of a law by a legislative act"."e If the propertylevy is not abrogated or destroyed but is continued in exist-ence for the further security of bondholders, provided otherfunds do not measure up to expectations, it seems that thetax has not in fact been "repealed".,'a Careful bond counsel, passing on the Emergency Bond Issue of 1935,suggested the possibility that the "annual tax or taxes," required by theConstitutional provision, might be limited to property taxes. It is believedthat such a construction would import into the provision a requirement notto be found in the natural meaning of the words used and is, therefore, notto be anticipated." Acts, 1935, Ch. 563, authorizes road bonds in the amount of $3,000,000to be paid from certain motor vehicle and gasoline taxes. Since the generalcredit of the State is not pledged, it is arguable that this is not a "debtcreated by the General Assembly", within the meaning of the Constitutionalrestriction.1" Acts, 1935, Ch. 91, provides for a general bond Issue of $8,500,000,serviced primarily by inheritance taxes and only secondarily by an addi-tional property tax.' Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 27 L. Ed. 448, 2 S. Ct. 128 (1883);Sawyer v. Colgan, 102 Calif. 283, 36 Pac. 580, 834 (1894) ; Colbert v. State,86 Miss. 769, 39 So. 65 (1906) ; Opinion of Justices, 49 Mo. 216 (1872)." Cf. method of servicing relief bonds in Illinois as described in Michaelsv. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 188 N. E. 921 (1934). See also Md. Acts. 1935,Ch. 91." 3 Bouvler's Law Dictionary, 2887.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWImpairing Obligation of ContractWhile a law repealing the property tax would violate theprovision of the State Constitution, that provision can itselfbe amended. The effect of a statute or constitutionalamendment as impairing contract rights of bondholders,guaranteed to them under the Federal Constitution, musttherefore be considered.Outright repeal of the property tax would impair theobligation of the State's contract and would be held invalidunder the Federal Constitution." Even the adoption of aState constitutional amendment repealing the tax would, asapplied to outstanding bonds, impair the State's contract.."A law repealing the tax would be disregarded, and Stateofficers could be compelled by mandamus to collect andapply the tax. 9 But if the tax is repealed by a State con-stitutional amendment, officers cannot be compelled to disre-gard the amendment; being part of the fundamental law ofthe State, it necessarily furnishes the guide to action byexecutive officers, and the bondholder will have a right with-out a remedy.2" While a State constitutional provisioncannot be asserted in violation of the basic Federal law in asuit against private litigants or municipal corporations, itis equally true that the State itself, in its sovereign capacity,cannot be coerced against its own supreme law.2'In the leading case in which these views were expressedby the Supreme Court, Louisiana had, by constitutionalamendment, abolished taxes applicable to bonds, withoutproviding other revenue.22 Loss of State credit throughsuch action would make unlikely any effort to follow a sim-ilar course here. If adequate substitutional revenue is pro-vided, and the real estate tax kept in reserve, no substantialright of bondholders has been impaired. Without substan-tial injury it is not apparent how a bondholder could show17 Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14; Board of Liquidation v. McComb,92 U. S. 531, 23 L. Ed. 623 (1876) ; Bunch v. Wolerstein, 62 Miss. 56 (1884)State, ex rel. Judd, v. Cooney, 97 Mont. 75, 32 P. (2d) 851 (1936) 1Quindry, Bonds and Bondholders, Sec. 86. And see Morton v. ComptrollerGeneral, 4 S. Car. 430 (1873). Cf. Rx parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct.441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908) ; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 13 S. Ct. 785, 37 L. Ed.689 (1893).19 Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14; Cf. State of Florida v. Palm BeachDist., 121 Fla. 746, 164 So. 851 (1935) ; State of Florida v. Boring, 121 Fla.781, 164 So. 859 (1935).19 Board of Liquidation v. McComb, supra, note 17: Cf. AMeriwethor v.Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. Ed. 197 (1880).10 Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14.1 Cf. Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14, with State of Florida v. PalmBeach Dist., supra, note 18, and State of Florida v. Boring. supra, note 18.12 Louisiana Y. Jumel. supra, note 14.STATE PROPERTY TAXany legal basis for complaint," apart from the question ofthe State's sovereign immunity,24 nor could the credit of theState suffer through an amendment affording such completeprotection of the interest of bondholders.Practical as well as legal considerations, therefore,would suggest that a Constitutional amendment permittingrepeal of the property tax should be coupled with a savingclause keeping the levy in reserve for the further securityof outstanding bonds. There remains the possibility ofprocuring from bondholders a waiver of the real estate levyconditional on other revenue proving sufficient.25 Bond-holders might be induced to have such waivers indorsed ontheir bonds in consideration of being granted the additionalsecurity of another specific tax. These and other considera-tions make it desirable that any plan relating to the realtytax should be worked out in cooperation with representa-tives of bondholders or of the bankers who purchased thebonds and resold them to the public.That the credit of the bonds would not be impaired bythe change is indicated by the credit now enjoyed by theEmergency Bond Issue of 1935.26 Bonds issued under thatact, payable primarily out of special taxes and only sec-ondarily from the property tax, which is not resorted to aslong as the other revenue is sufficient, are selling at pricesequal to those of bonds secured primarily by the propertytax.Effect Upon Gross Receipts TaxesThe gross receipts taxes on utilities involve constitu-tional conceptions which are today in a state of some uncer-tainty.27 It was formerly the rule that a tax on gross23 State of Florida v. Boring, supra, note 18; Storen v. Sexton, 200 N. E.251 (Ind., 1936). Cf. Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432,79 L. Ed. 912 (1935). See also 5 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.), Sec. 2218;Wood on Mandamus (3rd Ed.), p. 36. A party seeking to have a statutedeclared unconstitutional must show that he is actually injured by itsoperation. Louisville R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 59 L. Ed.379 (1915) ; Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, 30 S. Ct. 594, 54 L. Ed.868 (1910)24 Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14; Carolina Glass Co. v. South Caro-lina, 240 U. S. 305, 36 S. Ct. 293, 60 L. Ed. 658 (1916).11 The right to raise Constitutional questions may be waived. BoothFisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 271 U. S. 208, 46 S. Ct. 491, 70 L.Ed. 908 (1926).'Acts 1935, Ch. 91.Cf. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 48 S. Ct. 366, 67 L. Ed.682 (1923), and New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338, 50S. Ct. 111, 74 L. Ed. 463 (1980), with Potomac Ilec. Power Co. v. Hazen.90 F. (2d) 406 (1937), cert. den. 58 S. Ct. 11 (Oct. 11, 1937).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWreceipts from interstate business," or a franchise tax meas-ured partly by gross receipts from interstate business,"was invalid as a burden on commerce unless it could beregarded as a property tax or in lieu of a property tax onthe value of the company's intangible property or fran-chises. °  Changes in the personnel of the United StatesSupreme Court since its last decision indicate that a closedivision of opinion may exist on the validity of certain grossreceipts taxes. 1 Within the last month the Court has up-held a franchise tax on a foreign corporation which wasmeasured by its total authorized capital, 2 and this wasregarded as a deviation from previous views of the Court.8"In Maryland the gross receipts tax is levied in additionto property taxes, except in the case of domestic railroadcompanies.3 4 It therefore, under the former rule, could notbe collected as applied to interstate receipts, unless limitedto the equivalent of a tax on the companies' property,85 andthe taxing authorities have in practice limited it to receiptsfrom local business." It would seem, therefore, that repealof the property tax will not reduce present tax collectionsunder the gross receipts law except possibly from domesticrailroad companies.2' Pullman Co. v. Richardson, supra, note 27.21 New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, supra, note 27.80 United States Ex. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 32 S. Ct. 211, 56L. Ed. 459 (1912). Or the tax may be validly imposed in substitution for"the ordinary tax upon property", that is, property both tangible and in-tangible. See Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 15 S. Ct. 268, 360, 39L. Ed. 311 (1895).31 Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented in the New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.case and Mr. Justice Stone took no part in the decision. Justices Hughes,Roberts, Cardozo and Black have subsequently been appointed to the Court.32 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 58 S. Ct. 75 (decided Nov. 8, 1937).88 See Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45S. Ct. 477, 69 L. Ed. 916 (1925), and Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278U. S. 460, 49 S. Ct. 204, 73 L. Ed. 454 (1929), distinguished in the opinion inAtlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, supra, note 32, on the ground that in thosecases the corporation had already been admitted to the State. See alsoPrentice-Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Par. 7029.8, Md. Code, Art. 81, Sec. 91.'15 See doubt expressed in Postal Tel. Co. v. Harford Co., 131 Md. 96, 101AtI. 600 (1917). Even though imposed in addition to property taxes, thegross receipts levy (which is expressly declared to be a franchise tax) isclearly valid when measured by receipts from intrastate business alone,unless it burdens Interstate commerce. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Com-mission, 297 U. S. 403, 56 S. Ct. 222, 80 L. Ed. 760 (1936).30 A recent sampling of returns of utilities under the gross receipts taxshows that they customarily report only a small fraction of the statutoryestimate of their total receipts in Maryland, ranging from one-fourth toone-eighth. The statute in terms requires that the tax be paid on thatproportion of total gross receipts of the company which the mileage inMaryland bearO to the total mileage. See Md. Code, Art. 81, Sec. 91 (b).STATE PROPERTY TAXConclusionsBroadly speaking, private persons, unless they are ma-terially injured by a proposed change in State policy, shouldnot be permitted to control the form of taxation which thelegislature may see fit to impose. Any waiver of the State'ssovereign powers and immunities should not be extendedbeyond the necessities of the occasion upon which thewaiver is made. Accordingly, if bondholders are adequatelyprotected by a substitutional tax and by keeping the prop-erty tax in reserve (as was done in the case of the Emer-gency Bond Issue of 1935), they should not be permitted toobstruct such changes as may be desired by the people ofthe State.It is believed that formal breach of the State's contractagainst repeal would not result from conditional suspensionof the levy. Nor could a substantial impairment of thecontract obligation be shown. Litigation by a minoritybondholder is always possible, however, and for this reasona Constitutional amendment might offer a more desirableprocedure as tending to make the State's legal positionimpregnable. 7No suggestion is made that a breach of contract wouldbe desirable or justifiable on the ground of the State's im-munity from suit. On the contrary, the necessity of pre-serving the State's credit is an adequate guaranty againstunfair dealing with the State's bondholders and bankers.87 It has been assumed that Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights, asamended in 1915, will furnish no obstacle to repeal or suspension of theState property tax. Prior to the 1915 amendment it was held that Stateand local taxes on tangible personal property and on improvements couldnot be repealed as long as these taxes are retained on land, since the re-quirement of uniformity would be violated. Wells v. Hyattsville, 77 Md.125, 26 Ati. 357 (1893). Doubtless the amendment permits separate treat-ment of different classes of property, although an undefined requirementof uniformity remains. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission,159 Md. 334, 151 Atl. 29 (1930) ; aff'd 283 U. S. 291, 51 S. Ct. 434, 75 L. Ed.1042 (1931). A constitutional amendment would avoid all question of con-flict with Article 15.

Constitutional Aspects of Reduction in State Property Tax

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 2 Article 6Venue of Suit Against Domestic Corporation. M. J.Grove Lime Co. v. WolfendenFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Jurisdiction CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationVenue of Suit Against Domestic Corporation. M. J. Grove Lime Co. v. Wolfenden, 1 Md. L. Rev. 165 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss2/6MARYLAND LAW REVIEWtrine: ". . . the rule persists merely as one of the law'sanachronisms which should be consigned to the limbo oftime-worn dogma." For a footnote to this statement, thiswriter remarked about the doctrine and about the LondonGuarantee case: "But, alas, even so moribund a doctrineis not thus easily relegated. In a recent Maryland case(the London Guarantee case) it appears as serenely asthough the light of modern legal reasoning had not dis-owned it."It would seem that the situation is ripe for statutoryreform. Why should not there be a statute passed per-mitting suits to be brought in Maryland to collect damagesfor the wrongful death of persons occurring elsewhere?Such a statute could well provide rules for resolvingproblems of dissimilarity, so long as the law applicable tothe tort should afford a substantial right of action for thedeath.' 9 In the event of statutory reform to repeal the ruleof Davis v. Ruzicka and its precedent cases, thought mightwell be given also to reforming the internal details of ourown wrongful death laws. Is there any real argument forpreserving the distinction between the separate actions forthe death itself and for the suffering endured by the victimbetween the time of the fatal accident and the ensuingdeath? For that matter, what justification is there for thepresent rule requiring the action of the former type to bebrought in the name of the state as nominal plaintiff?VENUE OF SUIT AGAINST DOMESTIC CORPORA-TION. M. J. GROVE LIME CO. V. WOLFENDEN.1The M. J. Grove Lime Company, a Maryland corporationhaving its principal office in Frederick County, was sued inthe Superior Court of Baltimore City for damages arisingout of an automobile accident in Frederick County. Thesole activities of the corporation in Baltimore City consistedof the solicitation of orders, which were subsequently ac-19 The statute proposed by the Bar Association of Baltimore City, DailyRecord, February 2, 1937, and Ibid., February 3, 1937, does not go thisfar. It merely seeks to make it possible to bring suits In Maryland forwrongful deaths caused elsewhere. It provides that the "Courts of thisState shall apply the law of such other State, District of Columbia, orterritory of the United States, to the facts of the particular case, asthough such foreign law were the law of this state . . ." and that localrules of pleading and procedure shall apply to the end that they shall"give effect to the rights and obligations created by and existing underthe laws of the foreign jurisdiction..." where the tort occurred.SMd.- , 188 Atl. 794 (1937).CASENOTES AND COMMENTScepted by the company at its Frederick County office; occa-sional delivery of merchandise pursuant to said orders; oc-casional receipt of payments by the Baltimore City agent,and consultation by officers of the company with public of-ficials in connection with the submission of bids for publicwork. The company had no office in Baltimore City, al-though its sales agent in that district had previously, for ashort time, been listed in the telephone directory as agentof the company. Held, that the company was not "carryingon any regular business, or habitually engaging in any avo-cation or employment" in Baltimore City, within the mean-ing of Maryland Code, Art. 75, Sec. 157, and that the Su-perior Court had no jurisdiction.The statute cited by the Court was regularly applied tosuits against corporations prior to the enactment of Article23, Section 103 in its present form.2 An example of suchapplication is Henderson v. Maryland Home InsuranceCo.3 However, Article 23, Section 103 now regulates spe-cifically the question of venue in a suit against a corpora-tion, and it may be suggested therefore that Article 75, Sec-tion 157 no longer has any proper application to such suits.The applicable provision of Section 103 is as follows:"Every corporation of this State may be sued in anycounty or in the City of Baltimore, as the case may be,where its principal office is located, or where it regularlytransacts business or exercises its franchises, or in any lo-cal action, where the subject matter thereof lies." (Italicsours.)Language of substantially the same tenor is found inthe statute regulating suits against foreign corporations.'Hence, authorities on what constitutes "doing business"within the meaning of one of these statutes may properly beconsidered as applicable in the construction of the other.The Court in its instant decision cites and relies upon thecase of Stewart Fruit Co. v. Railroad Co.,5 holding that thesolicitation of orders for freight by a foreign corporationdoes not constitute doing business. Evidently the Court had2 The applicable sentence was introduced by Acts, 1908, Ch. 240, See. 62.Previously the statute relating to venue of suits against corporations con-tained language similar to Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 157, as, for example,Acts, 1900, Ch. 21 (amending Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 296).90 Md. 47, 44 Atl. 1020 (1899).4 Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 118 provides that a foreign corporation "reg-ularly doing business or regularly exercising any of its franchises" in theState is subject to suit therein, and permits such suit to be brought in thecounty in which its principal office in the State is located or in any countyIn which it "regularly transacts business."- 143 Md. 56, 121 Atl. 837 (1923).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWin mind the same tests, in construing Article 75, Section 157,which it would have applied if Article 23, Section 103 hadbeen brought to its attention6 and the decision seems inline with the substantial weight of authority.7Many of the cases, however, involving solicitation of or-ders, hold that a foreign corporation engaging in such ac-tivity is not required to qualify and pay a franchise tax,not on the ground that it is not "doing business," but on theground that such business is interstate commerce. Underthese authorities solicitation of orders may render a cor-poration subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. The par-ticular significance of the present decision is that the Mary-land Court appears to regard the regular solicitation of or-ders as not in fact the doing of business. Although consider-ations relating to undue burdens on interstate commercewere not present, the Court evidently felt that the sametests should be applied as in the case of foreign corpora-tions, and thus avoided the confusion which would resultfrom adopting different standards for the two classes ofcases.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DELEGATION TO PRESI-DENT OF POWER TO DECLARE EMBARGO ONEXPORTATION OF ARMS. UNITED STATESV. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORTCORPORATION'Defendants were indicted for conspiring to sell arms inthe United States to a foreign government in violation ofthe Joint Resolution of Congress of May 28, 19342. In thelower court, a demurrer to the indictment had been sus-tained, on the ground that the joint resolution constitutedan improper delegation of power by Congress to the Presi-dent.8 On appeal, held (one justice dissenting) :-Reversedand cause remanded; the powers of the Federal Govern-ment in respect of foreign affairs differ fundamentally inorigin and nature from its powers in respect of domesticaffairs; even assuming that the challenged legislation wouldhave constituted an improper delegation of power as to8 Examination of the briefs in the principal case discloses that Art. 23,Sec. 103 was not cited to the Court.7 Prentice-Hall Corp. Service, Pars. 7120-7122.- U. S. -, 81 L. Ed. 166, 57 S. Ct. 216 (1936).48 Stat. 811 (1934).'United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 14 F. Supp. 230(S. D. N. Y. 1936).

Venue of Suit Against Domestic Corporation. M. J. Grove Lime Co. v. Wolfenden

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 3 Article 10Book ReviewFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted forinclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contactsmccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationBook Review, 1 Md. L. Rev. 273 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss3/10Book ReviewJUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NOTICESAND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS. Edited and anno-tated by Harry C. Shriver. Introduction by Mr. JusticeHarlan Fiske Stone. Central Book Company, New YorkCity. 1936. Pp. xiii, 280.This slender volume is well worth buying and reading,and keeping and re-reading. Mr. Shriver is entitled to thethanks of all those, laymen as well as lawyers, who areinterested in the work and personality of Mr. JusticeHolmes.As stated in the preface, "This volume completes theMiscellanea of the writings of the late Justice Oliver Wen-dell Holmes. It is a collection of his early book notices,extant papers not heretofore collected, and some recentlypublished letters. . . . Part I consists of book notices, edi-torial comments and partial reprints from Common Car-riers and the Common Law, and Codes and the Arrange-ment of the Law. Part H is made up of uncollected writ-ings. Part III reproduces the letters of Justice Holmes toDr. John C. H. Wu, published by the latter in the October,1935, issue of the T'ien Hsia Monthly."To this feviewer, the letters to Dr. Wu, later commentedupon, are by far the most interesting part of the book. Thisis not to say, however, that the early book reviews and un-collected writings are not without great interest. For onething, the book reviews exhibit Holmes' intense interestin everything pertaining to the law and, even in cases wherehis convictions differed from those of the author, his criti-cisms were urbane, and his appreciation of honest work,generous. Two passages, written more than sixty yearsago, serve to indicate their quality. Reviewing an articlecomplaining that our courts give undue adherence to pre-cedent, he said:"We must add that we sincerely hope that theeditors will fail in their expressed desire to diminishthe weight of precedents with our courts. We believethe weight attached to them is about the best thing in.our whole system of law."BOOK REVIEWCommenting on a digest, he said:"It should be added that the author, in a very pre-possessing preface, vindicates his plan of extractingprinciples from cases instead of giving an abridge-ment of- the facts with the judgment of the court uponthem. We believe that he is wrong; and that just inproportion as a case is new and therefore valuable, noone, not even the judges, can be trusted to state theratio decidendi. We believe that the very essence ofa digest, apart from its alphabetical arrangement, isthat it should state cases and not principles. Butwhen the other course is deliberately taken, we go nofurther than to differ, and to be thankful that if gen-eralizing was to be done it should be done so well."The letters to Dr. Wu, remarkable in themselves, aremore remarkable in the circumstances of their writing andin the flood of light they throw upon the personality of thewriter. Consider the -circumstances. The first letter bearsdate of April 19, 1921. Justice Holmes was then eightyyears old and a world-famous jurist-58 years older thanthe Chinese student of law. They cover a period of elevenyears, the last being dated March 14, 1932. They number44. In them, one can find an epitome of his philosophy oflaw and of life; and the simple, cordial, and indeed affec-tionate relationship, without a trace of condescension,which he was capable of sustaining to a fellow-worker inthe same field. One delightful personal touch appears inthe letters regarding Dr. Wu's visit to Washington, inwhich the then 82-year-old Justice, in arranging for hisvisitor's accommodations, discusses at considerable lengththe relative merits of rooms at a club, priced from $1.25 to$2.50 a day.These letters cover a wide field of intellectual interests:Kant, Hegel, Spinoza; economics, general literature, andlaw are discussed. But the daily task comes first:"I have a number of tasks on hand this morning,and so don't write at length, since I am miserablewhen I have in my hands and in my conscience some-thing to be relieved."One would like, in reviewing this book, to summarizewhat is said on subjects such as work, reason, war, the useof words, literary criticism, and other matters, but space isnot sufficient and at any rate, it would probably be a hope-MARYLAND LAW REVIEWless undertaking to attempt to paraphrase the sayings of'such a master of language. A few quotations must suffice:On work:"Therefore I hope you will not shirk the detailsand drudgery that life offers, but will master them asthe first step to bigger things. One must be a soldierbefore one can be a general."On reason:"I hate to discourage the belief of a young man inreason. I believe in it with all my heart, but I thinkthat its control over the actions of men when it comesagainst what they want is not very great."Zest of living:".... Although my physical activity grows morelimited I still feel so much of the zest of life that I amafraid that I realize less than I should how precariousis the tenure of a man of 87."Justice Holmes was, as all know, taken to the bosomsof many "liberals". And he was a liberal. But thispassage may suggest that some of his devotees worshipedhim ignorantly:"Also, if there is a form of speech for which I haveless sympathy than another it is talk about 'exploita-tion,' as a hostile characterization of modern commer-cial life, and an implication that dominant brains areto blame. I think it is drivelling cant and I have astanding war with my dear friend Laski, as to hispassion for Equality, with which I have no sympathyat all."On the Constitution:"He seemingly has followed the suggestion ofBeard that really the adoption of the Constitution wasdue to the moneyed interests and I don't readily giveup the belief that Washington and the rest had for theirdominant motive a patriotic desire to see a powerfulnation take the place of squabbling states. If thechange helped their investments, I should suppose thatit was because they invested in the belief that whatthey thought best would come to pass, not that theytalked patriotism because they had invested."276 BOOK REVIEWThere is inspiration in these letters for the beginnerin law. There is inspiration, as well as consolation, formen of middle age and more, who are baffled and perplexedby the modern world. They show how a skeptic can havefaith and can find a meaning in life. He wrote: "If Iwere dying, my last words would be: Have faith and pur-sue the unknown end."-RAYMOND S. WILLIAMS.** Of the Baltimore City Bar.

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