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Carter, James T.

A Survey of the Maryland Income Tax Law

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 2 Article 9Difficulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings onSubstantive Criminal Law - Corroboration ofAccomplices- Folb V. StateFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Legal History, Theory and Process CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationDifficulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings on Substantive Criminal Law - Corroboration of Accomplices- Folb V. State, 1 Md. L. Rev. 175(1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss2/9MARYLAND LAW REVIEWcases where such officers had come into possession of prop-erty or money of the judgment debtor by virtue of the of-fice or otherwise, as in the case of money deposited withofficers, or where funds or property were in custodia legis.It is not for this court to broaden the terms of this act, orby construction read into the act an intention which doesnot clearly appear." The following year the Legislatureexpressed its intent unambiguously24 and extended the rightto garnishee funds in the hands of the state and its sub-divisions to salaries due public officers. This statute wasapplied to the salary of a district attorney in Stockard v.Hamilton.25Several decisions have been rendered on the question ofthe constitutionality of such statutes. It has been broadlystated that statutes authorizing the garnishment of the sal-ary or the wages of public officials or employees are withinthe legislative power.26 A statute permitting the garnish-ment of the wages of municipal and county employees, whichdoes not extend to those of the state, does not conffict with aconstitutional provision against class legislation, Cavenderv. Hewitt.27  An Illinois statute,28 was held unconstitu-tional as class legislation as it did not apply to all municipalcorporations of the state.2 9DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING APPELLATE RUL-INGS ON SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW-CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES-FOLB V. STATE'One of two defendants convicted by a judge without ajury of "operating a gaming table"I appealed from the con-viction alleging as grounds of error, first, that the "slotmachines" in question were not sufficiently proven to con-stitute "gaming tables" under the statute, and, second, thatthe testimony of an accomplice was erroneously admittedwithout corroboration. Held: Conviction affirmed. Thelegal sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the slot ma-chines were gaming tables may not be considered on appeal,24 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Ch. 59, Sec. 59 127 (1929).25 25 N. M. 240, 180 Pac. 294 (1919).26Dunkley v. McCarthy, 157 Mich. 339, 122 N. W. 126, 17 Ann. Cas. 523(1909); note, 22 A. L. R. 760.2"145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A. L. R. 755 (1922).28 Illinois Laws, 1905, p. 285." Badenock v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N. E. 31 (1906).1169 Md. 209, 181 Atl. 225 (sub. nom. Ruthenberg et al. v. State) (1935).CASENOTES AND COMMENTSalthough if it could have been so considered the Court wouldhave affirmed the trial court's conclusion that they did con-stitute gaming tables. While a person accused of crimeshould not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimonyof an accomplice, yet the question of the sufficiency of thecorroboration must be left to the jury or the trial court sit-ting as a jury. An objection that the corroboration is in-sufficient may be addressed to the trial court on motion fornew trial but is not a ground of reversal on appeal.The first point in the case illustrates a peculiar thingabout the Maryland legal system, i. e., the difficulty of ob-taining appellate rulings on points of substantive criminallaw. In common law jurisdictions generally there are fiveways in which an appellate court may be called on to enunci-ate the law concerning a specific problem of human guilt ofcrime. The first is in reviewing a trial court's action inruling on a demurrer to the indictment. In the course ofdeciding whether an indictment is legally sufficient, the ap-pellate court may have to announce specific rules concerningthe interpretation of penal statutes or the application ofcriminal defences. This device applies in Maryland and isthe one through which most of our scanty supply of appel-late criminal law has been promulgated. However, as timepasses, indictments become more and more stereotyped andprosecutors more astute, with the result that little appellatelaw comes through this route anymore.The second is by ruling on the relevancy of evidencewhich is offered by the State and admitted or which is of-fered by the defence and excluded. In the course of rulingon the relevancy (as distinguished from the admissibility)of evidence the appellate courts are frequently required toenunciate doctrine of substantive law. Thus in Spencer v.State,2 the Court, in the course of ruling on the proprietyof the trial Court's excluding evidence offered by the trav-erser as to his mental condition, laid down the rule of lawas to the "irresistible impulse" defense in Maryland andrejected that defense as part of our criminal law. Althoughthis method of securing rulings exists in Maryland, yet it isone not very likely to be productive of much appellate law.The third way is by ruling on the correctness of the in-structions either given by the trial court to the jury con-cerning the substantive law of the case or refused to begiven. Whenever a trial judge either instructs the jury bygranting an instruction asked by the State or refuses one269 Md. 28, 13 At. 809 (1888).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWrequested by the defense a potential ground of error existsin the common law system generally. In various otherStates the trial judge must grant prayers in criminal casesand the refusal of a proper one is as much error as thegranting of an improper one. But in Maryland, because ofour Constitutional provision3 that the jury shall be thejudges of the law, the Court of Appeals has ruled that thetrial judge need not grant prayers unless he wishes to, inwhich event he must grant correct ones, and advise the jurythat they are not bound by his instructions.4 As a resultof prayers not being compulsory in Maryland few trialjudges do grant them. Whether this is because the averagejudge feels foolish in telling a jury the law and then tellingthem (as he must) that they need not follow it, or becausehe is jealous of his score of affirmances and reversals in theCourt of Appeals and "plays safe" and avoids a reversalon a technicality by saying nothing, is a matter which can-not be determined. The fact is that the granting of prayerson the law in criminal cases is said to be rare. So it resultsthat, in Maryland, this avenue of presenting questions ofsubstantive criminal law to the Court of Appeals is usuallynot available.The fourth way is one which is totally non-existent inMaryland. Whereas in various other States appeals maybe taken on the ground that the evidence is legally insuffi-cient to support the conviction, this may not be done inMaryland as the Folb case pointed out and as numerousearlier cases also have. In other States when a court eitheraffirms or reverses on the point of the legal sufficiency of theevidence it has an opportunity to enunciate the points ofsubstantive law which may be involved in the case. No suchrulings are possible in Maryland, save by way of dictum, ashappened in the Folb case.The fifth way is one but little productive of appellatelaw. Occasionally in civil cases not involving as such thequestion of guilt or innocence of crime the solution of thelegal issue may involve the court's stating some proposi-tion of criminal law which happens to be involved.'* Md. Const., Art. XV, Sec. 5.' For a recent and leading case on prayers in criminal cases in Maryland,see Vogel v. State, 163 Md. 267, 162 Atl. 706 (1932), which refers to manyof the earlier Maryland cases in point.r Such a case was Stansbury v. Luttrell, 152 Md. 553, 137 Atl. 339 (1927),where the Court of Appeals had occasion to discuss the substantive law oflarceny in the course of ruling on the matter of reasonable and probablecause in an action for malicious prosecution.CASENOTES AND COMMENTSBecause of the lack of appellate review over the suffi-ciency of the evidence and the rarity of granted instructionsthere are relatively few Maryland cases on points of sub-stantive criminal law. Frequently it is impossible to givean answer to a question of the interpretation of a Mary-land criminal statute or that as to which of two conflictingviews concerning the common law of crimes Maryland wouldfollow. If predictability as to the law is a desideratum thenour system would seem to be deficient on the criminal side.To be sure, by the same token which deprives us of thenormal quantity of appellate law, our system functions hap-pily because there is less chance of a guilty criminal secur-ing a reversal of his conviction on an abstruse technicality.The system has both its merits and demerits.In the Folb case the Court of Appeals apparently feltthat it was desirable to settle the question of whether slotmachines constitute gaming tables under the statute. Forlack of a more appropriate device they were forced to usethat of a dictum. In view of the fact that the application ofthe gaming statute to slot machines is largely a matter of"jury law" anyhow, it is possible that the problem is nowas well settled as by any other method. Juries probablywould care little whether the court's statement were dictumor decision, assuming that they wished at all to follow theruling of the Court of Appeals. But query, would it be re-versible error for a prosecuting attorney, in a future case,to read the Court's dictum in the Folb case to the jury in aneffort to convince them that the law was that slot machinesare gaming tables? Would the fact that the opinion no-where contains a description of the particular type of "slotmachine" and its functioning preclude the State's Attorneyfrom relying on the dictum in future cases in order to per-suade the jury?Given administrative and judicial co-operation, it is pos-sible to secure appellate rulings on such dubious points ofsubstantive criminal law. If it were desirable say, to findout whether a given type of slot machine constituted agaming table, the State's Attorney, in drafting his indict-ment, could therein describe the operation of the machinewith great particularity. Thus the question of the legalityof the slot machine could be presented on demurrer to theindictment. Thus either on the State's appeal from thesustaining of the demurrer or on the traverser's appealfrom its being overruled the Court of Appeals would havean opportunity to rule on the point. As matters stand,State's Attorneys tend to put as little in their indictments178MARYLAND LAW REVIEWas is required, in order that they may be demurrer-proof.This is commendable because it avoids reversals on techni-calities. But if an appellate ruling is desirable on a minorpoint, one way of getting it is to invite demurrer by addingdetail touching on the point.The other way would be for the trial judge to give anadvisory instruction unfavorable to the defendant and hold-ing that the slot machine constituted a gaming table. Thus,assuming a jury conviction, the defendant could similarlyappeal and the question would be squarely presented to theCourt of Appeals. Normally trial judges tend to refrainfrom such instructions and either give none or ones aboutwhich there is no doubt. This too is normally commendablefor avoiding technical reversals. But it would seem that anoccasional technical reversal could well be risked to the endthat the matter at stake could be settled by an appellateruling.The second point in the Folb case also involves the rami-fications of our rule that the jury shall be judges of both thelaw and facts. Defendant claimed a reversal for allegederror in admitting the uncorroborated testimony of an ac-complice. The general rule is that the traverser should notbe convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accom-plice. Theoretically, Maryland has the rule." Practicallyit has not, except insofar as juries do as they ought or trialjudges grant new trials because they follow the rule strictly.The rule is of no value in an appeal of a criminal case inMaryland.This is because the rule differs from the other rules ofevidence in the mechanical method of its application.'Whereas most of the other rules function in terms of exclu-sion, so that error therein may be availed of on appeal (evenin Maryland) the rule of corroboration of accomplices re-quires for its effectual application two procedural deviceslacking in the Maryland criminal procedure. One is com-pulsory instructions to the jury. The other is appellate re-view of the sufficiency of the evidence.The usual practice in other States in applying this ruleof corroboration is for the trial judge to grant (as he else-where must) a prayer that the jury shall not convict on theuncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Then if theydo convict, the appellate court can review the question of' For a good discussion of the rule in Maryland, see Luery v. State, 116Md. 284, 292-5, 81 Atl. 685 (1911). Other Maryland cases in point are:Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 Atl. 1058 (1909) ; Garland v. State, 112Md. 83, 75 Atl. 631 (1910) ; Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 83 Atl. 759 (1912);and Wolf v. State, 143 Md. 489, 122 Atl. 641 (1923).CASENOTES AND COMMENTSwhether there was any corroboration, although it is usuallystated that the amount thereof is for the jury. But inMaryland the trial judge cannot be compelled to grant theprayer and the appellate court, as pointed out in the Folbcase, cannot review the question of whether there was evenany corroboration. As a result we practically do not havethe rule, short of the jury's or the trial judge's willingnessto enforce it.In the Folb case the defendant apparently contendedthat the corroboration rule should also be enforced by ex-cluding the evidence if it were not corroborated or (inferen-tially) by ordering the striking out of it if admitted on con-dition of later corroboration which did not materialize. Butfor the appellate court to have done that would have beenfor it to have gone into the sufficiency of the evidence, whichit cannot do. So it rejected the defendant's contentionalong these lines.Thus it is that in Maryland the only significance of therule of corroboration is that the traverser's counsel canharangue the jury not to convict without corroboration andhe can move the trial judge to grant a new trial if they seemto do so. But if both jury and trial judge turn him downthat is the end of it. It is possible for a defendant to beconvicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplicebecause of our belief that the jurors, as the judges of thelaw, must have found legally sufficient corroboration.

Difficulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings on Substantive Criminal Law - Corroboration of Accomplices- Folb V. State

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 2 | Issue 1 Article 10The Effect of a Separation Agreement Upon theSurviving Spouse's Right to Administer - Hewitt V.ShipleyFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Estates and Trusts CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationThe Effect of a Separation Agreement Upon the Surviving Spouse's Right to Administer - Hewitt V. Shipley, 2 Md. L. Rev. 76 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/10HEWITT v. SHIPLEYpany's financing of the Poole Engineering Company. TheDistrict Court's charge to the jury and the opinion denyinga motion for new trial took an opposite view of the law ofthe situation from that of the Court of Appeals of Marylandin the instant case. There was an appeal taken thereinfrom the judgment rendered for the plaintiff, but the casewas settled before it was argued on appeal.THE EFFECT OF A SEPARATION AGREEMENTUPON THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'SRIGHT TO ADMINISTERHewitt v. Shipley'Husband filed a petition in the Orphans' Court of Balti-more City claiming that he had received no notice beforeletters of administration were granted his brother-in-law,and that he, as surviving spouse, was legally entitled toadminister and share in the estate of his deceased wife. Theanswer denied the right of the husband to notice of thegranting of letters because the husband had surrendered allhis rights in the estate of the deceased wife by virtue of anagreement of separation between him and her. The perti-nent provisions of that separation agreement provided thatthe husband pay the wife a named sum of money and thecosts of a pending divorce proceeding and relinquish claimon certain named property as a fair and just provision forher; that the settlement be in lieu of all the property rightsof the wife against the husband whether vested, inchoate oranticipated as wife, widow, heir, or next of kin; that "allthe property of the wife, both real and personal, now heldby her or which shall hereafter come to her, shall be andremain her sole and separate property, free from all therights of the husband, with full power to her to convey, as-sign, or deal with the same as if she were single ;" and thathe would sign the necessary papers. From an ordergranting the petition, the administrator appealed. TheCourt of Appeals affirmed the order. Held: A separationagreement will not be construed to bar the right of a sur-viving spouse in the estate of the other, unless it is clearlyexpressed therein, or necessarily implied therefrom. There-fore the grant of letters to another was improper in thiscase where there was no express bar and none was neces-sarily implied.1169 Md. 221, 181 At]. 84 (iI).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWThe Court of Appeals cited as authority for the holdingof the instant case a number of earlier Maryland decisionswhere marriage settlements were held not to bar a hus-band's rights in the estate of his deceased wife unless thesettlement so provided.' The only square decision of theCourt of Appeals cited as authority was the case of Willis v.Jones' which held that a written agreement in contemplationof divorce, containing no evidence of an intent on the partof the husband to abandon his rights in his wife's propertyif there should be no divorce, was not a bar to his right toadminister or share in the estate of his deceased wife.Under the statute4 letters of administration are to begranted by the Court at its discretion either to the survivingspouse or one of the children; and, if there be no child,5 thesurviving spouse is preferred and entitled to notice of thegrant of letters before being excluded from the administra-tion.' The same preference is accorded surviving spousesas heirs in the distribution of deceased spouses' estates.7 Itis evident that our testamentary system has aimed to com-mit administration to the hands of those most interested inthe estate.' The instant case answers the question as to thesignificance of a separation agreement under this policy.By a separation agreement substantially the results of adivorce a mensa et thoro are attained by the parties withouta judicial determination. The marriage is not dissolved,the husband continues to support the wife, and rights inproperty are not changed except as provided by the agree-ment or by the decree. Thus separation alone does notchange the status of a wife and it therefore does not of itselfdeprive the wife of her share in her husband's personal2 Townshend v. Matthews, 10 Md. 251 (1856) ; Hutchins, et al., v. Dixon,Executor, 11 Md. 29 (1857) ; Moody v. Hall, 61 Md. 517 (1884). Inci-dentally the agreements there were found to affect the title to the propertybeyond life and thus effectuate a bar.'42 Md. 422 (1875).'Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 18.Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 19.'Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 32.7 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sees. 125, 126, 127.' Dalrymple, Admr., et al., v. Gamble, 66 Md. 298, 7 Atl. 683, 8 At]. 468(1886), where a widow who by an ante-nuptial agreement had no interestin her hitsband's estate was held to have no right to administer. But seeWillis v. Jones, supra, note 3, where a surviving spouse was held entitledto letters unless he had validly parted with his rights or been lawfullydeprived.9 For general validity of separation agreements see Md. Code Supp., Art.16, Sec. 39A, Acts of 1931, Ch. 220, and Harrison v. Harrison, 160 Md. 378,153 Atl. 58 (1930); Myers v. Myers, 153 Md. 44, 137 Atl. 501 (1927);McFrederick v. McFrederick, 160 Md. 91, 152 Atl. 818 (1930); Leary v.Clayton, 181 Md. 545, 102 Atl. 765 (1917).HEWITT v. SHIPLEYestate or her right to administer." This principle has beencarried to the extreme point that, since an agreement ofseparation does not dissolve the marital relations of theparties, the wife is the widow of the deceased husband andis, as such, technically entitled to preference in the right toadminister his estate regardless of the question as to herright in the property. 1 But it must be remembered that theright of the widow to administer depends on her right totake of the personal estate and therefore the right to inheritis necessarily involved in the application for letters. 2 So,although the marital status is not altered by the agreementof the parties, yet either may contract away his inheritableinterests in the other's estate and thereby lose the right toadminister. 8 There is ample authority holding that theright of a spouse to share in or inherit from the estate ofthe deceased spouse may be barred by a valid separationagreement. 4 That right, however, should not be denied be-cause of a separation agreement unless that purpose beexpressed or necessarily inferred from the agreement. 5In Girard v. Girard" the wife for a consideration paidby the husband "released all right, title, or interest of anykind, whatsoever, in law or in equity, which she may nowhave or possess in any and all property of any kind, nowowned or hereafter acquired by the husband in his lifetime."The New Mexico Supreme Court held that where a separa-tion agreement does not, by express terms or by necessaryimplication, provide that she waives, releases, relinquishes,and renounces her right to inherit from him upon his death,intestate and without issue, such rights still remain withand may be enforced by such surviving widow. Courts willgo no further than the language of the contract extends andwill not deprive either spouse of such rights unless there isa clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away.In Smith v. Smith' where the language of the separationagreement gave to the husband the full dominion of his own10 Nusz, et al., v. Grove, 27 Md. 391, 400 (1867) ; Mobley v. Mobley, 149Md. 401, 408, 131 Atl. 770 (1926).11 Read v. Howe, 13 Iowa 50 (1862)."2 35 A. L. R. 1511 Annotation.10 In re Davis' Estate, 106 Cal. 453, 39 Pac, 756 (1895) ; Jones v. Lamont,118 Cal. 499, 50 Pac. 766 (1897) ; see Dalrymple, Admr., et al., v. Gamble.66 Md. 298, 7 Atl. 683, 8 Atl. 468 (1886), where ante-nuptial agreement hadthis effect.1 See cases cited in 35 A. L. R. 1505 ff. Annotation; McCubbin v. Patter-son, 16 Md. 179 (1860).15 Willis v. Jones, supra, note 3; Girard, et al., v. Girard, 29 N. M. 189,221 Pac. 801, 35 A. L. R. 1493 (1923), both cases cited and approved in theprincipal case.'e Supra, note 15.1757 Ohio St. 27, 48 N. E. 28, 29 (1807).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWproperty, with power to dispose of it by will or otherwisewithout the assent of the wife in her lifetime, the SupremeCourt of Ohio held the wife's rights under the intestacylaws were not barred when the husband did not dispose ofhis property. This case was cited along with Willis v.Jones as authority in the Hewitt case.It would appear then, from the cases, that in Marylandthe law is that a separation agreement as such does not barthe right of a surviving spouse to share in or administerthe estate of a deceased spouse unless there is an expressrelease of such rights or an inference to that effect so strongthat a construction to the contrary would be unreasonable.But, if the right of inheritance is expressly or by strongimplication bartered away by the spouse in the separationagreement, the policy behind the statutes providing forgrant of letters of administration will also take away thepreference in administration of the decedent's estate.In the separation agreement in the Hewitt case thewords used would seem expressly to bar the rights of thewife in the husband's estate since it states the settlement tobe in lieu of all the property rights of the wife against thehusband, whether vested, inchoate, or anticipated, as wife,widow, heir, or next of kin. But the agreement as to thewife's property is merely that it should be "free from allrights of the husband, with full power to her to convey, as-sign, or deal with the same as if she were single." It cannoteven be inferred from the statement that the husband waivedhis right to inherit or to administer should the wife prede-cease him. If here the wife had survived the husband per-haps a different result would have been reached by virtueof the terminology of the wife's waiver of property rightsgrowing out of the marriage. It is arguable, however, thatthe husband's waiver of rights in his spouse's property issubstantially as broad as that of the wife in his, and there-fore it is necessarily implied that the husband by separationagreement bartered away the right to share in deceasedwife's estate and consequently the right to administer theestate.

The Effect of a Separation Agreement Upon the Surviving Spouse\u27s Right to Administer - Hewitt V. Shipley

Judicial Termination of a Contract - Recovery for Partial Performance of An Entire Contract After Breach - Bright V. Ganas

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 2 | Issue 1 Article 1Title PageFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrThis Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted forinclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contactsmccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationTitle Page, 2 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/1MarylandLaw ReviewVOLUME TWO1937-1938Published ByMaryland Law Review, Inc.Redwood and Greene StreetsBaltimore, MarylandIn Co-operation with:Maryland State Bar AssociationBar Association of Baltimore CityJunior Bar Association of Baltimore CityUniversity of Maryland School of LawCopyright 1937-1938 byMARYLAND LAW REVIEw, INC.PRINTED IN THE U. S. A.

Title Page

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 3 Article 3Editorial SectionFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrThis Editorial Section is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been acceptedfor inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contactsmccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationEditorial Section, 1 Md. L. Rev. 231 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss3/3Maryland Law ReviewPublished in December, February, April, and June by Maryland Law Review, Inc.Copyright, 193'7, by Maryland Law Review, Inc.$2.00 Per Volume 75 Cents Per NumberEDITORIAL STAFFJOHN S. STRAHORN, JR, Faculty EditorJOHN RITCHIE, 1II, Assistant Editor and Business ManagerALLEN E. BUZZELL, Chairman, Student Editorial BoardADVISORY EDITORIAL BOARDALEXANDER ARMSTRONG H. H. WALKER LEWISROBERT R. BowIE ARTHUR W. MACHENFREDERICK W. BRUNE CHARLES C. MARBURYHERBERT M. BRUNE, Ji. WILLIAM L. MARBURY, JR.ROBERT R. CARMAN CHARLES MARKELLHOWARD H. CONAWAY EDGAR G. MILLER, JR.PAUL L. CORDISH AMBLER H. MossW. PAGE DAME, JR. REUBEN OPPENHEIMERJOSEPH C. FRANCE NORWOOD B. ORRICKHILARY W. GANS CHARLES R. POSEY, JR.CHARLES McHENRY HOWARD ROSZEL C. THOMSENSYLVAN HAYES LAUCHHEIMER HERBERT T. TIFFANYCHARLES T. LBVINESS, III F. W. C. WEBBAnd the part-time and full-time faculty members of theUniversity of Maryland Law School.STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARDIRVING J. APPLEFELD WILLIAM S. JAMESTALBOT W. BANKS BERNARD S. MEYERALLEN E. BUZZELL JAMES C. MORTON, JR.RICHARD E. CULLEN JOHN G. RousE, JR.S. RAYMOND DUNN JESSE J. RUBINSHERLEY EWING BENSON J. SAKSCLIFFORD H. GRAVES EDWARD A. SCHAUB, Ji.EDWARD D. HIGINBOTHAM J. EDWARD TYLER, IIICONCERNING THE REVIEWWith this number the REVIw begins publishing signedsubject comments submitted by contributors who are notmembers of the Editorial Boards. The first of these, foundherein at page 238, has been contributed by B. H. Harto-gensis, Esq., of the Baltimore City Bar. The REVIEW willalso continue to carry unsigned subject comments (andalso casenotes) prepared by members of the Boards. Ex-EDITORIAL SECTIONamples of these are found in the present number followingMr. Hartogensis's comment and in the February numberat the beginning of the casenote and comment section.The REVIEw believes that such subject conunents offactual and informational nature will prove as useful to thereaders as the analytical and interpretational leadingarticles. The hope is expressed that members of the Barcan be induced to contribute material of each sort. Indistinguishing between leading articles and subject com-ments along the lines set out just above the REvIEW is fol-lowing the examples of several of the established legaljournals.NEWS OF THE LAW SCHOOLDean Howell has been appointed to serve for anotheryear as Chairman of the Special Committee on Non-MemberSchools of the Association of American Law Schools.The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, in itsMarch and April, 1937 numbers, has published an articlein two installments by Professor Strahorn entitled "AReconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions."AN EARLY MARYLAND DECISION ON JUDICIALREVIEW OF LEGISLATION.*The current controversy over President Roosevelt'srecent proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates has focussed attention on the general problem ofjudicial review of legislation and on the case of Marbury v.Madison,1 which was the first case in which the SupremeCourt, then speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall,* The REVIEW is indebted to G. Ross Veazey, Esqi., of the Baltimore CityBar for calling attention to the Whittington case and the other materialsand for suggesting that they be presented to the readers. The matter ofthe history of judicial review of legislation has been extensively treatedat various times in the past. No effort has been made herein to incor-porate the whole literature of the problem. The local materials are pre-sented because of the possible current Interest to the members of theMaryland bar.I Iranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWexercised the power to declare statutes unconstitutional.While the R~viEw refrains, for reasons of policy, fromtaking either side of the controversy over the merits of thePresident's proposal, yet it is felt that the readers on bothsides of the question may be interested in an early Mary-land case, decided less than a year before Marbury v. Madi-son, which also asserted the doctrine of judicial power tohold statutes unconstitutional. Although no actual coinci-dence of language appears yet the reasoning' foreshadowsthat of Marshall's famous opinion, and, because of the iden-tity of the participants in the case, it may throw some lighton the interpretation of the United States Constitutionitself.The case was Whittington v. Polka decided in the Mary-land General Court" by Chief Judge Jeremiah TownleyChase. In that case the plaintiff, William Whittington,had been appointed and commissioned Chief Justice of theCounty Courts of the Fourth District (Caroline,- Dor-chester, Somerset, and Worcester Counties) under thestatute of 17961 which provided that the terms of thejustices should last during good behavior. The then cur-rent state constitution provided' that all judges shouldhold their commissions during good behavior. By a laterAct of 1801 the former statute was repealed and underthe later one the defendant, William Polk, was commis-sioned by the Governor to' serve in place of the plaintiff.Luther Martin then brought an action of novel disseisinon behalf of the plaintiff against the defendant, on theI Beveridge says that in the Maryland case the opinion employs "pre-cisely the same reasoning" as was used by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, III, 612, app. c.I H. & J. 236 (1802).'The General Court, like the Chancery Court, was a central trial courtof state-wide jurisdiction. Although legally inferior to the Court of Ap-peals yet it was, until abolished in 1806, very highly regarded, as muchso as the Court of Appeals. To this effect and in general concerning theGeneral Court, see Bond, The Court of Appeals of Maryland-A History,Ch. III, 58-98. It is interesting to note that both Judge Chase, who wrotethe opinion, and William Polk, who was defendant, later served together onthe Court of Appeals after its reorganization in 1806. The former servedas Chief Judge and the latter as one of the Associate Judges.5 Acts 1796, Ch. 43 as amended Acts 1797, Ch. 69.'Md. Const. (1776), Form of Government, Se. 40.T Acts 1801, Ch. 74.EDITORIAL SECTIONground that the defendant had unjustly disseised the plain-tiff of his freehold in the office. The plaintiff relied on theprovision of the state constitution and contended that hehad a vested interest in his office during good behaviorand that the later Act could not constitutionally deprivehim of his life tenure.While the Court held for the defendant both on theground' that the constitutional provision protected only"judges" and not "justices", and because the writ of noveldisseisin was not the proper method by which to raise thequestion9 yet it discussed the question of its power to holda statute unconstitutional if it found a statute to violatesome constitutional provision. Although the correctnessof both the following propositions was conceded by coun-sel, yet the court discussed1" at great length whether it iscorrect:"1. That an act of assembly repugnant to the Con-stitution is void," and"2. That the Courts have a right to determine alact of assembly void, which is repugnant to the Con-stitution."The Court pointed out11 that the State Constitution,composed of the Bill of Rights and the Form of Govern-ment, was a compact between the people of Maryland whichestablished that all government, of right, originates fromthe people, who through the compact had distributed gov-ernmental powers to the several departments of govern-ment subject to the restrictions the people had seen fit toimpose. Said the Court :12"The legislature, being the creature of the consti-tution and acting within a circumscribed sphere, is notomnipotent, and cannot rightfully exercise any power,but that which is derived from that instrument."The constitution having set certain limits or land-marks to the power of the legislature, whenever they* 1 H. & J. at 248-9.* 1 H. & J. at 249-50.10 1 H. & J. at 241 et seq.1 1 H. & J. at 242.s Ibid, et seq.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWexceed them they act without authority, and such actsare mere nullities, not being done in pursuance ofpower delegated to them: Hence the necessity of somepower under the constitution to restrict the acts of thelegislature within the limits defined by the constitu-tion."The power of determining finally on the validityof the acts of the legislature cannot reside with thelegislature, because such power would defeat andrender nugatory, all the limitations and restrictionson the authority of the legislature, contained in thebill of rights and form of government, and they wouldbecome judges" of the validity of their own acts, whichwould establish a despotism and subvert that greatprinciple of the constitution, which declares that thepowers of making, judging, and executing the law,shall be separate and distinct from each other ..." ... It is the office and province of the court todecide all questions of law which are judicially broughtbefore them, according to the established mode of pro-ceeding, and to determine whether an act of the legis-lature, which assumes the appearance of a law, and isclothed with the garb of authority, is made pursuantto the power vested by the constitution in the legisla-ture; for if it is not the result or emanation of authorityderived from the constitution, it is not law, and cannotinfluence the judgment of the court in the decision ofthe question before them ..."The oath of a judge is 'that he will do equal rightand justice according to the law o f this state, in everycase in which he shall act as judge.'"To do right and justice according to the law, thejudge must determine what the law is, which neces-sarily involves in it the right of examining the con-stitution. (which is the supreme or paramount law,and under which the legislature derive the only author-ity they are invested with, of making laws), and con-sidering whether the act passed is made pursuant tothe constitution, and that trust and authority whichis delegated thereby to the legislative body."The three great powers or departments of gov-ernment are independent of each other, and the legis-lature, as such, can claim no superiority or pre-emi-EDITORIAL SECTIONnence over the other two. The legislature are thetrustees of the people, and, as such, can only movewithin those lines which the constitution has definedas the boundaries of their authority, and if they shouldincautiously, or unadvisedly transcend those limits,the constitution has placed the judiciary as the barrieror safeguard to resist the oppression, and redress theinjuries which might accrue from such inadvertent, orunintentional infringements of the constitution."The Whittington case was decided on June 12, 1802, andMarbury v. Madison on February 24, 1803. Senator Bev-eridge, in his Life of John Marshall,"3 lists the Whittingtoncase as one, among others, of which Marshall may haveheard before he delivered his opinion in Marbury v. Madi-son. Beveridge admits that the report of the Whittingtoncase was not published until 1821 but suggests that Mar-shall may have heard of it through Chase. Beveridge said:"Marshall was surely informed of this case by Chase who,as Chief Justice of Maryland, decided it." This is anobvious error on Beveridge's part for he apparently con-fused the Samuel Chase" of Maryland who sat on theSupreme Court with Marshall and the Jeremiah TownleyChase who wrote the opinion in the Whittington case. In-cidentally, the latter was "Chief Judge" and not "ChiefJustice". This is a distinction which is all the more im-portant because of the detail of the Whittington case.Regardless of whether Marshall had ever heard of theWhittington case, it is seemingly relevant on the questionof judicial review by the Federal Courts for another rea-son, viz., Luther Martin's connection both with the caseand the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Martin's con-nection with the Whittington case, as counsel for the plain-tiff who asserted the applicability of the doctrine of uncon-stitutionality of legislation, shows his agreement with thepropositions announced in the language of the opinion,which agreed with the major premise of his client's case,although not with the minor.18 Beveridge, loc cit., supra note 2.14 Samuel Chase had sat on the General Court prior to his appointmentto the Supreme Court of the United States In 1796.MARYLAND LAW REVIEWIt was Martin who, in the Constitutional Convention of1787, introduced the resolution15 which, as shortened, be-came the "Supreme law of the land" clause of the Constitu-tion, reading:"This Constitution, and the Laws of the UnitedStates which shall be made in pursuance thereof; andall Treaties made, or which shall be made, under theAuthority of the United States, shall be the supremeLaw of the land; and the Judges in every State shallbe bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution orlaws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."16The insertion of the substance of the Luther Martinresolution in the Constitution goes far to show that theframers had in mind that state judges might not willinglyenforce statutes passed in pursuance of the Constitution.It was generally thought that Federal judges would nothesitate to follow Federal law. The effort was to makecertain that any legislative act, State or Federal, should begauged by the State judiciary by applying the Constitutionas the Supreme Law of the land.Luther Martin's acceptance of the doctrine of judicialreview of legislation as shown by his position in the Whit-tington case may throw some light on the meaning of the"Supreme law of the land" clause of the Constitutionwhich, in substance, he introduced. It may go to showthat the framers of the Constitution contemplated that th dcourts should have the power to declare legislation uncon-stitutional.15 Mr. Brinton Coxe, in his Essay on Judicial Power and UnconstitutionalLegislation (1893) points out that on July 17, 1787 Luther Martin offeredthis Resolution In the Constitutional Convention:"Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virteand in pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all treaties made and rdti-fled under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law ofthe respective states, as far as those acts, or treaties, shall relate to thesaid states, or their citizens and Inhabitants :-and that the Judiciaries ofthe several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions--anything inthe respective laws of the individual states to the contrary, notwithstand-ing.""4United States Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2.

Editorial Section

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 2 Article 8Attachment - Public Institution as Garnishee.Hughes v. SvbodaFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrPart of the Remedies CommonsThis Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, pleasecontact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationAttachment - Public Institution as Garnishee. Hughes v. Svboda, 1 Md. L. Rev. 172 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss2/8CASENOTES AND COMMENTSATTACHMENT - PUBLIC INSTITUTION ASGARNISHEE. HUGHES V. SVBODA'While the defendant-appellee, Svboda, was serving aterm in the Maryland House of Correction, plaintiff-appel-lant, Hughes, instituted in the Circuit Court for AnneArundel County non-resident attachment proceedingsagainst Svboda for an alleged claim of $775. The writ ofattachment was served upon the superintendent of theHouse of Correction, and that institution was summoned asgarnishee. At the time of his incarceration Svboda had onhis person cash amounting to $426.25 which was taken bythe warden, of which amount, prior to laying the attach-ment, Svboda had spent a small sum. As to the remainder,the Board of Welfare, through the Attorney General of thestate, confessed assets. The motion of Svboda, defendant, toquash the attachment was granted, and an appeal was takenfrom such action. The Court did not discuss appellee's con-tentions that he had been a resident of Maryland for somemonths prior to sentence, that he was amenable to suit inthe Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County at the time theattachment was issued, and that the writ of summon issuedcould readily have been served upon him. The Court af-firmed the order upon the principle that a public officer orpublic institution is not subject to garnishment. In refer-ence to the confession of assets, it was held the superintend-ent had received the funds in question by virtue of his office,and, since the laws of the State were not intended to giveauthority to lay attachments in the hands of public officialsor institutions, it necessarily follows that their operationis not suspended by a confession of assets. The appellee'srights must be determined by the law of the State, and notby the pleasure of its subordinates.Although the statute2 prescribes in effect that an attach-ment may be laid in the plaintiff's own hands or in the handsof "any other person", it has long been held in this juris-diction that, notwithstanding the apparent broad scope ofthis phrase, it does not include within its purview a gov-ernmental or a municipal corporation; the rule being thatsuch bodies corporate are by reason and necessity excludedunless specifically named8. It was said in Wilson v. Ridge-ly4 that "great public inconvenience would arise if money'168 Md. 440, 178 Atl. 108 (1935).Md. Code, Art. 9, Sec. 29.'Baltimore v. Root, 8 Md. 95, 63 Am. Dec. 692 (1855); Gomborov onAttachment, 24 et seq."46 Md. 235, 248 (1877), quoting with approval from Bulkley v. Eckert,3 Barr (Pa.) 368 (1846).MARYLAND LAW REVIEWcould be thus arrested in the hands of officers, and they bemade liable to all the delay, embarrassment and trouble thatwould ensue from being stopped in the routine of their bus-iness, compelled to appear in court, employ counsel and an-swer interrogatories, as well as take care that the proceed-ings are regularly carried on." The holding in Baltimorev. Root,5 to the effect that salaries due public officials areexempt from attachment was expressed as a more generalprinciple in Wilson v. Ridgely6 to the effect that an attach-ment cannot be maintained which has been levied upon anyfunds held by a person as a public officer. The principlewas stated again in Dale v. Brumbly7 concerning funds inthe hands of a Clerk of a court.' Robertson v. Beall9 is ob-viously distinguishable. In that case, funds in the handsof an ex-sheriff, consisting of fees due to and collected byhim for an ex-register of wills were held liable to attach-ment; both parties being out of office at the time the attach-ment issued, they stood in the same relation to each otheras any other creditors and debtors. Their terms of officehaving expired, there was nothing in public policy which in-terdicted the levying of the attachment."The general rule is stated in Corpus Juris:" "the ex-emption of a State from being made garnishee extends toits officers and agents. The same rule applies to federal of-cers and agents."An interesting holding was arrived at in the Tennesseecase of Dickens v. Bransford Realty., wherein an attach-ment sought to reach funds held by a railroad operatingunder the supervision of the Director General of Railroads.Deciding that garnishment would not lie, the Court stated:"While it is true that Public Act No. 107 of the Sixty-FifthCongress very broadly authorized suits against such com-mon carriers, still their liability to suit is not greater thanthat of the various municipal corporations of this state.Such liability, however, should be confined to their owncreditors. Since it is the settled policy of this State to holdimmune from garnishments all municipalities and other5 Supra, note 3.'Supra, note 4.798 Md. 468, 56 Atl. 807, 64 L. R. A. 112 (1904).6 As this purports to deal solely with the position of a public institutionas garnishee, the question of funds in custodia legis will not be discussedherein. For an interesting case on this latter problem, see Horsey Co. v.Martin, 142 Md. 52, 120 Atl. 235 (1923).' 10 Md. 125 (1856).10 See also L. R. A. 1917-F, 1119.1128 C. J. 61, Garnishment, Sec. 74.21 141 Tenn. 387, 210 S. W. 644 (1918).CASENOTES AND COMMENTSgovernmental agencies, we think such protection must beaccorded to defendant .. "The salary of an instructor in a Los Angeles public schoolwas held not subject to garnishment, in Weiser v. Payne."However Smith v. City of Mobile, 5 from Alabama, held acity firemen's compensation subject to garnishment, sincethe fireman was an employee of the city, and his $75 permonth compensation was " salary" and not " wages " with-in the statute authorizing garnishment of money due cityemployees as salary. 6 This case is an instance of the trendof legislative policy reflected by statutes making expressprovision, by garnishment or closely analogous remedies,for the subjection of the compensation of public officers andemployees to the claims of their creditors. 7 This is, ofcourse, in strong contrast to the policy of the courts, as ex-emplified by Baltimore v. Root' s or by the recent Georgiacase of Haverty Loan and Savings Co. v. McAfee,1' hold-ing that a municipal employee's creditor having an assign-ment of salary, could not enjoin the municipality from pay-ing to the employee the salary due him, again speaking ofpublic policy exempting municipalities from garnishment ofwages due a municipal employee.2" Numerous courts arein accord with Baltimore v. Root in holding that a garnish-ment statute making corporations liable to garnishee pro-cess does not apply to municipal corporations, 21 although arespectable minority 2 of jurisdictions has held otherwise.The attitude of the courts and the extent to which theysometimes go in interpreting statutes is illustrated by Owenv. Terrell.2" A New Mexico statute provided in effect thatin all cases where the plaintiff has a judgment in some courtof the state against the defendant any public officer may besummoned as garnishee. The court held that there was noexpress or implied intent by the act in question to subjectthe salary of a public officer to garnishment. "So far as theact itself appears, the Legislature may have only intendedto extend the process of garnishment to public officers in23 Ibid., 141 Tenn. 391.1 110 Cal. App. 378, 294 Pac. 407 (1930), followed by Lay v. Hammond,212 Cal. 665, 300 Pac. 10 (1931).15 230 Ala. 584, 162 So. 361 (1935).16 Alabama Code, 1928, Sees. 8088, 8090.1" 28 C. J. 181, Garnishment, Sec. 219.1 Supra, note 3.'8 179 Ga. 673, 177 S. E. 241 (1934).10 See also Shepherd v. Jones, 228 Ala. 307, 153 So. 223 (1934).21 Ann. Cas. 1913-B, 746, 56 A. L. R. 602 et seq.12 Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416 (1850); Wilson v. Lewis, 10 R. 1.285 (1872).28 22 N. M. 373, 162 Pac. 171 (1916).174MARYLAND LAW REVIEWcases where such officers had come into possession of prop-erty or money of the judgment debtor by virtue of the of-fice or otherwise, as in the case of money deposited withofficers, or where funds or property were in custodia legis.It is not for this court to broaden the terms of this act, orby construction read into the act an intention which doesnot clearly appear." The following year the Legislatureexpressed its intent unambiguously24 and extended the rightto garnishee funds in the hands of the state and its sub-divisions to salaries due public officers. This statute wasapplied to the salary of a district attorney in Stockard v.Hamilton.25Several decisions have been rendered on the question ofthe constitutionality of such statutes. It has been broadlystated that statutes authorizing the garnishment of the sal-ary or the wages of public officials or employees are withinthe legislative power.26 A statute permitting the garnish-ment of the wages of municipal and county employees, whichdoes not extend to those of the state, does not conffict with aconstitutional provision against class legislation, Cavenderv. Hewitt.27  An Illinois statute,28 was held unconstitu-tional as class legislation as it did not apply to all municipalcorporations of the state.2 9DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING APPELLATE RUL-INGS ON SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW-CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES-FOLB V. STATE'One of two defendants convicted by a judge without ajury of "operating a gaming table"I appealed from the con-viction alleging as grounds of error, first, that the "slotmachines" in question were not sufficiently proven to con-stitute "gaming tables" under the statute, and, second, thatthe testimony of an accomplice was erroneously admittedwithout corroboration. Held: Conviction affirmed. Thelegal sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the slot ma-chines were gaming tables may not be considered on appeal,24 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Ch. 59, Sec. 59 127 (1929).25 25 N. M. 240, 180 Pac. 294 (1919).26Dunkley v. McCarthy, 157 Mich. 339, 122 N. W. 126, 17 Ann. Cas. 523(1909); note, 22 A. L. R. 760.2"145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A. L. R. 755 (1922).28 Illinois Laws, 1905, p. 285." Badenock v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N. E. 31 (1906).1169 Md. 209, 181 Atl. 225 (sub. nom. Ruthenberg et al. v. State) (1935).

Attachment - Public Institution as Garnishee. Hughes v. Svboda

Maryland Law ReviewVolume 1 | Issue 4 Article 10IndexFollow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlrThis End Matter is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted forinclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contactsmccarty@law.umaryland.edu.Recommended CitationIndex, 1 Md. L. Rev. 369 (1937)Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss4/10INDEX TO VOLUME ONEAUTHOR INDEX TO LEADING ARTICLES, SIGNEDCOMMENTS, AND BOOK REVIEWSArnold, Bridgewater M. Conditional Sales of Chattelsin M aryland .................................... 187Cairns, Huntington Review of Robinson, Law and theLawyers ...................................... 101Chesnut, W. Calvin The English Courts-Recent Pro-posals for Better Despatch of Business ........... 277Gump, George The Meaning of "General" Powers ofAppointment Under the Federal Estate Tax ........ 300Hartogensis, B. H. (Signed Comment) Maryland Statu-tory Modifications of the Common Law of RealProperty ...................................... 238Howard, Charles McHenry Charitable Trusts in Mary-land .... ...................................... 105Howard, Charles McHenry Review of Casner, MarylandAnnotations to the American Law Institute's Re-statement of the Law of Agency .................. 99Howell, Roger Review of Corwin, The Commerce Powerversus State's Rights ............................ 184Lentz, William Revocation of a Will by Birth of a Child. 32Lewis, H. H. Walker Review of Magill, Taxable Income. 362Mullen, James Morfit Jurisdiction Over Non-ResidentMotorists for Suits Arising from Local Accidents... 222Niles, Emory H. Review of Herbert, Uncommon Law.. 181Page, Charles G. Latent Equities in Maryland ........ 1Slingluff, Jesse, Jr. Mortgagee's Rights in the Event ofa Deficiency .................................... 128Strahorn, John S., Jr. Review of Reiblich, MarylandAnnotations to the American Law Institute's Re-statement of the Law of Conflict of Laws .......... 364Williams, Raymond S. Review of Shriver, Ed., JusticeOliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncol-lected Letters and Papers ........................ 273TITLE INDEX TO LEADING ARTICLESCharitable Trusts in Maryland, Charles McHenry How-ard .... ....................................... 105Conditional Sales of Chattels in Maryland, BridgewaterM . A rnold ..................................... 187English Courts, The-Recent Proposals for Better Des-patch of Business, W. Calvin Chesnut ............. 277Jurisdiction Over Non-resident Motorists for Suits Aris-ing from Local Accidents, James Morfit Mullen .... 222Latent Equities in Maryland, Charles G. Page .......... 1Meaning of "General" Powers of Appointment Under theFederal Estate Tax, The, George Gump ............ 300Mortgagee's Rights in the Event of a Deficiency, JesseSlingluff, Jr .................................... 128Revocation of a Will by Birth of a Child, William Lentz.. 32TITLE INDEX TO EDITORIAL SECTIONSConcerning the Maryland Law Review ..... 51, 141,231,317Early Maryland Decision on Judicial Review of Legisla-tion, A n ........................................ 232News of the Bar Associations ................. 54, 142, 318News of the Law School .................. 56, 143, 232, 318Recent Constitutional Amendments ................... 57Special Session of the Legislature, The ................ 144Symposium on Law Reviews in a Neighboring Journal, A. 59TITLE INDEX TO CASENOTES AND COMMENTSAction in Maryland for Wrongful Death Caused andOccurring Elsewhere ............................ 162Annulment of Marriage for Duress Where Pre-maritalRelations Have Occurred ......................... 348Appraisal of Shares of Dissenting Stockholders in Con-solidation ..................................... 338Attachment-Public Institution as Garnishee .......... 172Cancellation of Accrued Dividends on Preferred StockUnder General Reservation in Charter of Power toMake Amendments Changing Terms of Outstand-ing Stock ...................................... 254Constitutional Law-Delegation to President of Power toDeclare Embargo on Exportation of Arms ......... 167Constitutional Law-Municipal Bankruptcy Act-En-croachment Upon State Powers ................... 91Contract for Life-time Employment Held Void for Indefi-niteness of Subject Matter ....................... 73Covenants Running with the Land .................... 320Difficulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings on SubstantiveCriminal Law-Corroboration of Accomplices ...... 175Double Liability of a Bank Stockholder for a Debt of theBank Incurred Before His Ownership of the Stock.. 95Effect of Bankruptcy Discharge on Revocation of MotorVehicle Operator's License for Failure to SatisfyJudgm ent ..................................... 259Further Concerning the Double Liability of Bank Stock-holders ....................................... 270Judicial Termination of a Contract-Recovery for PartialPerformance of an Entire Contract After Breach... 329Maryland Statutory Modifications of the Common Law ofReal Property .................................. 238Need for Corroboration of Plaintiff in a Suit for AlimonyW ithout Divorce ................................ 266Proper Venue of Suit for Alimony Without Divorce-Ouster of Jurisdiction-Amendment .............. 81Surcharging Executors for Depreciation of Securities inMargin Account ................................ 355Tort Suit by Wife Against Husband's Partnership ...... 65Ultra Vires Contracts of Corporations in Maryland ..... 145Validity of State Compensating Tax on Use Within Stateof Chattels Purchased Outside State .............. 263Venue of Suit Against Domestic Corporation .......... 165TITLE INDEX TO BOOK REVIEWSCommerce Power versus State's Rights, The (Corwin)-Roger H owell ................................... 184Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices andUncollected Letters and Papers (Shriver, Ed.)-Raymond S. Williams ............................ 273Law and the Lawyers (Robinson) -Huntington Cairns.. 101Maryland Annotations to the American Law Institute'sRestatement of the Law of Agency (Casner)-Charles McHenry Howard ....................... 99Maryland Annotations to the American Law Institute'sRestatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (Reib-lich) -John S. Strahorn, Jr ...................... 364Taxable Income (Magill)-H. H. Walker Lewis ........ 362Uncommon Law (Herbert)-Emory H. Niles .......... 181INDEX TO CASES NOTEDAmerican General Corporation v. Camp et al ........... 338Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement DistrictN o. 1 .......................................... 91Baltimore and Ohio Railroad v. King .................. 73Bright v. Ganas .................................... 329David v. David ..................................... 65Davis v. Ruzicka .................................... 162Ellis v. Rudy, Commissioner .......................... 259Folb v. State ....................................... 175Ghingher v. Bachtell ............................. 95, 270Goldsborough et al. v. DeWitt et al .................... 355Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc ..................... 263Hughes v. Svboda ................................... 172Lurz v. Lurz ....................................... 348M. J. Grove Lime Co. v. Wolfenden .................... 165Roeder v. Roeder ................................... 266Stockholders of People's Banking Co. v. Sterling ........ 270Union Trust Co. v. Rosenburg ........................ 320United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation .... 167W oodcock v. W oodcock .............................. 81

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