Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2-18-2025 In Re: James Tice Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "In Re: James Tice" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 133. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/133 This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.   ALD-084        NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 25-1086 ___________  In re: JAMES ROBERT TICE,     Petitioner ____________________________________  On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 1:24-cv-00044 & 1:24-cv-00046) ____________________________________  Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 21 February 13, 2025 Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges   (Opinion filed: February 18, 2025) _________  OPINION* _________  PER CURIAM Pro se petitioner James Tice seeks a writ of mandamus relating to two cases, a civil rights case and a federal habeas case, both of which he filed in the District Court in February 2024.  Tice asks us to direct the District Court in those actions, and the state  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  2  court in his underlying criminal matter, to take a variety of actions, such as vacating his adult state court convictions, reversing the dismissal of his civil rights complaint, and granting his habeas petition.  Because Tice has not demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief, we will deny his petition. In his civil rights case, the District Court dismissed Tice’s complaint upon defendants’ filing motions to dismiss and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Tice v. Wilson, No. 24-cv-44, 2024 WL 4336306, at *1 (September 27, 2024).  Tice filed an appeal that is currently pending before us and in which he has already filed his brief.  In Tice’s habeas petition, the Magistrate Judge issued a recent report and recommendation to which Tice filed objections on the same day he filed this petition.  See Tice v. Wilson, No. 24-cv-00046.  The District Court has yet to rule on the report and Tice’s objections.  See id.   “The writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy reserved for only the most extraordinary situations.”  In re Abbott Labs., 96 F.4th 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).  It is not a substitute for the appeal process.  In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).  We have the discretion to grant a writ only if the petitioner shows: “(1) a clear and indisputable abuse of discretion or error of law, (2) a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate relief, and (3) a likelihood of irreparable injury.”  In re Abbott Labs., 96 F.4th at 379 (cleaned up).    3  Tice does not meet those standards.  He has not identified any reason that he cannot obtain the relief he seeks concerning his civil-rights case in his ongoing direct appeal or the relief he seeks concerning his habeas matter either in the District Court or, if necessary, on appeal.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d at 219 (“If, in effect, an appeal will lie, mandamus will not.”).   Finally, to the extent that Tice asks us to direct the state court to take action, we lack authority to grant such relief.  See In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 781 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that federal courts of appeal ordinarily “lack appellate jurisdiction over their state counterparts, thus making writs of mandamus generally inappropriate”); White v. Ward, 145 F.3d 1139, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (explaining that a federal court “lack[s] jurisdiction to direct a state court to perform its duty”).  For these reasons, we will deny the mandamus petition. 

English

In Re: James Tice

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-4-2025 Ronaldo Elias Da Silva v. Attorney General United States of America Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Ronaldo Elias Da Silva v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 182. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/182 This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________  No. 24-1755 _______________  RONALDO ELIAS DA SILVA; CRISTINA APARECIDA DE LANA SILVA; E.R.D.S.; M.G.D.S.,   Petitioners  v.  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.   _______________  On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Nos. A216-983-704, A216-983-705, A216-983-706, A216-983-707) Immigration Judge: Jason L. Pope _______________  Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  January 28, 2025  Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges.  (Filed: March 4, 2025) _______________  OPINION∗ _______________     ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. 2  PORTER, Circuit Judge.  Ronaldo Elias da Silva, his wife, and their two children (collectively, the “da Silvas”) are Brazilian nationals petitioning for review of their respective final removal orders. For the reasons below, we will deny their petitions. I  The da Silvas allege that, back in Brazil, unknown individuals fired gunshots at Ronaldo’s car on May 16, 2021. Ronaldo drove to the police station and filed a report complaining about drugs in his neighborhood. Later that day, two armed men showed up at the da Silvas’ house and told Ronaldo that he “should not [have] do[ne] that.” Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 163. Armed men also searched for Ronaldo’s daughter at her school. Undeterred, Ronaldo filed a second report the next day. The police advised Ronaldo to leave the city. The da Silvas fled to another city in Brazil, about an hour-and-a-half away, and stayed with family for ten days. Ronaldo testified that the armed men seemed to stop looking for him while the da Silvas were away. But believing they were still in danger, they continued to the United States, arriving on or about May 28, 2021.  Removal proceedings against the da Silvas began on October 2, 2021. The da Silvas admitted the factual allegations in their respective Notices to Appear and conceded removability. The da Silvas filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the da Silvas’ requests for relief from removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ’s decision. This petition for review followed. 3  II  We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Venue is proper because the immigration proceedings were completed in Newark, New Jersey. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). While we review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence, we review its legal determinations, including “its legal conclusion that those facts did not amount to torture and government acquiescence” under CAT de novo. Manuel-Soto v. Att’y Gen., 121 F.4th 468, 472 (3d Cir. 2024). III A  To be eligible for asylum, an applicant “must demonstrate that he is a ‘refugee’ within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).” Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515–16 (3d Cir. 2006). That requires a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of a protected ground—race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The protected ground must be “an essential or principal reason for the persecution.” Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 685 (3d Cir. 2015); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Persecution means “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985). “ ‘[G]enerally harsh conditions shared by many other persons’ do not amount to persecution.” Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222). Where an applicant for asylum establishes past 4  persecution, a presumption arises that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).  With this framework in mind, the BIA did not err by concluding that the da Silvas are ineligible for asylum. The da Silvas claim membership in the following particular social groups: “[i]nformants who cannot get protection from the Brazilian police;” “[c]rime victims who cannot get protection from the Brazilian police;” and “[w]histleblowers who cannot get protection from the Brazilian police.” Pet’rs’ Opening Br. at 13. But since none of those groups “exist independently of the persecution suffered,” they are not cognizable. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172.   The da Silvas argue that their proposed groups exist independently of their persecution because “the fact that . . . they can’t get protection from the Brazilian police is not the harm.” Pet’rs’ Opening Br. at 13. That argument is unconvincing. As the Court in Lukwago suggested, the prohibition against defining a “particular social group” with reference to the group’s shared experience of persecution is substantive: it avoids a circularity that, if permitted, would end-run Congress’ judgment that asylum is only available to those that have been persecuted on account of certain grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172. Reframing a group’s shared experience to be the inability of the group to be protected from persecution, as opposed to the persecution itself, does nothing to address that concern.  The da Silvas’ applications for asylum based on political opinion likewise falter. For asylum claims premised on political opinion, it is essential that the persecutor attribute a political opinion to the applicant, otherwise persecution cannot be on account 5  of opinion. Guzman Orellana v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 2020). The da Silvas argue that the BIA erred in determining that they do not have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of their pro-whistleblowing political opinion. Although the BIA recognized that “pro-whistleblowing” is a cognizable political opinion, it concluded that the da Silvas had not demonstrated persecution on the basis of an actual or imputed political opinion. Whether persecution has been on the basis of a political opinion is a factual determination that we review for substantial evidence. See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 176. Asked at his hearing whether Ronaldo or his wife ever “publicly express[ed] any political opinion in Brazil, or any anti-crime or anti-drug political opinion in Brazil,” Ronaldo answered, “[n]o.” A.R. at 175. In light of this testimony and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we cannot say that the BIA erred. B  Because the standard for withholding of removal is higher than that for asylum, applicants ineligible for asylum are necessarily also ineligible for withholding of removal. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 182. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in denying the da Silvas’ requests for withholding of removal.  C  The standard for protection under CAT requires applicants to show “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture” under CAT “is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Officials 6  acquiesce when they are “willfully blind to torturous conduct and breach their legal responsibility to prevent it,” or collude with the torturers. Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir. 2007). The da Silvas argue that the BIA erred in concluding that they failed to establish that it is more likely than not that they will be tortured if removed to Brazil. We cannot say the BIA erred in concluding that the da Silvas did not show that they would be subject to torture, or that Brazilian authorities would acquiesce to such treatment. Although Ronaldo believed his pursuers would try to kill him if he returned to Brazil, it is the BIA’s and IJ’s prerogative to disagree with applicants on the basis of other evidence in the record, such as the fact that when the da Silvas fled to a nearby city, the armed men “stop[ped] looking for [them].” A.R. 166. Moreover, the police here were receptive to Ronaldo’s plight, and there is no evidence that public officials were colluding with the da Silvas’ tormentors. Indeed, Ronaldo testified that the Brazilian police took multiple reports. In light of this testimony and without evidence suggesting otherwise, we again cannot say that the BIA erred. * * * Accordingly, we will deny the da Silvas’ petitions. 

Ronaldo Elias Da Silva v. Attorney General United States of America

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4-2-2025 Jalina Fluellen v. David Krasn Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Jalina Fluellen v. David Krasn" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 258. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/258 This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.          NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 24-3083 __________  JALINA FLUELLEN,      Appellant  v.  DAVID KRASN, President/Officer of Boyd Gaming Corporation a/k/a Valley Forge Casino and Resort; VALLEY FORGE CONVENTION CENTER PARTNERS, L.P.; MICHAEL SADOWSKI, Pennsylvania State Trooper, (Troop-T); JOSEPH MEADOWCROFT, Pennsylvania State Trooper, (Troop-T); TABETHA A. DAVIS; RODNEY E. FRYE, JR. ____________________________________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00570) District Judge:  Mia R. Perez ____________________________________  Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 3, 2025  Before:  SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  (Opinion filed: April 2, 2025) ___________  OPINION* ___________  PER CURIAM  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2   Jalina Fluellen appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders denying her motion for a preliminary injunction and granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss because her claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  We will affirm the District Court’s order and judgment, with one slight modification. I.  The procedural history of this case and the details of Fluellen’s claims are well known to the parties and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, Fluellen filed her instant, pro se action on February 5, 2024, based on an altercation that occurred on December 29, 2018, at the Valley Forge Casino.  Fluellen alleged that defendants Tabetha Davis and Rodney Frye assaulted her while she was playing roulette.  After this assault, she was wrongfully branded the aggressor and arrested by Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Troopers Michael Sadowski and Joseph Meadowcroft.  She further claimed that Valley Forge Casino violated her rights by failing to protect her from this assault. The District Court also construed Fluellen’s complaint as asserting a claim for malicious prosecution. The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that all of her claims were outside of their relevant statutes of limitations. After a flurry of additional filings, Fluellen then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which alleged that the Clerk of the Eastern District had violated her rights in relation to a “Constitutional Challenge of Rule 26.1,” without providing specific details. The District Court then dismissed the motion for an injunction without a hearing and granted defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.   3  II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). “We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim, “accept[ing] all factual allegations as true and constru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be appropriate where an affirmative defense—the relevant statute of limitations, for example—is apparent on the face of the complaint. See Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). Meanwhile, we review a district court's ultimate decision to deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, but we exercise plenary review over legal conclusions and review findings of fact for clear error. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010).   III.   On appeal, Fluellen argues that the District Court erred in concluding that her claims were barred by the statute of limitations.1 She is, however, mistaken. All events giving rise to Fluellen’s complaint occurred on or around December 29, 2018. Fluellen did not file her complaint until over five years later, in February 2024. Because Fluellen’s claims for violations of her constitutional rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 arose in  1 Fluellen’s brief raises several additional arguments, but none are relevant to the District Court’s dispositive ruling concerning the statute of limitations, and thus need not be addressed here. 4  Pennsylvania, they are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189–90 (3d Cir. 1993). Her state tort claims likewise have, at most, two-year statutes of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. Fluellen’s claims accrued, and the relevant statutes of limitation began to run, at the time of the incident on or around December 29, 2018. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007); Dubose v. Quinlan, 643 Pa. 244, 258 (Pa. 2017).  Fluellen, therefore, filed her complaint more than five years after the events giving rise to these claims, and well beyond the two-year limitations period.  Fluellen has not argued, and nor can we discern from the record, any reason for equitable tolling to apply in this instance. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639-45 (3d Cir. 2009). As a result, with one exception discussed below, Fluellen’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as her state tort claims, are manifestly untimely, and the District Court correctly granted the Defendant’s motions to dismiss as to those claims. And, in these circumstances, we are satisfied that amendment would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).  The District Court construed Fluellen’s complaint as raising a claim for malicious prosecution, which it dismissed under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. To the extent that Fluellen truly intended to raise such a claim, dismissal pursuant to the statute of limitations is not proper at this time, because Fluellen’s cause of action for this claim would not accrue until her underlying criminal conviction is terminated in her favor. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994); see also Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346, 354 (3d Cir. 2022). That said, dismissal of Fluellen’s malicious prosecution claim 5  was nevertheless proper based on the alternative conclusion that the claim is Heck-barred, as success on her malicious prosecution claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of her underlying conviction.2  Coello, 43 F.4th at 354. As a result, the District Court’s October 23, 2024 order dismissing her malicious prosecution claim is modified to be without prejudice. Curry, 835 F.3d at 379.  The District Court also correctly denied Fluellen’s motion for a preliminary injunction, because her submission did not contain any facts or argument which would suggest that she would suffer irreparable harm or that she would ultimately succeed on the merits of her claims. Bradley v. Pittsburg Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1990). Fluellen’s motion for an injunction appeared to allege that two members of the District Court’s Clerk’s Office had violated her rights in their application of Local Rule 26.1 but does not contain any factual allegations or legal arguments beyond broad allusions to constitutional rights.   Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment as modified. Fluellen’s motion to file a supplemental brief is granted.  2 The Heck bar applies “no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief).” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). 

Jalina Fluellen v. David Krasn

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3-21-2025 Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 223. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/223 This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.   ALD-102        NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 24-3087 ___________  EMILE J. DOMINIQUE, IV,   Appellant  v.  UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ____________________________________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-05752) District Judge:  Honorable John M. Younge ____________________________________  Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 March 13, 2025 Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges  (Opinion filed: March 21, 2025) _________  OPINION* _________  PER CURIAM  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  2   The District Court dismissed Emile J. Dominique IV’s complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We will summarily affirm.  Dominique’s complaint asserts various federal constitutional claims against the United States Department of Defense (DOD) and seeks $40 trillion in compensatory and punitive damages. The complaint alleges that the DOD engaged in targeted, continuous, publicly broadcasted surveillance of Dominique, who claims to be the Messiah. The District Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it with prejudice as factually frivolous. This timely appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Dominique’s complaint as frivolous. “To be frivolous, a claim must rely on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). The complaint relies on a clearly baseless or delusional factual scenario, alleging that the DOD placed Dominique “on live TV[] that anyone could access” and allowed the public to watch Dominique’s everyday activities, all in an effort “to ensure that [C]hristianity[] gets  3  wiped out as a whole.” Complaint at 6. The District Court thus did not err in dismissing these claims as frivolous. Given the nature of Dominique’s filings in the District Court and in this Court, we conclude that providing leave to amend the complaint would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7-16-2025 USA v. Martins Inalegwu Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "USA v. Martins Inalegwu" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 571. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/571 This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.   NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________  No. 24-2594 ____________  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  v.  MARTINS INALEGWU, a/k/a Martins Friday Inalegwu,      Appellant ____________  On Appeal from the United States District Court  for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal No. 1:23-cr-00282-001) District Judge: Honorable Christine P. O’Hearn ____________  Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 5, 2025  Before:  HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.  (Filed:  July 16, 2025) ____________  OPINION* ____________  FISHER, Circuit Judge.  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.   2 Martins Inalegwu participated in a widespread and complex financial fraud scheme. Once apprehended, he pled guilty to committing, and conspiring to commit, illegal money transmission1 and income tax evasion.2 Inalegwu and the Government agreed that his offense level was 28, with Inalegwu potentially being eligible for multiple reductions, including a two-level reduction as a zero-point offender.3 However, the District Court declined to impose the reduction given the severity of the crime and sentenced Inalegwu to 80 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Inalegwu argues that we should vacate his sentence because the District Court erred in its Guidelines calculation and violated his right to allocution by cross-examining him during his sentencing allocution.4 We, however, perceive no such errors and will affirm the sentence of the District Court.  First, Inalegwu argues that the District Court miscalculated his Guidelines range by denying the zero-point offender reduction. We review the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, we review its factual findings for clear error, “and we ‘give due deference to the district court’s application of the [G]uidelines to the  1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1960, 2. 2 26 U.S.C. § 7201; 18 U.S.C. § 2. 3 U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. 4 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (federal crimes). We have appellate jurisdiction under both 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (review of a sentence) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final decisions of district courts).    3 facts.’”5 To be eligible for the zero-point offender reduction, Inalegwu must not have “personally cause[d] substantial financial hardship.”6 While the parties invite us to opine on the contours of personally causing financial hardship, we do not need to do so here: “[e]ven if we determine that the District Court committed procedural error,” such as miscalculating the Guidelines range as Inalegwu argues, “we may still uphold its sentence if the error was harmless.”7  Miscalculating the Guidelines is a non-constitutional error and “is harmless when ‘it is highly probable that the error did not prejudice’ the defendant.”8 If the record establishes “that there is a high probability ‘that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence under a correct Guidelines range,’” it is highly probable that the defendant was not prejudiced by the calculation error.9 When discerning whether this high probability exists, we may consider whether the court made a clear statement of its intent to impose the same sentence even if the range were calculated differently, whether the sentence departed from the advisory range, and whether the court demonstrated awareness of the relevant facts and circumstances.10   5 United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 327 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2003)). 6 U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(6). 7 Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 386. 8 United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 9 Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 387 (quoting Langford, 516 F.3d at 216). 10 See id. at 387–90 (noting it is sometimes discernible from the record that the choice between two possible Guidelines ranges “did not affect the actual sentence”).   4 Here, the District Court heard argument on the zero-point offender adjustment and reviewed the parties’ offered authority. It then made a “clear statement” that it “would have imposed the same sentence regardless of” which range applied.11 When handing down Inalegwu’s 80-month sentence, the sentencing court “want[ed] to specifically note [it] would have imposed this sentence, quite frankly, even if [it] had sustained the defendant’s objections on the zero-point offender [reduction].”12 Still, Inalegwu argues that the District Court’s failure to explain the alternative sentence establishes that he was harmed by the alleged miscalculation. While it is true that clear statements alone are probative but not dispositive of harmless error, the District Court “explain[ed] its reasons” for sentencing Inalegwu to 80 months’ imprisonment “under either Guidelines range.”13 It stated that “the seriousness of the offense . . . warrants a severe and substantial penalty” 14 given its duration and the complexity and sophistication of Inalegwu’s role in the scheme.15 Our conclusion that any alleged error was harmless is further supported by the fact that the District Court imposed a sentence well above the Guidelines range (57 to 71 months) and the range that would have applied with the adjustment (46 to 57 months). When the record shows a clear variance from the disputed Guidelines range and suggests  11 See id. at 387. 12 App. 152–53. 13 See Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 389. 14 App. 153.  15 App. 149.   5 that the sentence was not influenced by that range, “we can be certain that” any alleged error “had no effect on the sentence imposed.”16 Finally, the District Court’s thorough analysis of the circumstances surrounding Inalegwu’s offenses further supports our conclusion “that it would have imposed the same sentence” regardless of any error because sentencing enhancements and reductions are meant to “train the district court’s attention on the details of the crime.”17 Here, the District Court extensively questioned Inalegwu, then deliberately imposed the 80-month sentence to reflect the complexity of the offense, including its enduring harm to the victims. The District Court also emphasized the need for “adequate general deterrence for this type of conduct.”18 Because the foregoing convinces us that any alleged procedural error in calculating Inalegwu’s applicable Guidelines range was harmless, we decline to vacate his sentence. Second, Inalegwu argues that the sentencing judge impermissibly cross-examined him during his allocution. Because he did not object to this questioning at the time of his sentencing, we review for plain error.19 “For reversible plain error to exist,” Inalegwu must establish “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and  16 See Langford, 516 F.3d at 218. 17 See Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 387–88. 18 App. 144. 19 United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the [District Court’s] attention.”).   6 (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”20 We need not go further than the first prong, as there is no error. The purpose of allocution “is not to permit the defendant to re-contest the factual issues of innocence and guilt. Rather, [it] is to afford the defendant an opportunity to raise mitigating circumstances and to present his individualized situation to the sentencing court.”21 In furtherance of this purpose, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires that, prior to imposing a sentence, a sentencing court must “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”22 Inalegwu asserts that the District Court’s questioning amounted to cross examination because it “grill[ed] him about other issues, including his relationship with his children and his knowledge about the source of the funds” and “repeated questions and pushed back against [his] responses.”23 But the District Court’s questions simply engaged with the facts and “enable[d] the sentencing court to craft an individualized sentence.”24 After Inalegwu seemingly concluded his allocution, the Court inquired about Inalegwu’s personal relationships specifically because Inalegwu requested house arrest to  20 See United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2014). 21 United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 778 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2013)). 22 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). 23 Appellant’s Br. 40. 24 Ward, 732 F.3d at 181.   7 limit the effect of his sentence on his children. Likewise, it inquired about the source of the funds because Inalegwu asserted that “[he] never knew full score of [his] mistake and the consequences [he] put [himself] and [his] family into.”25 At no point did the questions become adversarial like a cross-examination or go beyond a clarification of the relevant facts. Inalegwu received a full and fair opportunity to allocute; thus, there was no violation of his right to allocution. Because any error in calculating Inalegwu’s sentencing range was harmless and the sentencing judge’s questioning at allocution did not violate Inalegwu’s due process rights, we will affirm his sentence.  25 App. 126. 

USA v. Martins Inalegwu

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-7-2025 James Jones v. Harry Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "James Jones v. Harry" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 633. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/633 This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.   BLD-186        NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 25-1387 ___________  JAMES JONES,    Appellant  v.  DR. HARRY, COMMISSIONER, SECRETARY, PA DOC;  J. TERRA, SUPERINTENDENT; KERI MOORE, CHIEF GRIEVANCE OFFICER; C.E.R.T., CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS ____________________________________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-05692) District Judge:  Honorable Mia R. Perez ____________________________________  Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 July 24, 2025  Before:  SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges  (Opinion filed: August 7, 2025) _________  OPINION* _________  PER CURIAM  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  2   Inmate James Jones appeals pro se the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint.  We will summarily affirm.  I. On the morning of August 14, 2024, at the State Correctional Institution in Phoenix, Pennsylvania, Correctional Emergency Response Team (“CERT”) officers visited Jones in his housing cell, subjected him to a strip search, and ordered him to carry his mattress to the lower level for screening.  While he transported his mattress, the officers searched his living quarters.  Shortly after returning to his cell, Jones discovered that the CERT officers had removed two cases of his legal documents and discarded them in the housing unit’s trash bin, which he could see from his cell door.  Jones called out to officers on the unit floor and asked them to retrieve his legal materials from the garbage, but they refused.  Jones requested assistance from his Unit Manager, numerous corrections officers, and members of the cleaning crew—all refused to retrieve his documents from the bin.   Jones initiated this action against Department of Corrections’ Commissioner Dr. Harry, Superintendent Terra, CERT officers, Chief Grievance Officer Kerri Moore, and anyone else that may have been involved, referring to them as “Defendants et al.”  Jones sued the defendants in their official and individual capacities, alleged violations of his First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and brought a claim of negligence against Terra.   The District Court screened Jones’ complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), dismissed it with prejudice in part and without prejudice in part, and granted Jones leave  3  to amend his complaint within thirty days.  In its subsequent order denying Jones’ motion for reconsideration, the District Court reiterated that he could file an amended complaint within thirty days or proceed with his original filing, but that if Jones opted to stand on his original complaint, it would “issue a final order dismissing the case.”  Jones filed a notice of intent to stand on his original complaint.  The District Court therefore dismissed all of Jones’ federal claims with prejudice and dismissed his state law claim without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Jones appealed.1   II. We agree with the District Court’s analysis.  As an initial matter, the District Court properly concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred Jones’ official capacity claims against all defendants, who are all state officials, for monetary damages.  See Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2020).  The District Court’s dismissal of Jones’ individual capacity claims against Moore was also proper, as a prisoner does not have a free-standing right to an effective grievance process, and an officer’s  1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing Jones’ complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020).  Dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) are governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  This standard requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).  Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.     4  mishandling of grievances does not itself violate a constitutional right.  See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001).    As for Jones’ individual capacity claims against Harry and Terra, we agree that Jones failed to plead their liability as supervisors.  To do so, Jones had to “plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) Id. at 676.  Jones vaguely claimed that Harry “unleashed the CERT on all prisoners,” but he failed to identify an unconstitutional policy or articulate any direct actions she or Terra took related to the incident on August 14, 2024.2  And, while the District Court provided him the opportunity to amend these claims, he declined to do so. The District Court also properly dismissed Jones’ Fourth Amendment claims.  Regarding the CERT officers’ search of his cell, “prisoners do not have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in their cells.”  Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001).  Thus, it was appropriate for the District Court to dismiss this claim without granting him leave to amend, as amendment would have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).   As for Jones’ strip search claim, an inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights in this regard are “very narrow.”  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325–26 (3d Cir. 2016).  The District Court properly concluded that Jones’ original complaint failed to establish the  2 In his filing on appeal, Jones referenced a pattern of alleged abuses that included denial of medical services and assaults on inmates by staff, but he failed to demonstrate that these alleged practices had any connection to the claims in his complaint.    5  search was conducted for an illegitimate purpose.  Again, the District Court granted him the opportunity to elaborate via amendment, but Jones elected to stand on his original complaint.  There was no error in converting the dismissal to with prejudice.  Cf. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996).  We also agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Jones’ claims related to the destruction of his legal documents.  Although Jones couched this claim as a Sixth Amendment violation, the District Court properly treated it as an “access-to-courts” claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendment.  See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (noting that the Sixth Amendment is limited to criminal proceedings).  An inmate raising an access-to-courts claim must allege that he lost a chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable claim challenging his conviction or conditions or confinement.  See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  Jones did not plead a claim under those standards.  Jones claimed that CERT officers disposed of legal documents he needed for a pending Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition or appeal and for the District Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”).3  But the District Court reviewed the public docket and found no pending PCRA proceeding.4  The Court provided Jones the opportunity to amend his pleading and  3 In both his motion for reconsideration and his filing on appeal, Jones clarified that he had withdrawn his PCRA petition because he planned on pursuing an application with the CIU.  However, he failed to show he lost an arguable claim.  See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).   4 A district court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including judicial proceedings.  See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).   6  specify whether he had an active PCRA petition, but he opted to stand on his original complaint.  Therefore, the District Court’s dismissal was proper.   We also agree that Jones failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation because the deprivation of his legal materials does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (explaining that only deprivation of life’s “necessities” is sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation).   Finally, given Jones’ failure to state a claim under federal law, we find that the District Court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over his supplemental state-law claim.  See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A court may [decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction] under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) when it dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).   Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.    

James Jones v. Harry

Hector Tipan Lopez v. Attorney General United States of America

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4-29-2025 Bobby Williamson v. Brian Bolton Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Bobby Williamson v. Brian Bolton" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 340. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/340 This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.            NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 24-2246 __________  BOBBY KENNETH WILLIAMSON,    Appellant  v.  BRIAN BOLTON; SHANE GRASSMEYER; KELSEY STRONG;  DANIEL WENDLE; TIMOTHY STRAIT; SCOTT ELLENBERGER;  JOHN RIVELLO; CHARLES PITTSINGER; BEVERLYN BECK ____________________________________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01965) District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane ____________________________________  Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 15, 2025 Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges  (Opinion filed: April 29, 2025) ___________  OPINION* ___________  PER CURIAM  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  2  Bobby Williamson appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his amended complaint brought against various correctional officers at SCI Huntingdon. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.  I.  Williamson is an inmate at SCI Huntingdon. His pro se complaint1 alleges multiple federal and state law claims arising from the same incident—that while he was using the urinal in an inmate-only bathroom, correctional officer Brian Bolton “peered into” the bathroom in an act of voyeurism. ECF No. 36 at 7. The incident was investigated after he reported it under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and his complaint was determined to be unfounded. As a result of this determination, he received a Class I misconduct for lying to an employee and was sentenced to the loss of his prison job and 30 days of cell restriction. He also alleges multiple incidents in which a different correctional officer ordered him to do work he was not required to do. His complaint connects these incidents and the Class I misconduct to his decision to file the PREA complaint. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the District Court granted while providing leave to amend some of the claims.   1 Because this case was adjudicated at the motion to dismiss stage, we accept the allegations in Williamson’s complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to him. See Mator v. Wesco Distrib., Inc., 102 F.4th 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2024). We also construe Williamson’s filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  3 Williamson subsequently filed an amended complaint with an attached supplemental pleading, as well as a motion for leave to file the supplemental pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The supplemental pleading alleged constitutional violations arising from strip searches he was subjected to after the events in his original pleadings. He later moved for leave to amend the supplemental pleading. The District Court denied the motion for leave to file the supplemental pleading because the alleged cause of action was not factually connected enough to the original complaint. It also denied the motion for leave to amend the supplemental pleading as moot. Finally, it dismissed Williamson’s amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) without further leave to amend. Williamson timely appeals. II  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Williamson’s claims under § 1915(e)(2).2 See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). We may affirm on any basis in the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). To survive dismissal, a complaint must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Williamson raises three issues in his opening brief: whether the District Court appropriately dismissed (1) his retaliatory misconduct claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2)  2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  4 his § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, and (3) his state law tort claim of invasion of privacy against Bolton. We address each issue in turn. To state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a prisoner must plausibly allege (1) that they were engaged in protected conduct; (2) that they suffered an adverse action “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising their constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001). Williamson alleges that the misconduct charge for lying was filed against him in retaliation for his decision to file a PREA complaint against Bolton. Filing a grievance against a corrections officer is certainly protected conduct, see Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016),3 and being charged with a Class I misconduct is an adverse action. See id. at 423. The Class I misconduct charge for lying was, by its nature, motivated by Williamson’s decision to file the PREA complaint, as he was charged for allegedly lying in the complaint itself. Thus, Williamson adequately stated a claim for retaliation regarding the misconduct charge. Once a plaintiff adequately pleads a retaliation claim, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that “they would have made the same decision absent the protected  3 The Appellees argue that Williamson’s claim fails on the first element because filing a false PREA complaint is not protected conduct. But Williamson’s complaint alleges that his complaint was not false, which at this stage we must accept as true, and PREA forbids disciplinary action against an inmate based on a good faith complaint. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.78(f).   5 conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016).4 In general, this “same decision” defense is fact-specific and should be decided by the fact-finder, see Baldassare v. State of N.J., 250 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 2001), and thus, “it makes little sense to apply it at the pleading stage,” Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2007), unless it is apparent on the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). This defense is not apparent on the face of Williamson’s complaint. The relevant defendants clearly would not have had any reason to charge him for lying to an employee if he had not filed the PREA complaint in the first place. While prison policy arguably makes disciplinary action mandatory when a prisoner files an unfounded PREA complaint,5 Williamson’s pleadings not only contest whether the PREA complaint was unfounded, but also allege that the policy was unevenly applied in practice.6 We will therefore vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Williamson’s retaliatory misconduct claim.  4 In dismissing this claim, the District Court relied on the “some evidence” standard as derived from Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). But as we have previously explained, that is not the applicable standard in this context. See Watson, 834 F.3d at 425.  5 The Pennsylvania DOC PREA Procedures Manual, DC-ADM 008 Section 17(C)(8) states that “[r]eporting inmates shall be subject to disciplinary action for sexual abuse or sexual harassment allegations which have been unfounded” (emphasis added).  6 In his complaint, Williamson details specific instances of Class I misconducts being issued against black inmates whose PREA complaints were deemed unfounded, and one instance of a white inmate whose PREA complaint was also deemed unfounded but who did not receive a Class I misconduct.   6 The District Court properly dismissed Williamson’s § 1985(3) claim. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following:  (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.  Davis v. Wigen, 82 F.4th 204, 214 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983)). To adequately plead the first element, Williamson needed to allege “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). His bare assertion that defendants “agreed amongst themselves . . . to act in concert in order to deprive plaintiff of” his rights, ECF No. 36 at 27, is not enough. See id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81. For this reason, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Williamson’s § 1985(3) claim. The District Court dismissed Williamson’s state law tort claims, including invasion of privacy, on the basis of sovereign immunity. It reasoned that “the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment when they took the allegedly tortious actions.” ECF No. 43 at 9. We disagree. It is true that Pennsylvania state employees acting within the scope of their employment enjoy sovereign immunity from intentional tort claims. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310.7 Under Pennsylvania law, employees’ actions are not  7 There are exceptions under which the state legislature has waived immunity, none of  7 within the scope of their employment if they are “different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.” Justice v. Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057, 1067 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1958)). Accepting Williamson’s allegations as true and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to him, it is difficult to see how an act of voyeurism by a correctional officer could be within the scope of his employment, given that it is certainly not an authorized action. See DC-ADM 008 Section 11 Attachment 11-C (2020) (including voyeurism in the definition of prohibited sexual abuse by a staff member and providing as an example “peering at an inmate who is using a toilet in his or her cell to perform bodily functions”). For this reason, we will also vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Williamson’s state law tort claim of invasion of privacy.8 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Williamson’s retaliatory misconduct and invasion of privacy claims and remand for further proceedings on those claims. We will otherwise affirm the judgment of the District Court.  which apply here. See 42 Pa. C.S.§ 8522. 8 In his opening brief, Williamson did not discuss the remaining claims in his complaint, so we do not consider them here. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that litigants forfeit claims that they fail to develop in an opening brief).  1 MATEY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the majority’s judgment but write separately to note the overextension of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and the needlessly protracted nature of this case.  A. Start with PREA, passed by Congress to “establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States,” and “develop and implement national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape.” 34 U.S.C. § 30302(1), (3). To effect this aim, Congress directed the Attorney General to “publish a final rule adopting national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape.” Id. § 30307(a)(1). Almost a decade later, the Attorney General embraced an expansive set of prohibitions, including a crackdown on “[v]oyeurism,” defined as “an invasion of privacy of an inmate . . . by staff for reasons unrelated to official duties, such as peering at an inmate who is using a toilet in his or her cell to perform bodily functions.” 28 C.F.R. § 115.6. But that regulation seems to exceed its statutory authorization. Congress defined “rape” in PREA as “carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling.” 34 U.S.C. § 30309(9). Voyeurism, which as defined here springs only from a vague notion of privacy, falls outside both the ordinary and defined meaning of “rape.” Indeed, the Attorney General acknowledged this regulatory rewrite, replacing “rape” with “sexual abuse,” and its attendant and extended definitions, because it was “a more accurate term to describe the behaviors that Congress aimed to eliminate.” National  2 Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37106, 37116 (June 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115). I am doubtful that decision follows Congress’s command. So even if the complained-of action occurred exactly as Williamson alleges, it would not be actionable under PREA. This definitional drift should be considered by the Executive or Congress.   B. Turning to this matter, the Defendants raise the right arguments in the wrong posture. They claim that Williamson’s PREA complaint was false, so it cannot satisfy the protected-conduct element of the retaliation analysis, and contend that the misconduct charge was supported by sufficient evidence. But these arguments are not properly considered on a motion to dismiss where we “presume that a complaint’s factual allegations are true.” Johnson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 108 F.4th 163, 175 n.57 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 283 n.7 (3d Cir. 2020)). The Defendants could have attached the evidence supporting these arguments and asked the District Court for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Perhaps that is an option to pursue on remand. But this is all an expensive exercise, drawing considerable time and resources from public funds, that may have otherwise been avoided.  For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the judgment.  

Bobby Williamson v. Brian Bolton

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 6-23-2025 Point Blank Protective Apparel and Uniforms LLC v. Vertical Source Inc Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Point Blank Protective Apparel and Uniforms LLC v. Vertical Source Inc" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 514. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/514 This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.    NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________  No. 24-2511 ______________  POINT BLANK PROTECTIVE APPAREL AND UNIFORMS LLC, Appellant  v.  VERTICAL SOURCE INC; CHRISTOPHER R. NEARY ______________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 1:22-cv-00567) District Judge:  Honorable Edward S. Kiel ______________  Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) May 1, 2025  Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.  (Opinion filed: June 23, 2025)  ______________  OPINION ______________  MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.   This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2  In this appeal, Point Blank Protective Apparel and Uniforms LLC (“Point Blank”) seeks to escape its Settlement Agreement and Release (the “Settlement Agreement”)1 with Vertical Source, Inc. and Christopher Neary (collectively “Vertical Source”).  The Settlement Agreement released numerous claims that Point Blank asserted in its pre-settlement litigation against Vertical Source after their business relationship soured.  Point Blank argues that it may rescind the Settlement Agreement as a remedy for Vertical Source’s breach of a material term of the Settlement Agreement, which resulted in Vertical Source providing no consideration for the promises exchanged in the Settlement Agreement.2   For the reasons explained below, we hold that Point Blank adequately pleaded a breach of contract claim relating to the Settlement Agreement, which may open the door to rescission of the Settlement Agreement as a remedy for the breach.  If the Settlement Agreement is rescinded as a remedy for the breach, then the Settlement Agreement cannot bar Point Blank from pursuing Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI (the “Released Claims”) because the release in the Settlement Agreement would no longer be operative.  But the District Court correctly held that Point Blank cannot pursue its fraudulent inducement  1  The Settlement Agreement contains mutual releases, which provide that “[i]n consideration of the covenants and agreements” the parties “fully and forever release[ ]” one another “from any and all claims . . . that relate to, arise out of, or pertain” to “allegations contained in the” original complaint.  App. 9.   2  Under Point Blank’s theory of the case, once Vertical Source failed to provide any consideration for the Settlement Agreement, Point Blank had the right to either sue for breach of contract or treat the Settlement Agreement as rescinded and revert to the pre-settlement litigation.   3  claim in Count VII.  Thus, we will affirm in part and vacate in part the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint, and we will remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   I. BACKGROUND In 2018, Point Blank entered into a joint venture agreement (the “JV Agreement”) with Vertical Source, Inc.  Over the next few years, Vertical Source repeatedly failed to fulfill its obligations.3  So in 2022, Point Blank sued Vertical Source for various claims related to the JV Agreement.  While the lawsuit was pending, the parties engaged in several months of negotiations and entered into the Settlement Agreement.   As part of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed to release all asserted claims against one another in exchange for a series of dependent obligations.  Vertical Source’s first obligation was to fund an escrow account, but it failed to disclose that its ability to fund depended on an outside event.  When the outside event did not occur, Vertical Source did not fund the escrow account.  So Point Blank filed its amended complaint, which asserted all claims from the initial complaint and added a claim for fraudulently inducing Point Blank to enter into the Settlement Agreement and an imbedded claim for breach of contract.  Vertical Source then moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the Settlement Agreement barred the claims.4  Point  3  The facts are derived from Point Blank’s Amended Complaint and taken as true.  Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016). 4  Vertical Source did not move to dismiss Count III (declaratory judgment); and after the District Court’s order, Count III remained.  To expedite this appeal, Point Blank  4  Blank responded that the Settlement Agreement and any release therein was unenforceable because Vertical Source breached a material term by failing to provide any consideration, which allowed Point Blank to rescind the Settlement Agreement.5  The District Court held that the Settlement Agreement was enforceable and barred all claims and granted the motion to dismiss.  Point Blank timely appealed.6 II. DISCUSSION On appeal, we must determine whether Point Blank has sufficiently alleged a claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement.  If it has, rescission may be an available remedy.  And if the Settlement Agreement is rescinded, then it cannot bar the Released Claims—the basis for the dismissal.  Thus, this opinion will determine whether Point Blank alleged a claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement, whether rescission is an available remedy for the breach claim, and whether the Released Claims are definitively  voluntarily dismissed Count III.  Thus, the issues on appeal concern Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII.   5  Vertical Source argues on appeal that Point Blank forfeited its rescission argument by failing to raise it before the District Court.  Although not fully fleshed out below, Point Blank argued that the Settlement Agreement was unenforceable because “Defendants never funded the escrow account.” S. App. 47.  An argument is forfeited when it is not raised in the District Court.  See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dir. Of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017).  The point of forfeiture is to “protect litigants from unfair surprise.”  Id. at 146.  Because Point Blank did alert Vertical Source that it deemed the releases unenforceable, and Vertical Source states that it “anticipated” these arguments, Point Blank did not forfeit the rescission argument.  Resp. Br. 18. 6 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss.  See Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311, 324 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020)). 5  barred.  Finally, we will determine whether Point Blank may pursue its fraudulent inducement claim in Count VII.   Under Florida law, to state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege that the parties entered a valid contract, that there was a material breach of the contract, and that resulting damages occurred.  Deauville Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. Ward, 219 So. 3d 949, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).  All agree that the parties entered a valid contract—the Settlement Agreement.7  And the complaint alleges that Vertical Source materially breached the contract: • Vertical Source was “required to execute a related escrow agreement and fund an escrow account . . . within five days of [Point Blank’s] execution of the Settlement Agreement,” App. 150 (¶ 54);  • Vertical Source “failed to fund the escrow account,” id. ( ¶ 56);  • “in breach of their obligations under the Settlement Agreement[, Vertical Source] never funded the escrow account,” id. (¶ 57); and  • Vertical Source’s “ability to fund the escrow account by the agreed-to deadline was material,” App. 151 (¶ 59).   Lastly, Point Blank alleges that it was damaged by the breach and seeks numerous forms of relief, including “equitable and other relief as this Court deems just and appropriate,” which includes rescission.  App. 161.  These allegations sufficiently pleaded a claim for  7 Point Blank argues that there was no valid contract because there was a failure of consideration.  However, the Settlement Agreement provides that its terms shall be construed according to Florida law, and under Florida law, “failure of consideration is not alone sufficient to support a claim for rescission or cancellation of the contract.”  Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Schwalier, 901 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  Therefore, the Settlement Agreement is valid.   6  breach of the Settlement Agreement.  While a more clearly crafted complaint would have included a separate count for breach of the Settlement Agreement, it would be disingenuous of us to ignore the breach of contract claim that is reflected in the allegations.8    But this conclusion naturally leads to another question.  Why does the existence of a claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement preclude dismissal of the Released Claims?  It is because under Florida law, when a party breaches a “dependent covenant” that “goes to the whole consideration of the contract”—i.e., “where it is such an essential part of the bargain that the failure of it must be considered as destroying the entire contract”—the “equitable remedy” of “[r]escission” is available.  Steak House, Inc. v. Barnett, 65 So. 2d 736, 738 (Fla. 1953); Billian v. Mobil Corp., 710 So. 2d 984, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).  That is the essence of Point Blank’s allegations.    8  We acknowledge that Point Blank’s amended complaint is not a model of clarity, as evidenced by its failure to demarcate the breach of the Settlement Agreement claim with a header.  But, luckily for Point Blank, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require headers.  Cf. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[R]egardless of how a complaint labels its claims or counts, courts are to look to the complaint and its allegations as a whole to identify the plaintiff’s claims and any theories undergirding those claims.”).  Dismissing the breach of contract claim because it lacks a header would elevate form over substance, which is inappropriate.  So we must look to the actual allegations to determine if Point Blank has provided a short and plain statement sufficient to put Vertical Source on notice of its claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement.  And here, the complaint’s substance reveals such a claim.  We are by no means encouraging parties to format their complaints so that they fail to clearly identify their claims.  But when a claim is apparent from the allegations, we cannot ignore it.  7  According to Point Blank, Vertical Source’s failure to fund the escrow account breached a dependent covenant in the Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Agreement’s consideration section lists a series of occurrences, and the completion of each must occur in sequential order.  Vertical Source’s first obligation was to pay funds into the escrow account, and the rest of the consideration was to follow; without the funds, there was virtually no consideration for the Settlement Agreement.  Point Blank alleges that funding the escrow account was so essential to the Settlement Agreement that it would not have entered into the Settlement Agreement if Vertical Source could not fund the escrow account, and Vertical Source’s failure to fund means there was no consideration for the Settlement Agreement.  Stated differently, Vertical Source “destroy[ed] the entire contract” by “fail[ing] to fund the escrow account—the critical step on which all the subsequent terms of the settlement agreement were contingent.”  Steak House, 65 So. 2d at 738; Opening Br. 13.  As a result, “none of the subsequent series of contingent steps contemplated by the [S]ettlement [A]greement were performed.”  Opening Br. 13.  At the pleading stage, Point Blank has sufficiently established that funding the escrow account was so paramount that Vertical Source’s failure to fund breached a dependent covenant of the Settlement Agreement.   Because Point Blank sufficiently alleged a claim for a breach of a dependent covenant in the Settlement Agreement, the dismissal of the Released Claims with prejudice was improper.  While the Released Claims are not currently live claims, Point Blank might be able to revive them if its breach of the Settlement Agreement claim is successful and if the District Court awards equitable rescission of the Settlement 8  Agreement.  The ability to pursue the Released Claims is, in essence, the relief sought for the successful litigation of the breach of the Settlement Agreement claim.  And, because Rule 12(b)(6) only allows dismissal for the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” it was improper to dismiss the Released Claims, which function as the ultimate relief of the sufficiently pleaded breach of contract claim.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Therefore, the District Court’s dismissal of Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI was in error and is vacated. We note that Point Blank also included a claim for fraudulent inducement to enter into the Settlement Agreement, which, unlike the Released Claims, was not included in the pre-settlement lawsuit and is not subject to the Settlement Agreement’s release.  It alleges that, absent a finding of breach of the Settlement Agreement, it was fraudulently induced to sign the Settlement Agreement.  But the District Court properly dismissed this claim because three separate provisions unequivocally disclaimed fraud and barred the parties from bringing any fraud claims.  Under Florida law, those claims were properly dismissed.  See Oceanic Villas, Inc. v. Godson, 4. So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1941).  Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Count VII.  III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we will affirm in part and vacate in part the District Court’s order dismissing with prejudice the Released Claims, and we will remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   

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