Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-8-2025 Stacey Watson v. Attorney General United States of America Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Stacey Watson v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 382. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/382 This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.            NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 24-2290 __________  STACEY WATSON,    Appellant  v.  ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________________________________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-20303) District Judge:  Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi ____________________________________  Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 22, 2025 Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges  (Opinion filed: May 8, 2025) ___________  OPINION* ___________  PER CURIAM  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  2   Stacy Watson, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment in an action challenging the denial of an I-130 petition.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. Watson, a United States citizen, filed an I-130 petition on behalf of her husband, K.S., who is a citizen of India.1  The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), concluding that K.S. had entered into a prior marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.  Watson appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the record contained substantial and probative evidence that K.S.’s prior marriage was fraudulent. Next, Watson filed a petition for review in this Court.  We determined that we lacked jurisdiction because the BIA’s order, which effectively affirmed the denial of an I-130 petition, was not a final order of removal.  See Ruiz v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir.2009) (noting dismissal of petition for review of I-130 denial for “lack [of] jurisdiction”).  In the interests of justice, we transferred the petition for review to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under 28 U.S.C § 1631.  See Watson v. Attorney General United States, C.A. No. 21-2977 (order entered Dec. 2,  1 An I-130 petition is the first step in the process by which a United States citizen helps an eligible family member adjust status to lawful permanent resident.  See Robinson v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2009).   3  2021); see also Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 139 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that District Courts have jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to review BIA decisions other than a final order of removal). In the transferred proceedings, Watson primarily argued that the I-130 petition should have been approved because she demonstrated “extreme hardship” based on her permanent disability, her anxiety disorders, and her need for K.S. to help raise their minor child.  The Government filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the District Court could not consider the extreme hardship argument because it was neither raised by Watson in the immigration proceedings nor considered by the Board.  The Government also asserted that the Board’s marriage fraud conclusion was not arbitrary or capricious, and that neither USCIS nor the BIA abused its discretion.  The District Court granted the summary judgment motion, essentially for the reasons put forth by the Government.2  Watson timely appealed.3    2 The District Court also granted the Government’s motion to seal the record, agreeing that the “voluminous record . . . contains private identifying familial and financial information of minors and nonparties, as well as medical records of [Watson].”  (ECF 58, at 9.)  Watson has not challenged that determination, and there appears to be no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to seal the record.  See In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications and Orders, 964 F.3d 1121, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  4  We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in actions brought under the APA and apply the same standard that the District Court applied to “the underlying agency decision.”  Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Under the APA, a reviewing court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  “The scope of review . . . is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  “[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”  Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).  Relatedly, “[i]t is a hard and fast rule of administrative law, rooted in simple fairness, that issues not raised before an agency are waived and will not be considered by a court on review.”  Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citation omitted).   Watson argued before the agency that her I-130 petition should be granted because K.S.’s prior marriage was not fraudulent.  But in the complaint filed in the District Court, Watson asserted that the I-130 petition should have been approved because she demonstrated extreme hardship.  Because the extreme hardship claim was not raised before the agency, the District Court properly refused to consider it.  Nuclear Energy  5  Inst., 373 F.3d at 1297.  And even if it had been raised before the agency,4 Watson would not be entitled to relief.  The “extreme hardship” provision upon which Watson relied, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.58, applies to a noncitizen’s eligibility for suspension of deportation, not to adjustment of status.  Because K.S. was not in deportation or removal proceedings, § 1240.58 is inapplicable.    In addition, the District Court did not err in finding that there was nothing arbitrary or capricious in the Board’s determination that “the record, when viewed in its totality, contains substantial and probative evidence that [K.S.’s] prior marriage to his spouse was fraudulent.”  When a United States citizen marries a noncitizen, the citizen can petition for lawful permanent residency for their spouse by filing an I-130 petition.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1154; 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1).  But the agency must not approve an I-130 petition for a beneficiary who previously sought lawful status through “a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.”  8 U.S.C. § 1154(c); Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Once the Government determines that it has accorded a mock marriage the benefit requested in an I–130 Petition, or even that the benefit is sought by that marriage,  4 Although Watson submitted to the agency documents pertaining to her alleged hardships, she conceded in the District Court that she “did not quote the [extreme hardship] statute” and “did not cite the [extreme hardship] law on paper to” the agency.  Nevertheless, she asserted that the agency “know[s] [that she] has a disability of permanent personality and anxiety disorders and they did not care about [her] health.”  But the District Court properly found no fault on the agency’s part “for being unable to intuit [Watson’s] unspoken wish to invoke the Extreme Hardship Provision.”    6  further Petitions are foreclosed.”).  The finding of a fraudulent marriage must be supported by “substantial and probative” evidence “documented in the alien’s file.”  In re Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 167 (BIA 1990); see 8 C.F.R § 204.2(a)(1)(ii).  “The central question is whether the [couple] intended to establish a life together at the time they were married.”  In re Soriano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 764, 765 (BIA 1988).  If the agency determines that substantial and probative evidence of fraud exists, it issues a notice of intent to revoke the immigration petition.  Zerezghi v. United States Citizen and Immigration Services, 955 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2020).  The “burden shifts to the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary did not seek . . . status based on a prior fraudulent marriage.”  In re Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. 803, 806-07 (BIA 1988).  Prior to his marriage to Watson, K.S. married D.L., a United States citizen.  USCIS approved D.L.’s I-130 petition to confer legal permanent resident status on K.S.  K.S. and D.L. divorced in 2010, after approximately 18 months of marriage.  K.S. traveled outside the United States in 2011.  When he returned pursuant a grant of advance parole, he was detained, inspected, and interviewed by a Customs and Border Protection officer.  In a sworn statement made at the airport, K.S. indicated that he had paid D.L. $5000 to marry him so that he could stay in the United States, that he had “put [D.L.] on [his property lease] and [obtained] a life insurance policy so that [he] could show immigration” authorities, and that he had lied about living with D.L. when questioned by an immigration officer.  Those admissions clearly provide substantial and probative  7  evidence of marriage fraud.  See In re Singh, 27 I. & N. Dec. 598, 607 (BIA 2019) (stating that “[a] sworn statement by the parties admitting that the marriage is fraudulent, that money changed hands, and that the couple did not intend to live together or consummate the marriage is direct evidence of fraud that is ‘substantial and probative’”).      Moreover, the Board properly held that Watson failed to rebut the finding of marriage fraud.5  In support of her claim, Watson provided an affidavit from K.S. in which he asserted that, although he did not “have a happy marriage” with D.L., he “never paid [her] any money[] in connection with [their] relationship.”  Addressing the sworn statement that he made at the airport, K.S. explained that “[i]f I signed any such statement, it may have been due to the unbelievable pressure that was placed on me while I was under the Service’s custody.  Undue influence was placed on me implying that the only way for me to get out of my predicament at that time was by admitting that something improper had taken place.  But such is not the case.”  Watson also provided a lease agreement listing K.S. and D.L. as tenants, and 2008 state and federal tax returns for K.S. and D.L.6  Finally, Watson submitted two sworn statements from D.L. in which  5 Watson had two opportunities before the agency to submit evidence demonstrating that K.S.’s marriage to D.L. was bona fide:  (1) in her challenge to the revocation of her approved I-130 petition; and (2) in connection with another I-130 petition filed in 2018.  She submitted the same evidence both times.    6 The Government cited the tax returns in its Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, but the returns themselves are redacted in the record.    8  she stated that her marriage to K.S. “was real,” “was very real[,] [and that] [t]here was nothing fraudulent about it.”   The Board was “unpersuaded by [Watson’s] arguments that [K.S.’s] prior marriage was not fraudulent[,]” stating that her “submission of evidence, as a whole, [was] insufficient to refute the evidence of marriage fraud given by [K.S.’s] sworn statement before the USCIS in 2011.”  Although K.S. later disavowed the sworn statement, asserting that he made it under duress, we agree that K.S.’s general claim of duress was insufficient to undermine his detailed admissions about marriage fraud.  See Matter of Isber, 20 I. & N. Dec. 676, 679 (BIA 1993).  In his airport statement, K.S. provided specific responses to open-ended questions.  For example, he identified the amount of money that he paid D.L. to marry him, he volunteered that he included D.L. on a property lease and falsified a life insurance policy to help demonstrate that his marriage was legitimate, and he admitted that he lied to an immigration officer in connection with D.L.’s I-130 petition.  The specificity of these answers suggests that K.S. was not under duress and there is no indication that K.S did not understand the questions.  Because K.S. admitted that he generated documents for the purpose of demonstrating a bona fide marriage to D.L., the Board reasonably discounted the documents, including the joint tax returns filed by K.S. and D.L., that Watson submitted.  See Quezada-Caraballo v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 32, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2016) (endorsing the IJ’s application of the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in a marriage fraud case where the petitioner admitted that she  9  had submitted fabricated documents and falsely claimed that she and her ex-husband lived together).   In sum, the District Court properly concluded that the Board’s decision was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  The Government’s motion to file its brief and supplemental appendix under seal is granted; those documents will be permanently sealed.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 106.1(c).       

English

Stacey Watson v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4-22-2025 USA v. Randal Wise Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "USA v. Randal Wise" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 309. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/309 This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.    PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________ No. 24-2460 _______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  v.  RANDAL WISE,     Appellant _______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 3:20-cr-00102-001) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp _______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  on March 24, 2025 Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges (Filed: April 22, 2025)  David E. Schafer  Suite 207 2273 State Highway 33 Trenton, NJ 08690     2   Counsel for Appellant  Mark E. Coyne   UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 970 Broad Street Room 700 Newark, NJ 07102  Norman Gross  UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE Camden Federal Building & Courthouse 401 Market Street Camden, NJ 08101  Counsel for Appellee  _______________ OPINION OF THE COURT _______________ BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  Randal Wise lobs a slew of challenges to his convictions and sentence for possessing child pornography, attempting to entice a minor, and attempting to transfer obscene matter to a minor.  All fail. In so ruling, we hold that a smartphone counts as a computer under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6).  I. THE STING On Grindr (a gay dating and chat app), Wise had the username “Cuddle??” He used the app to reach out to “Steve,” a cop posing as a fourteen-year-old boy. Wise sent him two  3  photos of a penis and asked him to come over and have sex. But then “Steve’s” account crashed.  The next day, Wise went back onto Grindr and pinged “Sean,” another cop posing as an eighth-grade boy. Wise sent “Sean” four photos of a penis and four times asked him to reciprocate. He suggested that “Sean” come to his hotel, but “Sean” demurred.  The day after that, Wise again contacted “Sean” on Grindr. Wise asked if “Sean” wanted to hang out at his place or Wise’s. “Sean” suggested his own place. Wise got “Sean’s” address, asked him to “[s]end a nude,” and followed up with, “U wanted to do sexual stuff?” App. 162. About twenty minutes later, Wise walked over to “Sean’s” address, holding an iPhone, and was arrested. His phone contained sexual chats and child por-nography of a thirteen-year-old boy.  Wise was charged with possessing and transporting child pornography, attempting to entice a minor online, and attempt-ing to transfer obscene matter to a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1470, 2422(b), 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(a)(5)(B). The trial court denied his motion to sever these charges. The jury con-victed on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to 288 months in prison.  II. JOINING THE CHARGES AND NOT  SEVERING THEM WAS PROPER On appeal, Wise first claims that his charges should not have been joined, or else that the District Court should have severed them. We review joinder de novo and severance for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lacerda, 958 F.3d 196, 224 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 182  4  (3d Cir. 2005). The charges were properly joined because they were “of the same or similar character.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). As the District Court explained in denying the motion, “they all involve the sexual exploitation of minors.” App. 55; accord United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 253–54 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002).  Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying the motion to sever. Severance is called for only if the defend-ant can show that joinder would prejudice him. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. Wise cannot. His crimes were all disturbing in the same way, so there was little risk of spillover prejudice. See Hersh, 297 F.3d at 1243. And there is no evidence that joinder pre-vented the jury from making an independent judgment about his guilt on each charge. See Davis, 397 F.3d at 182. The dis-trict judge carefully instructed the jury to consider the evidence of each crime separately.  Plus, the charges are connected. The child pornography helped bolster the government’s case that Wise intended to have sex with “Sean,” who held himself out as a minor. Though Wise protests that he nevertheless believed Sean was an adult, those protests are less compelling when one learns that Wise was interested in sexually explicit photos of children. So the District Court rightly found the child-pornography evidence “di-rectly relevant to Wise’s intent in” the child-abuse crimes. App. 58. And its instructions focused the jury on using that evidence only to show knowledge and intent on those charges. The Dis-trict Court properly tried all four counts together.   5  III. WISE’S SENTENCE WAS PROPER TOO Next, Wise raises three sentencing claims. We review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error, its reading of the Guidelines de novo, and its application of the Guidelines for abuse of discretion. United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2020). Wise objects to his five-level sentencing enhancement for a pattern of “sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor” under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5). The District Court determined that a pattern requires only two instances, including the current crime. The District Court cited commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines for this conclusion. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) cmt. n.1. Wise does not challenge this legal conclusion on appeal. He says only that the District Court wrongly concluded that he engaged in relevant conduct on two separate occasions. So we need not consider whether the District Court erred in deferring to the commentary to the Guidelines to interpret the word “pat-tern.” See United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459, 471 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc). We take up only the narrower question of whether Wise twice sexually abused a child.   He did. First, Wise was convicted in Indiana of sexual bat-tery of a sixteen-year-old boy. Wise claims that all he did was force the boy’s hand onto Wise’s penis, but that is sexual abuse. Second, a month before the current crimes, Wise sexted with fifteen-year-old “Young,” exchanging naked photos on Grindr, and inviting the boy to copulate with him. Even apart from the current crimes, those two past crimes suffice to support the enhancement. And Wise had advance notice and an oppor-tunity to be heard before the court imposed the enhancement.   6  For the same reasons, the District Court properly applied another five-level enhancement for repeated sex crimes against minors under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1). Though the two en-hancements are based on the same facts, “the Guidelines per-mit the simultaneous application of both enhancements.” Seibert, 971 F.3d at 401.   Wise’s last sentencing claim is that he does not deserve a two-level enhancement for using a computer in the crime under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6) because he used an iPhone. Whether an iPhone is a computer under § 2G2.2(b)(6) is a question of first impression in this Circuit. To resolve this question, we start with text of the Guideline itself. We look to the commentary only in limited circumstances. To do so, we must first ask “whether [the] Guideline provision is genuinely ambiguous by carefully consider[ing] the [Guideline’s] text, structure, his-tory, and purpose.” United States v. Mercado, 81 F.4th 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2023). If the Guideline is unambiguous, that ends the inquiry “and we simply disregard the commentary.” Id.  Here, the text is unambiguous. The Guideline reads: “If the offense involved the use of a computer or an interactive com-puter service for the possession, transmission, receipt, or dis-tribution of the material, or for accessing with intent to view the material, increase by 2 levels.” § 2G2.2(b)(6). To decide if an iPhone counts as a computer under this Guideline, we start with dictionaries. The word “computer” means “a programma-ble usu[ally] electronic device that can store, retrieve, and pro-cess data.” Computer, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diction-ary (11th ed. 2003). More specifically, it is “[a]n electronic device … which is used to store, manipulate, and communicate infor-mation, perform complex calculations, or control or regulate  7  other devices or machines.” Computer, Oxford English Diction-ary (3d ed. 2025). Computers are “capable of receiving infor-mation (data) and of processing it in accordance with variable procedural instructions (programs or software).” Id. And they are often used “in the home or workplace … for handling text, im-ages, music, and video, accessing and using the internet, com-municating with other people (e.g. by means of email), and play-ing games.” Id.  The dictionary definitions of “computer” unambiguously include smartphones: Smartphones store and communicate information and host software in the form of apps, and people frequently use them to access the internet. These definitions are enough to solve this puzzle. And they are consistent with com-mon sense. “The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading short-hand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014). If we needed to look fur-ther, a smartphone also fits the evident purpose of the Guide-line. Media stored digitally is easier to store and distribute. So the Guideline increases the penalty for having or distributing me-dia involving the sexual exploitation of a minor in digital format. We thus hold that smartphones trigger the computer enhance-ment. Two other circuits have gone further, holding that even basic cellphones count. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902–04 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014) (adopting Kramer’s reasoning), abrogated on other grounds by Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016). Because Wise’s phone was an iPhone, we need not decide whether to go so far.  8  Finally, Wise argues that his trial lawyer was ineffective. But courts ordinarily await collateral review before adjudicat-ing such claims, when parties can further develop the factual record. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Senke, 986 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2021). We will thus do that and affirm. 

USA v. Randal Wise

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 8-18-2025 Stephanie Ricketts v. Titusville Area School District Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Stephanie Ricketts v. Titusville Area School District" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 672. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/672 This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.   PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________  No. 24-2569 _______________  STEPHANIE RICKETTS, as parent of L.G., a minor,     Appellant  v.  TITUSVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; ROCHELLE CRESSMAN _______________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00129) District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter _______________  Submitted April 28, 2025   Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges  (Filed: August 18, 2025) __________________________  OPINION OF THE COURT __________________________  PER CURIAM One way in which courts protect the right of public access to judicial proceedings is by requiring, as a general rule, that cases proceed using the real names of the parties.  In  2  cases involving minor children, however, a child’s privacy interests outweigh the public’s interest in knowing their real name.  For this reason, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and our Local Rules mandate that the names of all minor children be redacted or replaced by initials in all documents filed with the court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(5); Third Circuit L.A.R. 113.12(a)(2), and failure to comply with such rules may be grounds for sanctions.  Fed. R. App. P. 46(c).  Litigation, however, can be a lengthy ordeal, so it is not uncommon for a minor child to reach adulthood before a case has fully resolved.  That occurred here when L.G.—a minor victim of sexual abuse—turned eighteen in between the filing of the complaint and the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  Counsel, uncertain as to their obligations in this scenario, included L.G.’s unredacted name in certain filings before the District Court and before us on appeal.  Because we had not spoken clearly on this issue before, we will not impose sanctions, though we will take this opportunity to clarify the relevant rules. I.  In 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Ricketts brought claims on behalf of her child, L.G., arising out of sexual abuse he suffered at the hands of a teacher while he was a minor.  Pursuant to the applicable rules, Ms. Ricketts’ counsel used the initials “L.G.” in the complaint and both sides’ counsel understood their duty to redact or initialize L.G.’s name and those of any other minor children in all documents filed with the Court.  But by the time the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, the Titusville Area School District, L.G. had turned eighteen.   That meant that L.G. was  3  no longer a minor when Ms. Ricketts appealed the District Court’s decision and the parties filed merits briefs and appendices in the matter now before us.   Upon review of those materials, we discovered that the appendices included L.G.’s unredacted name, as well as the unredacted names of other individuals who were minors at the time of the events described.  We therefore sua sponte placed these unredacted appendices under seal and ordered the parties to submit new redacted versions and to show cause why sanctions were not warranted.  Both parties responded by apologizing for their error, with the School District further explaining that it had understood the Federal Rules and our rules to require redaction only of the names of persons who were minor children at the time of filing. II. We begin with counsel’s obligations before the District Court.  Because L.G. was a minor at the time the complaint was filed, Rule 5.2 required counsel to redact his name in all court filings.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3).  When L.G. turned 18 during the course of litigation, however, that rule no longer applied on a prospective basis.  At that point, counsel could have moved to continue to allow L.G. to proceed anonymously by demonstrating that doing so would be necessary to prevent serious harm.  See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 672 (3d Cir. 2019).  Depending on the nature and circumstances of the case, minors who reach adulthood during the course of litigation may be able to justify such treatment as a result of their continuing interests in avoiding the embarrassment, stigma, and potential for retaliation that can attend public disclosure.  See, e.g., Katie M. and A.M. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2025 WL 934458, at *1-2  4  (D. Utah, Mar. 27, 2025); M.V. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 2025 WL 463308, at *2 (D. Utah, Feb. 11, 2025); N.E. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 2023 WL 2696834, at *15 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2023); Doe v. USD No. 237, 2017 WL 3839416, *11 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 2017).  Those criteria would seem to weigh heavily on the side of redaction in the case of a minor victim of sexual assault, but no such motion was filed, so counsel was not required by Rule 5.2 or by order to anonymize submissions after L.G. turned 18. Before L.G. turned 18, however, his counsel filed at least three documents that did not redact his name, including one document that was also filed with the appendix on appeal.  These filings clearly violated Rule 5.2, but because they originated in the District Court we have no occasion to impose sanctions for these failures to redact.1 Turning to counsel’s obligations on appeal, we identified several unredacted documents filed publicly as part of the parties’ supplemental appendix on appeal.  These documents had originally been filed under seal in the District Court, meaning there was no Rule 5.2 violation with respect to them.  But the District Court never ordered those documents unsealed, and under our rules, any “records sealed in the district court and not unsealed by order of [this] court must not be included in the paper appendix.”  See Third Cir. L.A.R. 30.3(b).  Thus, it appears the parties violated our Local Rules by filing previously sealed information on the public docket.  Nonetheless, because both parties have  1 We note that the unredacted documents on the District Court’s docket have since been sealed.  5  expressed sincere regret and explained their good-faith efforts to comply with the rules, we do not believe that violation warrants sanctions.   III. For the foregoing reasons, we will not impose sanctions on either party. 

Stephanie Ricketts v. Titusville Area School District

Rashonna Ransom v. GreatPlains Finance LLC

San Diego County Employees Retirement Association v. Johnson & Johnson

Dusevic, Nikolette C.

Robin Hood or Robbin’ the Goods? The Second Circuit Restores SEC Disgorgement to Equity in SEC v. Govil

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1-14-2025 Palani Karupaiyan v. Wipro Ltd Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Palani Karupaiyan v. Wipro Ltd" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 43. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/43 This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.          NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 23-2424 ___________  PALANI KARUPAIYAN; P.P.; R.P.,              Appellants  v.  WIPRO LTD.; THIERRY DELAPORTE, individually and in his official  capacity as MD, CEO of Wipro; ABIDALI NEEMUCHWALA, individually  and in his official capacity as MD, ex-CEO of the Wipro; T.K. KURIEN, individually and in his official capacity as ex CEO of the Wipro; AZIM HASHIM PREMJI, individually and in his official capacity as owner, promoter, chairman of the Wipro; WIPRO ENTERPRISE LTD; IDC TECHNOLOGIES; PRATEEK GATTANI, individually and in his official capacity as CEO of the IDC ____________________________________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-02005) District Judge:  Honorable Georgette Castner ____________________________________  Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) November 7, 2024  Before:  SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  (Opinion filed: January 14, 2025) _________  OPINION* _________  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2   PER CURIAM  Palani Karupaiyan appeals1 from the order of the District Court denying his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.  We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. I. Karupaiyan submitted to the District Court a motion to proceed IFP along with a complaint against Wipro Limited and related defendants.  Most of his complaint accused Wipro of non-actionable misconduct and sought fanciful relief.  But he also alleged that Wipro refused to hire him as a software engineer for numerous discriminatory reasons, including his diabetes and his age.   In that regard, Karupaiyan asserted claims for (1) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and (2) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).  In support of his ADA claim, he alleged that he told a “Wipro employee” that he needed the job because he was diabetic and that the employee responded “Wipro is not place for sick people’s  employment.”  (ECF No. 1 at 21 ¶ 98.)  And in support of his ADEA claim, he alleged that he is 48 years old (id. at 7 ¶ 2) and that a “Wipro employee” told him “Wipro did not  1 Karupaiyan purported to sue and then appeal on behalf of his minor children.  Our Clerk notified him that he cannot litigate pro se on their behalf.  See Osei-Afriyie by Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991).  He then filed a motion for various forms of relief from that order but a motions panel denied his requests (as we have done in at least 10 of his prior cases).  Thus, Karupaiyan is the only appellant. 3  want[] to give [him] employment opportunity” because “Plaintiff is old US citizen and Wipro team members were under 30 years old” (id. at 20 ¶ 96).   By single order, the District Court denied Karupaiyan’s IFP motion and dismissed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.  The court did so without prejudice to his ability to pay the filing fee or submit a proper IFP motion and to amend his complaint as to certain claims.  Karupaiyan filed this appeal instead.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2   II. We will affirm the dismissal of most of Karupaiyan’s claims for the reasons that the District Cort explained, but we will vacate and remand as to his ADA and ADEA claims.  We limit our discussion to those two claims. First, the District Court dismissed the ADA claim on the sole ground that Karupaiyan did not adequately allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC”).  We disagree.  There might be some tension in our caselaw regarding whether a Title VII or ADA plaintiff must affirmatively allege exhaustion in order to state a claim.3  But we need not address the  2 Orders denying IFP status or dismissing a complaint without prejudice typically are not final under § 1291, see Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801, 803 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam), but they can become final if the plaintiff stands on his filings, see Oakwood Labs. LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 903 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2021).  Karupaiyan did that here.  We exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, see Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000), but we review the denial of IFP status only for abuse of discretion, see Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985). 3 Compare, e.g., Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997) (treating Title VII exhaustion as part of the claim for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), with, e.g., Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the lack of Title VII 4  issue in this case because Karupaiyan adequately alleged exhaustion under the circumstances presented here.  Karupaiyan alleged that he timely filed a complaint regarding Wipro with the EEOC, and he provided the charge number.  (ECF No. 1 at 26 ¶ 134.)  He also later submitted an EEOC right-to-sue letter bearing that charge number.  (ECF No. 12.)  Although that letter was not before the District Court when it dismissed Karupaiyan’s complaint, it reinforces our conclusion that his pro se complaint alleged enough to avoid dismissal on this ground.  Cf. Webb v. DOJ, 117 F.4th 560, 568 (3d Cir. 2024) (reversing dismissal of a pro se complaint where “the complaint raises enough uncertainty about exhaustion [under the Prison Litigation Reform Act] to preclude dismissal at the screening stage”).4 Second, the District Court did not require Karupaiyan to allege exhaustion of his ADEA claim.  Instead, the court dismissed it because “the Complaint does not elaborate on the factual basis of the ADEA claim with specificity as required by Rule 8.”  (ECF No. 5 at 8.)  But Rule 8 does not require factual pleading “with specificity.”  See In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “to require pleading facts with specificity . . . is not the federal notice pleading standard”).  Instead, Rule 8 requires only enough facts to state a plausible claim.  See Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2021).  The court acknowledged that  exhaustion is an affirmative defense that the defendant bears the burden of pleading).    4 To be clear, we do not hold that Karupaiyan exhausted this claim or that the court cannot revisit exhaustion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or at summary judgment as circumstances might warrant.  Instead, we hold only that he alleged enough to survive dismissal at the screening stage under the circumstances presented here. 5  standard earlier in its opinion, but it did not address whether or how this claim fell short of that standard.  Nor did it otherwise identify any specific deficiency on this claim. Nevertheless, we agree that Karupaiyan failed to state an ADEA claim on the merits, and we reach the same conclusion as to his ADA claim.  Although Karupaiyan made some direct allegations of discrimination as noted above, those stray allegations buried in the middle of his largely fanciful complaint5 do not raise a plausible inference of discrimination under the circumstances presented here.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim” is “a context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”); Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (looking to “[t]he circumstances surrounding the particular pleading, including the nature of the action, the sort of relief being sought, the availability of information, and other  practical considerations”).   Karupaiyan, for example, has not alleged material facts bearing on his claims that one would expect to be within his knowledge, such as the specific position or positions for which he applied, or when.  Nor has he alleged any identifying information about the “Wipro employee” or employees who allegedly made the statements referenced above or any other employee with whom he may have spoken or who might have been involved in the alleged decision not to hire him.  Cf. Martinez, 986 F.3d at 267 (summarizing details  5 Karupaiyan’s allegations of discrimination occupy only about two pages of his 41-page complaint.  The rest of the complaint accuses Wipro and other defendants of non-actionable misconduct (such as violation of various criminal statutes) and requests plainly fanciful relief (such as an order transferring ownership of Wipro to him).   6  that were enough to put the defendant on notice of an ADEA claim).  Such details are all the more important here because Karupaiyan alleges that Wipro’s decision not to hire him was the product of numerous separate forms of discrimination.   In sum, Karupaiyan has not stated an ADA or ADEA claim (or any other discrimination claim).  But as to his ADA and ADEA claims only,6 we will remand for the District Court to give him another chance to amend his complaint.  We take that step because the court did not reach the merits of his ADA claim and did not identify any specific deficiency with his ADEA claim.7  For similar reasons, we conclude that Karupaiyan has not waived or forfeited the ability to amend his complaint as to these claims by standing on his compliant for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.  Cf. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2000).  6 Karupaiyan also asserted his claims of disability and age discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).  (ECF No. 1 at 26 ¶¶ 302, 304.)  The District Court did not identify those claims, but our discussion of Karupaiyan’s ADA and ADEA claims and our remand applies equally to them.  7 In noting several deficiencies ourselves, we do not intend to provide a checklist of specific matters that Karupaiyan must allege or that will suffice to state a claim.  Instead, if Karupaiyan files an amended complaint, and if the District Court screens it under § 1915(e)(2)(B), see note 9, infra, then the court can consider whether the amended complaint as whole states plausible claims to relief.    7  Thus, we will vacate the dismissal of these claims and will remand for further proceedings.  On remand, the court should provide Karupaiyan with another chance to cure his IFP application8 and another chance to amend his complaint.9 III. For these reasons, we will affirm in part but will vacate the order of dismissal in part and remand for further proceedings as to Karupaiyan’s claims under the ADA and ADEA and his related claims under the NJLAD.  Karupaiyan’s motion to enjoin a Wipro “outsourcing deal” is denied.  To the extent that any of Karupaiyan’s filings on appeal can be construed to request any other relief, such relief is denied as well.  8 Karupaiyan has argued on appeal that he need not show indigence in order to proceed IFP because this suit is in the “bests interest” of the United States.  That argument lacks merit because the IFP statute requires a showing of indigence, see Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989), which in turn requires “particularized information with regard to the party’s financial status,” id. at 602 n.5.  And we agree with the District Court that Karupaiyan failed to make that showing for the reasons the court explained.  But in light of our ruling, the court should give Karupaiyan another chance to make that showing on remand.  9 When a plaintiff submits an IFP motion and a complaint, courts can address IFP status and dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) “in either order or even simultaneously.”  Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc).  The District Court in this case addressed the issues simultaneously, but nothing in this opinion prevents the court from taking a different approach on remand after giving Karupaiyan another chance to cure his IFP application and amend his compliant. 

Palani Karupaiyan v. Wipro Ltd

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1-13-2025 Daniel Salvatierra v. Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "Daniel Salvatierra v. Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 33. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/33 This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.          NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________  No. 24-2552 __________  D.O. DANIEL A. SALVATIERRA,    Appellant  v.  LAKE ERIE COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE,  also known as LECOM ____________________________________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00152) District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon ____________________________________  Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 20, 2024  Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges  (Opinion filed: January 13, 2025) ___________  OPINION* ___________  PER CURIAM  * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  2  Pro se Appellant Daniel A. Salvatierra appeals the District Court’s July 29, 2024 order reentering its dismissal of his complaint against Appellee Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine (“LECOM”) for failure to prosecute.  On a prior appeal, we found the District Court’s initial order dismissing the case deficient because it merely cited Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), without analysis or explanation.  See Salvatierra v. Lake Erie Coll. of Osteopathic Med., No. 24-1274, 2024 WL 3518304, at *1 (3d Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam).  We remanded the matter to the District Court and instructed it to explicitly consider the Poulis factors.  See id.  On remand, the District Court considered the six factors and concluded that dismissal under Poulis was warranted.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.   We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review a District Court’s order dismissing a suit under Poulis for an abuse of discretion.  Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2019).  The factors a District Court must weigh under Poulis before dismissing a case for failure to prosecute are: “(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim.”  747 F.2d at 868.  Although not every Poulis factor needs to be satisfied to warrant dismissal of the suit, “we have always required consideration and balancing of all six of the factors and have recommended the resolution of any  3  doubts in favor of adjudication on the merits.”  United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original).   We do not have any “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to use when determining whether a District Court abused its discretion by its balancing of Poulis factors and its dismissal of a plaintiff’s case.  Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).  However, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he question, of course, is not . . . whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.”  Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976).   Although we may have viewed some of the factors differently, the District Court’s amended order provided an analysis of the Poulis factors as we directed, and we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Salvatierra’s complaint for failure to prosecute.1  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.    1  Because the District Court did not rule on LECOM’s motion to dismiss, we will not consider LECOM’s alternative argument that affirmance is warranted for failure to state a claim. 

Daniel Salvatierra v. Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

USA v. Dwayne Sherman

2025 Decisions Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1-17-2025 USA v. Joshua Hall Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 Recommended Citation "USA v. Joshua Hall" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 53. https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/53 This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu.  NOT PRECEDENTIAL  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________  No. 24-1303 ____________  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                                        v.  JOSHUA HALL,     Appellant ____________  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (District Court No.1:23-cr-00114-001) District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner ____________  Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  December 9, 2024 ____________  Before:  BIBAS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges  (Filed: January 17, 2025) ____________  OPINION1 ____________ CHUNG, Circuit Judge.  Joshua Hall appeals the District Court’s imposition of a special condition,  1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.  2 computer monitoring, on Hall’s two-year term of supervised release.  Hall argues that the computer monitoring condition infringes upon his First and Fourth Amendment rights because it chills his speech and invades his privacy interests.  Hall therefore requests that we vacate the computer monitoring condition.  We conclude that the District Court’s imposition of the condition was not plain error and will affirm.  I. BACKGROUND2  Between September 2019 and December 2020, Hall used a crowdfunding website and several fake social media accounts to raise funds that he claimed would go towards supporting President Trump’s reelection campaign.  In reality, Hall appropriated the money for his own use.  Hall was indicted due to this conduct.  While on pretrial release, Hall abused alcohol repeatedly and, on one occasion, called the office of a sitting United States Congressman and threatened to kill him.  As a result, Hall was charged in a superseding indictment with transmitting an interstate communication containing a threat to injure another person.  On December 21, 2022, after having previously pleaded guilty to both counts, Hall was sentenced for both offenses to twenty months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.   Hall’s term of supervised release began on October 6, 2023, and throughout the fall of 2023, Hall cycled in and out of alcohol rehabilitation facilities, often leaving each facility after only a few days.  These untimely departures were contrary to a condition of his supervised release that he participate in an inpatient substance abuse treatment  2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.  3 program.   Hall was also subject to another condition that he disclose all of his online accounts to his probation officer.  On January 9, 2024, Hall announced that he was running for Congress via an undisclosed X (formerly Twitter) account.  Hall also used this account to issue another threat to the same United States Congressman.  Hall’s probation officer petitioned the District Court to issue an arrest warrant for Hall’s violation of the conditions of his supervised release.  Hall was arrested, highly intoxicated, shortly thereafter.   The District Court held a supervised release revocation hearing on February 5, 2024.  At that hearing, the District Court noted that Hall had violated the condition requiring that he report all online accounts to his probation officer when he failed to disclose his X account.  App. 51.  Because of this violation, and Hall’s refusal to accept treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, the District Court revoked Hall’s supervised release.  The District Court said its “main concern” in sentencing was “community protection and deterrence,” App. 54, and Hall was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment followed by a two-year term of supervised release.  The District Court imposed several conditions on Hall’s term of supervised release, including a special condition that required the installation of computer monitoring software and unannounced searches of his computers.  App. 55.  Hall did not object to this condition at his revocation hearing. Hall timely brought this appeal, arguing that the computer monitoring condition violates the First and Fourth Amendments.  For the reasons discussed below, we find that the computer monitoring condition is constitutional, and we therefore affirm the District  4 Court’s order in full.  II. DISCUSSION3  A district judge may impose a special condition on a term of supervised release after considering factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).  Special conditions that restrict the defendant’s First or Fourth Amendment rights “will be upheld if (1) they are directly related to deterring [the] defendant and protecting the public and (2) are narrowly tailored.”  United States v. Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th 435, 448 (3d Cir. 2023).  A condition is not “narrowly tailored” if it restricts a constitutional freedom “without any resulting benefit to public safety.”  United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2018). Regardless of the type of condition imposed, “[w]e insist on some evidence that the special conditions imposed are tangibly related to the goals of supervised release.  To justify special conditions, district courts must find supporting facts.  We may affirm if we can ascertain any viable basis in the record for the restriction.”  Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–91 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Conditions of supervised release must be supported by some evidence that the condition imposed is tangibly related to the circumstances of the offense, the history  3  The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Hall did not object to the conditions of his supervised release, so we review for plain error.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2009).  To satisfy the plain-error standard, Hall must establish that (1) the District Court erred; (2) the error was clear or obvious under the law at the time of review; and (3) the error affected substantial rights, that is, the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997).  If all three elements are established, we may, but need not, exercise our discretion to award relief.  Id.  5 of the defendant, the need for general deterrence, or similar concerns.”). Hall argues that the District Court plainly erred in imposing the computer monitoring condition because the condition unconstitutionally infringes upon his First and Fourth Amendment rights.  We disagree. A. Hall’s First Amendment Argument  The computer monitoring condition was imposed for the purposes of deterring Hall from making more threats to injure others, protecting the public from those threats, and rehabilitating Hall.  App. 54; see Holena, 906 F.3d at 295.  (“[R]estrictions must be tailored to deterring crime, protecting the public, or rehabilitating the defendant.”).  Hall’s personal computer has been integral to the majority of Hall’s charged conduct—from making a fraudulent online fundraising account, to impersonating others via fake social media accounts, to making threats against a Congressman on X.  Moreover, the computer monitoring condition was not imposed reflexively upon Hall’s release.  Rather, it was imposed only after Hall misled his probation officer about the existence of his X account, demonstrating a need to obtain more reliable information about Hall’s social media use.  Finally, the computer monitoring condition lasts only as long as the term of Hall’s supervised release and therefore extends no longer than necessary to address the purposes of imposing supervised release on Hall in the first place.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2, comment. (n.4).  On plain error review, we will affirm.  There is a “viable basis in the record” to support the District Court’s imposition of the condition, Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–91 (3d Cir. 2018), and condition is “tangibly related  6 to the goals of supervised release.”  See Holena, 906 F.3d at 290.4  We perceive no “clear or obvious error under the law,” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, in the District Court’s tailoring of the condition to address Hall’s failure to comply with a previous condition of release and the District Court’s concern for community protection and deterrence.  Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th at 448. B. Hall’s Fourth Amendment Argument  Next, Hall argues that the District Court plainly erred in imposing the search portion of the computer monitoring condition because it infringes his privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment.  Again, we disagree. “Defendants on supervised release enjoy less freedom than those who have finished serving their sentences,” Holena, 906 F.3d at 295, so Hall has a reduced privacy  4  Hall relies on various cases to support his argument that the computer monitoring condition “has a chilling effect on his ability to express political views,” and thus violates his First Amendment rights.  The District Court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte consider these cases, especially when considering that those cases are readily distinguishable from Hall’s. Compare App. 55 (special condition imposing no restriction on Hall’s access to the internet, social media posting, or run for Congress); with Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (agency threatened to remove Appellant’s website unless he complied with certain guidelines, provided a “red-pen mark-up of his website,” and threatened to continuously monitor his website to ensure compliance); Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that the Appellant had First Amendment standing where he alleged that he “faced ... a real threat of prosecution” because of his investigative reporting and where Appellant could not “limit his exposure other than [by] curtail[ing] his investigative and journalistic activities”).  Hall’s references to Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017)—where the Supreme Court found that a law prohibiting registered sex offenders from ever accessing certain websites violated the First Amendment—are equally unpersuasive.  See United States v. Browder, 866 F.3d 504, 511 n.26 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that Packingham was not on point as “[i]t involved an internet ban—not internet or computer monitoring—and that ban extended beyond the completion of a sentence.”).  7 interest in his computers while he is on supervised release.  See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Balon 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) Indeed, nearly two decades ago, the Supreme Court held that because individuals on supervised release have a significantly diminished expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the suspicionless search of those individuals.  See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849, 857 (2006).5 Taking into account Hall’s reduced privacy interest in his computers, we must consider whether the computer monitoring condition imposes a “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); Holena, 906 F.3d at 291 (“A defendant’s conduct should inform the tailoring of his condition[].”).  While the monitoring condition contains no limitations on when the probation officer may search Hall’s computers, the searches are limited in purpose to “determin[e] whether the computer contains any prohibited data prior to installation of the monitoring software, to determine whether the monitoring software is functioning effectively after installation, and to determine whether there have been attempts to circumvent the monitoring software after installation” and apply only for the length of Hall’s supervised release.  This condition is clearly geared towards ensuring the proper functioning of the means (the software) for deterring further violations and addressing Hall’s lack of candor with his  5  Hall argues that probation and supervised release should be treated differently and that therefore Samson does not apply here, but Hall cites to no caselaw to support this conclusion, and several Courts of Appeal have applied Samson in the context of federal supervised release.  See, e.g., United States v. Rusnak, 981 F.3d 697, 712 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Supervised release is akin to parole.”).  8 probation officer.  We again perceive no “clear or obvious error under the law,” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, in the District Court’s tailoring of the condition given that it is “directly related to deterring [the] defendant and protecting the public.”  Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th at 448.  This is especially so in light of the ample “viable bas[e]s in the record for the restriction” such as Hall’s violation of the terms of his initial supervised release by misusing his personal computer and failing to accurately report his activities on that computer.  Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–91 (3d Cir. 2018).  Considering the above, the District Court did not commit plain error in imposing the computer monitoring condition. III. CONCLUSION  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order, imposing the computer monitoring condition on Hall’s term of supervised release. 

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