ANDREAS SCHÄDEL

Buchanan

Bunce

Cederman

Crowder

Fleshman

Gagnon

Gellner

Gelman

Guha

Gurr

Hechter

Herbst

Hoddie

Horowitz

JULIAN WUCHERPFENNIG

Kymlicka

Lacina

Lake

LARS-ERIK CEDERMAN

Le Vine

Lijphart

McGarry

Negash

Rabushka

Riker

Roeder

Rothchild

SIMON HUG

Singh

Snyder

Walter

Young

This article evaluates the effect of territorial autonomy on the outbreak of internal conflict by analyzing ethnic groups around the world since WWII. Shedding new light on an ongoing debate, we argue that the critics have overstated the case against autonomy policies. Our evidence indicates that decentralization has a significant conflict-preventing effect where there is no prior conflict history. In postconflict settings, however, granting autonomy can still be helpful in combination with central power sharing arrangements. Yet, on its own, postconflict autonomy concessions may be too little, too late. Accounting for endogeneity, we also instrument for autonomy in postcolonial states by exploiting that French, as opposed to British, colonial rule rarely relied on decentralized governance. This identification strategy suggests that naïve analysis tends to underestimate the pacifying influence of decentralization.</jats:p

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American Political Science Review

Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?

Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?

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