Austrian Research Association (ÖFG) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grant P25490

Albert Falcó-Gimeno

Andrea Ceron

Bassi

Busse

Cheibub

Derlien

Fleischer

Hanna Bäck

Isabelle Guinaudeau

Knill

Kristoffer Kolltveit

Laver

Lehnguth

Mair

Martin Ejnar Hansen

Müller

Ostrom

Peters

Pollitt

Przeworski

Saalfeld

Sabatier

Scharpf

Schnapp

Smeddinck

Strøm

Thomas M. Meyer

Thomas Persson

Timmermans

Tom Louwerse

Tsebelis

Ulrich Sieberer

Verzichelli

White

Wolfgang C. Müller

British Journal of Political Science

The design of government portfolios – that is, the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders – has been largely ignored in the study of executive and coalition politics. This article argues that portfolio design is a substantively and theoretically relevant phenomenon that has major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics. The authors use comparative data on portfolio design reforms in nine Western European countries since the 1970s to demonstrate how the design of government portfolios changes over time. Specifically, they show that portfolios are changed frequently (on average about once a year) and that such shifts are more likely after changes in the prime ministership or the party composition of the government. These findings suggest a political logic behind these reforms based on the preferences and power of political parties and politicians. They have major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics

SIEBERER, Ulrich

MEYER, Thomas

BÄCK, Hanna

CERON, Andrea

FALCÓ-GIMENO, Albert

GUINAUDEAU, Isabelle

HANSEN, Martin Ejnar

KOLLTVEIT, Kristoffer

LOUWERSE, Tom

MÜLLER, Wolfgang

PERSSON, Thomas

Oskar Bordeaux

The Political Dynamics of Portfolio Design in European Democracies



The design of 
government portfolios – that is, the distribution of competencies among 
government ministries and office holders – has been largely ignored in 
the study of executive and coalition politics. This article argues that 
portfolio design is a substantively and theoretically relevant 
phenomenon that has major implications for the study of institutional 
design and coalition politics. The authors use comparative data on 
portfolio design reforms in nine Western European countries since the 
1970s to demonstrate how the design of government portfolios changes 
over time. Specifically, they show that portfolios are changed 
frequently (on average about once a year) and that such shifts are more 
likely after changes in the prime ministership or the party composition 
of the government. These findings suggest a political logic behind these
 reforms based on the preferences and power of political parties and 
politicians. They have major implications for the study of institutional
 design and coalition politics.

Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Sieberer, U.

Meyer, T.M.

Bäck, H.

Ceron, A.

Falcó-Gimeno, A.

Guinaudeau, I.

Hansen, M.E.

Kolltveit, K.

Louwerse, T.

Müller, W.C.

Persson T.

Leiden University Scholary Publications

The political dynamics of portfolio design in European democracies

Crossref

Sieberer, Ulrich

Meyer, Thomas M.

Bäck, Hanna

Ceron, Andrea

Falcó-Gimeno, Albert

Guinaudeau, Isabelle

Hansen, Martin Ejnar

Kolltveit, Kristoffer

Louwerse, Tom

Müller, Wolfgang C.

Persson, Thomas

NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives

The design of government portfolios - that is, the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders - has been largely ignored in the study of executive and coalition politics. This article argues that portfolio design is a substantively and theoretically relevant phenomenon that has major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics. The authors use comparative data on portfolio design reforms in nine Western European countries since the 1970s to demonstrate how the design of government portfolios changes over time. Specifically, they show that portfolios are changed frequently (on average about once a year) and that such shifts are more likely after changes in the prime ministership or the party composition of the government. These findings suggest a political logic behind these reforms based on the preferences and power of political parties and politicians. They have major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics

The political dynamics of portfolio design in European democracies

Abstract

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Oskar Bordeaux

Leiden University Scholary Publications

Oskar Bordeaux

Crossref

NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives

Lund University Publications

Brunel University Research Archive

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