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Associations and propositions: the case for a dual-process account of learning in humans
Authors
Alexander
Beckers
+75 more
Blough
C.L.D. Forrest
Cohen
Colwill
Colwill
Danner
Dennis
Dickinson
Dickinson
Elman
Evans
F.W. Jones
Feldman
Gebauer
Hanson
Haselgrove
Hawkins
Hawkins
I.P.L. McLaren
Jacoby
Jensen
Jiménez
Jones
Kahneman
Kahneman
Kaufman
Kaufman
Knowlton
Lawrence
Le Pelley
Le Pelley
Lewis
Livesey
Lovibond
M.R.F. Aitken
Mackintosh
Mackintosh
Mackintosh
McAndrew
McGeorge
McLaren
McLaren
McLaren
McLaren
McLaren
Miller
Mitchell
N.J. Mackintosh
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Perruchet
Poldrack
R.P. McLaren
Reber
Rescorla
Rescorla
Salthouse
Schultz
Spence
Spetch
Spiegel
Spiegel
Stanovich
Suret
Thompson
Unsworth
Wasserman
Weidemann
Williams
Willingham
Wills
Wills
Yang
Yeates
Publication date
1 January 2014
Publisher
'Elsevier BV'
Doi
Cite
Abstract
Copyright © 2013 Elsevier. NOTICE: This is the author’s version of a work accepted for publication by Elsevier. Changes resulting from the publishing process, including peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting and other quality control mechanisms, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 2014, vol. 108, pp. 185 – 195 DOI: 10.1016/j.nlm.2013.09.014We review evidence that supports the conclusion that people can and do learn in two distinct ways - one associative, the other propositional. No one disputes that we solve problems by testing hypotheses and inducing underlying rules, so the issue amounts to deciding whether there is evidence that we (and other animals) also rely on a simpler, associative system, that detects the frequency of occurrence of different events in our environment and the contingencies between them. There is neuroscientific evidence that associative learning occurs in at least some animals (e.g., Aplysia californica), so it must be the case that associative learning has evolved. Since both associative and propositional theories can in principle account for many instances of successful learning, the problem is then to show that there are at least some cases where the two classes of theory predict different outcomes. We offer a demonstration of cue competition effects in humans under incidental conditions as evidence against the argument that all such effects are based on cognitive inference. The latter supposition would imply that if the necessary information is unavailable to inference then no cue competition should occur. We then discuss the case of unblocking by reinforcer omission, where associative theory predicts an irrational solution to the problem, and consider the phenomenon of the Perruchet effect, in which conscious expectancy and conditioned response dissociate. Further discussion makes use of evidence that people will sometimes provide one solution to a problem when it is presented to them in summary form, and another when they are presented in rapid succession with trial-by trial information. We also demonstrate that people trained on a discrimination may show a peak shift (predicted by associative theory), but given the time and opportunity to detect the relationships between S+ and S-, show rule-based behavior instead. Finally, we conclude by presenting evidence that research on individual differences suggests that variation in intelligence and explicit problem solving ability are quite unrelated to variation in implicit (associative) learning, and briefly consider the computational implications of our argument, by asking how both associative and propositional processes can be accommodated within a single framework for cognition.ESR
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