Anti-competitiveness of Instant Messenger Tying by Microsoft

In this paper, we theoretically analyze Microsoft's tying practice in the instant messenger market. Using a model that highlights distinct features of the instant messenger, which are different from the cases of the web browser and the media player, we show that Microsoft can leverage its monopoly power in the operating system (OS) market to the instant messenger market through tying strategy. Microsoft's messenger tying hurts consumers because it enables Microsoft to monopolize messenger market and so fully exploit consumer's willingness to pay to the OS-messenger bundle. However, since tying saves installing costs, consumer loss is not so serious that total surplus improves under messenger tying. Finally we show that such results are robust to the possibilities of multi-homing in the instant messenger market.Microsoft, instant messenger, tying, foreclosure, multi-homing

Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets

This paper investigates the role of product upgrades and consumer switching costs in the tying of complementary products. Previous analyses of tying have found that a monopolist of one product cannot increase its profits and reduce social welfare by tying and monopolizing a complementary product if the initial monopolized product is essential, where essential means that all uses of the complementary good require the initial monopolized product. We show that this is not true in durable-goods settings characterized by product upgrades, where we show tying is especially important when consumer switching costs are present. In addition to our results concerning tying our analysis also provides a new rationale for leasing in durable-goods markets. We also discuss various extensions including the role of the reversibility of tying as well as the antitrust implications of our analysis.

Aid tying and donor fragmentation

This study tests two opposing hypotheses about the impact of aid fragmentation on the practice of aid tying. In one, when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more aid to purchases from contractors based in their own countries. Alternatively, when donors have a larger share of the aid market, they may have stronger incentives to maximize the development impact of their aid by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the latter hypothesis. The key finding -- that higher donor aid shares are associated with less aid tying -- is robust to recipient controls, donor fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation. When recipient countries are grouped by their scores on corruption perception indexes, higher shares of aid are significantly related to lower aid tying only in the less-corrupt sub-sample. This finding is consistent with the argument that aid tying can be an efficient response by donors when losses from corruption may rival or exceed losses from tying aid. When aid tying is more costly, as proxied by donor country size and income, it is less prevalent. Aid tying is lower in the Least Developed Countries, consistent with the OECD Development Assistance Committee's recommendation to its members.Gender and Health,Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness,Disability,School Health,Economic Theory&Research

Bundling, tying and collusion

Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in the collusive oligopolistic market.bundling ; tying ; collusion

The impact of tool selection on back and wrist injury risk in tying steel reinforcement bars: a single case experiment

The paper explores the risk of work-related musculoskeletal injury in tying steel reinforcement bars. Three tools are compared to determine the extent to which ergonomic tools can reduce the risk of injury to the back and wrist in steel-tying. A whole body system of wearable sensors was used to measure biomechanical risk in tying. Three tools were assessed to determine their impact on the risk of work-related musculoskeletal injury when used at different heights. These were: a conventional pincer-cutting tool; a power-driven tying tool, and a long handled stapler tool. No tool was found to work best in all situations. The long handled stapler tool significantly reduced trunk inclination when used from ground to shoulder height, but produced higher trunk extension (backward bending) when used above shoulder height. The power tying tool did not reduce the need to bend when working at lower work heights. The power-tying tool produced significantly lower peak wrist flexion values compared to the conventional pincer-cutter tool at all work heights except overhead. The power tying tool involved significantly lower levels of wrist rotation than the conventional pincer-cutter tool at all work heights above knee level. Many assessments of ergonomic risk factors in construction rely on observational methods. The use of small, lightweight wearable sensors permits the objective measurement of biomechanical risk factors for work-related musculoskeletal injury, as well as providing objective performance data that can be used in the design and selection of task-specific tools. Our analysis of work by height also provides insight into the way in which risk factors and reduction opportunities afforded by different tools vary depending on the height at which work is to be performed

The Tying of Lending and Equity Underwriting

This article examines the practice of tying,' which occurs when an underwriter lends to an issuer around the time of a public securities offering. We examine whether there are efficiencies from tying lending and underwriting which lead to benefits for issuers and underwriters. We find evidence consistent with tying occurring for issues when there are informational economies of scope from combining lending and underwriting. Firms benefit from tying through lower financing costs, as tied issuers receive lower underwriter fees on seasoned equity offerings and discounted loan yield spreads. These financing costs are significantly reduced for non-investment grade issuers, where informational economies of scope from combining lending with underwriting are likely to be large. These results are robust to matching methodology developed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998). For underwriters, tying helps build relationships that augment an underwriter's expected revenues by increasing the probability of receiving both current and future business. Both commercial banks and investment banks tie lending and underwriting and offer price discounts, albeit in different ways, with commercial banks discounting loan yield spreads and investment banks offering reduced underwriter spreads.

Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing

This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive contents available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.tying, two-sided markets, (indirect) network effects, multi-homing

Exact Cosmological Solutions of Gravitational Theories

A global picture is drawn tying together most exact cosmological solutions of gravitational theories in four or more spacetime dimensions.Comment: 11 latex article style page