Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship

This paper studies a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard in which the principal or the supervisor can monitor the agent's hidden action by using identical monitoring technologies. The paper shows that delegation of monitoring to the supervisor is profitable because of two effects. With delegation the principal can better regulate the incentives (incentive effect) and can commit to wage structures to which she could not commit without delegation (commitment effect). As a logical step collusion is introduced and it is shown that even with the possibility of collusion delegation is an optimal strategy.

Profit Sharing and the Quality of Relations with the Boss

Profit sharing generates conflicting changes in the relationship between supervisors and workers. It may increase cooperation and helping effort. At the same time it can increase direct monitoring and pressure by the supervisor, and mutual monitoring and peer pressure from other workers that is transmitted through the supervisor. Using data on satisfaction with the boss, we initially show that workers under profit sharing tend to have lower satisfaction with their supervisor. Additional estimates show this is largely generated by groups of workers who would be least likely to respond to increased supervisory pressure with increase effort: women, those with dependents and those with health limitations. Despite this finding, profit sharing seems to have little or no influence on overall job satisfaction as the reduction in satisfaction with the boss is offset with increased satisfaction with earnings, a finding consistent with profit sharing enhancing productivity and earnings.

The Economic Pay-Offs To On-The-Job Training In Routine Service Work

This study examines the relationship between on-the-job training and job performance among 3,408 telephone operators in a large unionized telecommunications company. We utilize individual data on monthly training hours and job performance over a five-month period as provided by the company’s electronic monitoring system. Results indicate that the receipt of on-the-job training is associated with significantly higher productivity over time, when unobserved individual heterogeneity is taken into account. Moreover, workers with lower pre-training proficiency show greater improvements over time than those with higher pre-training proficiency. Finally, whether the training is provided by a supervisor or a peer also matters. Workers with lower proficiency achieve greater productivity gains through supervisor training, while workers with higher proficiency achieve greater productivity gains through peer training

Peran Pengawas Pendidikan Dalam Peningkatan Mutu Pendidikan SMP Di Kabupaten Bima Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat

This study aims to analyze and obtain comprehensive and objective description of recruiting process of educational supervisor, the role of educational supervisor, also to know the obstacles and supporting factors of educational supervisor roles to improve the education quality of secondary schools in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara. This is a qualitative approach with case study method. The data were collected through interviews, observation and document study. The phase of data analysis used by interactive model and componential analysis. The results showed: 1) the recruitment process of educational supervisor in Bima was not based on goverment rules and law. 2) monitoring of scholl programmes implementation by educational supervisor ran less optimal. 3) supervising by educational supervisor ran less optimal. 4) evaluating of school programmes undertaken by educational supervisor has ran well. 5) reporting about the results of monitoring, supervising, and evaluating, was done well. 6) the follow up of the results of supervision was not optimal. 7) some obstacles factors are: a) geographical area, b) highway access, c) facilities, d) mastery of information and technology, e) human resources. Then, some supporting factors are: a) operational funds form local government, b) vehicle, c) coaching, d) the involvement of communities, e) educational supervisor domicile, e) students, f) spirit of the educational supervisor itself

Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties

We analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an agent’s corruption by supplementing a costless noncollusive outside detector such as the media with a collusive internal supervisor. The principal’s objective is to minimize the overall costs, made up of enforcement costs and social costs of corruption. If the penalties on the corrupt agent and a failing supervisor are nonmonetary in nature and yet the two parties can engage in monetary side-transfers, the principal may stand to benefit by allowing supervisor-agent collusion. This benefit may even prompt the principal to actively encourage collusion by hiring a dishonest supervisor in strict preference over an honest supervisor.Corruption, monitoring, collusion, bounty hunter mechanism

Rater accuracy and training group effects in Expert- and Supervisor-based monitoring systems

This study evaluated rater accuracy with rater-monitoring data from high stakes examinations in England. Rater accuracy was estimated with cross-classified multilevel modelling. The data included face-to-face training and monitoring of 567 raters in 110 teams, across 22 examinations, giving a total of 5500 data points. Two rater-monitoring systems (Expert consensus scores and Supervisor judgement of correct scores) were utilised for all raters. Results showed significant group training (table leader) effects upon rater accuracy and these were greater in the expert consensus score monitoring system. When supervisor judgement methods of monitoring were used, differences between training teams (table leader effects) were underestimated. Supervisor-based judgements of raters’ accuracies were more widely dispersed than in the Expert consensus monitoring system. Supervisors not only influenced their teams’ scoring accuracies, they overestimated differences between raters’ accuracies, compared with the Expert consensus system. Systems using supervisor judgements of correct scores and face-to-face rater training are, therefore, likely to underestimate table leader effects and overestimate rater effects.</p

Koordinasi antara Kepala Sekolah dan Pengawas dalam Pelaksanaan Supervisi Akademik

The purpose of this study was to discribe how the general objective of the research is to describe the coordination between principal and supervisor in the implementing of instructional supervision is in the Elementary Schools of Karang Tinggi Sub District, Central Bengkulu Regency. The result of the study The result of the research showed that the coordination between principal and supervisor in the implementation of instructional supervision. That can be seen from the absence of coordination between principal and supervisor in the arrangement of instructional supervision planning program, there is no coordination intensity between principal and supervisor in the implementation of academic supervision, the coordination of monitoring and evaluating between principal and supervisor has not run optimally, and there is no coordination of result follow-up between principal and supervisor in the implementation of academic supervision

An Approach to Monitor and Initiate Community Led Actions for Antenatal Care in Rural India – A Pilot Study

Background and Objective: Utilization of antenatal care in rural India is far from universal. It requires monitoring and identification of specific needs at field level for timely corrective actions. To pilot test the triangulation of rapid quantitative (Lot Quality Assurance Sampling) and qualitative (Focus Group Discussion) monitoring tools for ensuring antenatal care in a community based program. Methods: The present study was undertaken in surrounding 23 villages of Kasturba Rural Health Training Centre (KRHTC), Anji, which is also a field practice area of Mahatma Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences (MGIMS), Sewagram. The monthly monitoring and action system of the study was based on the rapid quantitative monitoring tool (Lot Quality Assurance Sampling, LQAS)to find out poor performing supervision areas and overall antenatal service coverage and the qualitative methods (Focus group discussions (FGDs), and free listing) for exploring ongoing operational constraints in the processes for timely decision making at program and community level. A trained program supervisor paid house visit to 95 randomly selected pregnant women from 5 supervision areas by using pre-designed and pre-tested questionnaire. For poor performing indicators, semi structured FGDs and free listing exercise were undertaken to identify unmet service needs and reasons for its poor performance. Results: Registration of pregnancy within 12 weeks improved from 22.8% to 29.6%. The consumption of 100 or more IFA tablets during pregnancy significantly improved from 6.3% to 17.3%. There was significant improvement in awareness among pregnant women regarding danger signs and symptoms during pregnancy. Over three months period, the overall antenatal registration improved from 253 (67%) to 327 (86.7%). Conclusion: The present field based monitoring and action approach constructively identified the reasons for failures and directed specific collective actions to achieve the targets

Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws.

When supervisors have imperfect information about the soundness of banks, they may be unaware of insolvency problems that develop in the interval between on-site examinations. Supervising banks more often will alleviate this problem but will increase the costs of supervision. This paper analyzes the trade-offs that supervisors face between the cost of supervision and their need to monitor banks effectively. We first characterize the optimal supervisory policy, in terms of the time between examinations and the closure rule at examinations, and compare it with the policy of an independent supervisor. We then show that making this supervisor accountable for deposit insurance losses in general reduces the excessive forbearance of the independent supervisor and may also improve on the time between examinations. Finally, we extend our analysis to the impact of depositor-preference laws on supervisors' monitoring incentives and show that these laws may lead to conflicting effects on the time between examinations and closure policy vis-a-vis the social optimum.Deposit Insurance; Depositor Preference; Supervision.

Shaping supervision practice through research: Effects of supervision for counselling practice

That there are links between effective supervision and effective counselling practice tends to be taken for granted. As a contribution to documenting the professional knowledges and experiences that might stand behind the profession’s claims for the benefits of supervision, this study interviewed experienced supervisors, seeking their perspectives on the links between effective supervision and effective counselling practice. Taking a social constructionist approach and showing the processes of knowledge production, researchers then engaged with these supervisors’ perspectives, in a series of reflections. These reflections show how the research interviews contribute to shaping the researchers’ ongoing supervision practice. Areas of interest include the power relation between supervisor and practitioner; responsibilities for monitoring practice; taping; supervisor responsibility for evaluating the effectiveness of supervision, and generativity of practice through storying a practitioner’s values and principles. Questions are offered for readers, too, to engage in a shaping of practice through their own responses to the article