Statistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination

We live in a tightly knit world. Our emotions, desires, perceptions and decisions are interlinked in our interactions with others. We are constantly influencing our surroundings and being influenced by others. In this thesis, we unfold some aspects of social and economical interactions by studying empirical datasets. We project these interactions into a network representation to gain insights on how socio-economic systems form and function and how they change over time. Specifically, this thesis is centered on four main questions: How do the means of communication shape our social network structures? How can we uncover the underlying network of interests from massive observational data? How does a crisis spread in a real financial network? How do the dynamics of interaction influence spreading processes in networks? We use a variety of methods from physics, psychology, sociology, and economics as well as computational, mathematical and statistical analysis to address these questions

An alternative to statistical discrimination theory

This paper offers a new representation of discrimination on the job market based on the most recent findings in the socio-psychological academic literature about human behaviour. Put it simply, it is assumed that the agents prefer working with people like themselves. This "affinity" principle is modelled through a distance between an individual (the candidate for a job) and the staff of the firm. Contrary to the classical view according to which discrimination results from asymmetric information, this new model provides a rationale for the presence of discriminative attitudes on the job market even when full information is available on the skill levels of all candidates for a working position.

Discrimination by Gender and Disability Status: Do Worker Perceptions Match Statistical Measures?

We explore whether perceptions of discrimination are related to ordinary statistical measures. The majority of disabled respondents report feeling some discrimination due to their disability, the majority of women feel some discrimination because of their gender, and a surprising number of men also report some discrimination. We do not find a strong link between perceptions of discrimination and measured discrimination perhaps because those who perceive discrimination feel that it occurs along other dimensions than pay. However, we do find a connection between whether a person feels his or her income is inadequate and measured discrimination for all groups studied

Some Thoughts and Reflections on the Fortieth Anniversary of the New York City Human Rights Commission

This article serves as a response to a previous article in this issue, entitled Local Law Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing: The New York City Human Rights Commission, by Michael H. Schill. This article reflects the tripartite structure of Schill\u27s, and comments on each of the three sections in turn: first, the article conducts an analysis of the statistical evidence of housing discrimination; second, this article contemplates the myriad consequences of discrimination on minority communities; finally, the paper concludes with a reflection on the future prospects of the Human Rights Commission in anti-discrimination law

Is ethnic discrimination due to distaste or statistics?

Employing a lab experiment, we directly test the empirical importance of key attitudes underlying the models of taste-based and statistical discrimination in explaining ethnic hiring discrimination. We find evidence that employer concern that co-workers and customers will prefer collaborating with native individuals drives unequal treatment

Is It Your Foreign Name or Foreign Qualifications? An Experimental Study of Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring

This paper contributes to the existing literature on ethnic discrimination of immigrants in hiring by addressing the central question of what employers act on in a job application. The method involved sending qualitatively identical resumes signalling belonging to different ethnic groups to firms advertising for labour. The results show that whether the applicant has a native sounding or a foreign sounding name explains approximately 77 per cent of the total gap in the probability of being invited to an interview between natives and immigrants, while having foreign qualifications only explains the remaining 23 per cent. This in turn, suggests a lower bound for statistical discrimination of approximately 23 per cent of total discrimination. The analysis indicates further that the 77 per cent are most likely driven by a mixture of preference-based and statistical discrimination.statistical discrimination, ethnic discrimination, hiring, job search, preference-based discrimination, correspondence testing

A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the Boston Police Department

This paper provides new evidence on the role of preference-based versus statistical discrimination in racial profiling using a unique data set that includes the race of both the driver and the officer. We first generalize the model presented in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) and show that the fundamental insight that allows them to distinguish between statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimination depends on the specialized shapes of the best response functions in their model. Thus, the test that they employ is not robust to a range of alternative modeling assumptions. However, we also show that if statistical discrimination alone explains differences in the rate at which the vehicles of drivers of different races are searched, then search decisions should be independent of officer race. We then test this prediction using data from the Boston Police Department. Consistent with preference-based discrimination, our baseline results demonstrate that officers are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the officer differs from the race of the driver. We then investigate and rule out two alternative explanations for our findings: race-based informational asymmetries between officers and the assignment of officers to neighborhoods.

Group Reputation and the Dynamics of Statistical Discrimination

Previous literature on statistical discrimination explained stereotypes based on the existence of multiple equilibria, in which principals have different self-confirming beliefs about different social groups (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993). However, the literature has not provided an account of where the principals' prior beliefs come from. Moreover, the static models dominating the literature do not offer relevant information about the dynamic paths that lead to each equilibrium. This paper develops a dynamic version of statistical discrimination in which economic players' forward-looking behaviors determine the dynamic paths to each equilibrium. Defining ``Group Reputation'' as the objective information shared by principals regarding the average characteristics of agents belonging to each group, this study identifies groups as advantaged or disadvantaged, based on their initial reputation states, and provides conditions by which a group can switch from one reputation state to another. By understanding this dynamic structure of reputation evolution, we examine the strategy that well-coordinated principals may voluntarily utilize to maximize their profits, helping the group in the reputation trap to improve its skill investment rate.Statistical Discrimination; Group Reputation; Reputation Trap; Forward-Looking Behavior

Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments on the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Peru

We present a series of experiments to understand the nature and extent of discrimination in urban Lima, Peru. The experiments exploit varying degrees of information on performance and personal characteristics as people sort into groups to test for statistical versus taste-based discrimination. This allows us to examine the nature of discrimination. Our sample is similar to the racial and socio-economic diversity of young adults in urban Lima. This allows us to look at the extent of discrimination. We use a unique method to measure race, along four racial dimensions common in Peru, and find that race is clearly observable. This gives us confidence that we can examine discrimination based on race. While behavior is not correlated with personal, socio-economic or racial characteristics, people do use personal characteristics to sort themselves into groups. Beauty is a robust predictor of being a desirable group member as is being a woman. Being unattractive or looking indigenous makes one less desirable and looking white increases oneâ??s desirability. Interestingly, indigenous subjects are three times more likely to be classified as unattractive, suggesting that beauty might mask discrimination. We find that once information on performance is provided, almost all evidence of discrimination is eliminated, except in the most-preferred group. The evidence in these cases is consistent with taste-based, rather than statistical, discrimination.