Word Limited: An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between theLength, Resiliency, and Impact of Federal Regulations

Since the rise of the modern administrative state we have seen a demonstrable trend towards lengthier regulations. However, popular critiques of the administrative state that focus on the overall size of the Federal Register are misguided. They rest on the premise that more, and longer, regulations unduly burden industry and the economy in general. However, movement towards lengthier and more detailed regulations could be rational and largely unproblematic. This study tests two potential rational explanations for the trend towards longer regulations: dubbed (1) “the insulation hypothesis” and (2) “the socially beneficial hypothesis.” Each of these explanations embodies a theoretically rational decision. First, the insulation hypothesis rests on the idea that it would make sense for policy-makers to include more detailed legal and scientific support in new regulations, and thereby increase their length relative to previous regulations, if the addition-al detail provided more insulation from judicial review. Second, the socially beneficial hypothesis rests on the idea that devoting relatively more time and re-sources to each new rule would be appropriate if longer, newer regulations produced more net social benefits than older, shorter ones. The empirical analysis set forth in this article combines data from a number of publicly available sources to test these hypotheses. The results, confirming “the socially beneficial hypothesis,” add to the canon of empirical analysis of administrative law, building on the work of Cass Sunstein, Cary Coglianese, and others. Recognizing an overly burdensome regulatory state, an undoubtedly worthwhile and vital check in a democratic society, requires more than simply counting the pages of regulations. The results of this study should put some minds at ease, at least with respect to EPA regulations; they should also help better direct our scrutiny in the future

A biological analysis of endocrine-disturbing chemicals in camel meat sector in Kazakhstan

Endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) consist of a diverse group of industrial chemicals and pharmacological agents. The use of instrumental analyses as the first screening tool might not be cost-effective to identify the existence of enormous numbers of chemical contaminants in environments. Also, knowledge of the concentration of individual residues is difficult to use to evaluate biological impacts of contaminants to wildlife and humans. The primary objective of present paper is a biological analysis of camel meat status in Kazakhstan. After a post-independence decline linked to the restructuration of collective structures in agriculture and food sector, the camel sector increased regularly. The camel population increased annually by 0.5% on average since the independence, while camel meat production increased by 1.2%. The slaughtering rate appeared still high, but stable for 10 years. Camel meat represented 1% only of the total red meat consumed in the country but this proportion is increasing. Despite this growing interest for camel meat, the sector is not organized in Kazakhstan. Despite recent initiatives in big towns the breeding is still traditional, and the consumption is essentially rural. Moreover, there are very few processing and no standard regarding this meat. The perspectives of development require however, the establishment of formal rules

A Whale\u27s Tale: Efforts To Save The Cook Inlet, Alaska Beluga Whale

In 1998, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) became concerned about the status of the beluga whale in Cook Inlet, Alaska. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) data indicated that the estimated population of beluga whales in the Cook Inlet region had been declining since 1994. Results from annual surveys in 1998 revealed that the estimated beluga whale population was nearly fifty per-cent lower than 1994 estimates. At the beluga whale\u27s current fifteen percent rate of decline per year, the Cook Inlet beluga whale stock would be reduced to fifty percent of its current level within five years. This level of removal is significant. The primary source of the decline was determined to be the subsistence harvest conducted by Alaskan Natives. After a comprehensive review of the Cook Inlet beluga whale\u27s status, NMFS proposed that the beluga whale be designated as depleted under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). Once the beluga whale was designated as depleted, Alaskan Natives, represented by the Cook Inlet Marine Mammal Council (CIMMC), could not harvest another whale without first entering into a cooperative agreement with NMFS. In addition to the co-management agreement, NMFS prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) and a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) so that management of the beluga whale could be conducted with the Alaskan Native Organizations (ANOs) beyond the year of the co-management agreement. Despite NMFS\u27s actions to reduce the depletion of the beluga whale, there were environmental groups that believed NMFS did not go far enough. These groups sued to have the species declared as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). An ESA listing would require more stringent regulations than a depleted listing under the MMPA. The groups\u27 concerns raised some critical questions: did NMFS obtain enough information to correctly determined that the primary cause of the beluga whale\u27s population decline was the subsistence hunting alone, making an ESA determination unwarranted; was the NMFS decision arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider future impacts; and, is the subsistence hunt so important to the ANOs that they should be allowed to continue to hunt a depleted species? This Comment evaluates the politics and implications of NMFS\u27s decision to designate the beluga whale as depleted under the MMPA. First, this Comment explores the applicable laws concerning marine mammals, most particularly the MMPA and the ESA. Second, it will examine the history of the beluga whale, its role in the Alaskan Native hunt, and its declining numbers over the years. Third, in addition to studying Cook Inlet Beluga Whale v. Daley, this Comment will look in depth at NMFS\u27s response to accusations that it was not aggressive enough in considering to list the beluga whale as endangered under the ESA. NMFS\u27s consider- ations of other factors that may have caused the beluga whale\u27s decline are examined to determine why the beluga was designated as depleted rather than endangered or threatened. Fourth, and finally, the importance of subsistence harvesting, and the restrictions on that harvest by Alaskan Natives are explored. After weighing the considerations on each side of the issue, this Comment concludes that NMFS took the appropriate action under the prevailing circumstances, and that NMFS\u27s restriction on the ANOs\u27 harvest was put in place after a careful weighing of the need for the beluga whale population to increase while also trying to preserve Alaskan Natives\u27 historical tradition

Inconvenient Truths: Facts and Frictions in Defense of Guardians Ad Litem for Children

During the 2013 Maine legislative session, citizens, elected officials, and professionals passionately expressed their beliefs concerning the legitimacy and efficacy of guardian ad litem [GAL] appointments in private child custody cases. In many respects, this policy discussion mirrored national trends in the scholarly and social science literature concerning allegations of the overuse or capacious role of a GAL. Establishing the proper legal and scientific contours within which GALs may serve the best interests of children and simultaneously provide constructive investigative and evidence-informed recommendations to judicial fact finding remains a proper concern for proponents and critics alike. The challenge, in this era of emotion and visceral responses to even the most sincere disputes, is how to engage in meaningful policy, practice, and legislative changes which effectively and responsibly serve the complex needs of modern family systems. The specific or precise role of a GAL differs from state to state but the general definition is a “person, not necessarily a lawyer, who in a litigated matter stands in the place of a party deemed legally incompetent” with the specific authority to act within a peculiar combination of a court’s delegation under the applicable law of that jurisdiction. For the most part, this role is a gyrating function of advocate, educator, evaluator, mediator, investigator, expert witness, social science consumer, and recommender. As one scholar aptly summarized, GALs perform widely diverse and concurrent tasks when assisting the court, and when “resolving custody disputes, visitation schedules, temporary placements, or other matters, legal and ethical issue arise in everyday GAL practices that have important implications for all parties involved. The need for judges to delegate flexible and diverse authority to GALs occurs because: (1) a family court judge cannot ethically perform certain functions in the American judicial system such as home visits and ex parte communications and (2) each family system presents unique social and environmental histories. Both these factors require an archeological approach to digging out some semblance of factual reality, which, if done properly, connects to recommended interventions. From those relatively simple truths of civics and human nature, a key point is inadvertently—or conveniently—missed: a trial judge, sitting on the bench each day with dozens of files containing little more than vague identities and undulating allegations, may only presume the most basic biopsychological context for child custody conflict

Alumni Newsletter - Issue No. 22

Highlights: Edward s. Godfrey Fund Unveiled at Dinner Honoring Former Dean Dean’s Column Faculty Notes Graduation 1985 Alumni in the Newshttps://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/maine-law-magazine/1022/thumbnail.jp

Alumni Newsletter - Issue No. 4

Highlights: President’s Message: Setting Our Sights Dean’s Column Class of 1968 Holds 10th Alumni in Governmenthttps://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/maine-law-magazine/1004/thumbnail.jp

Smith v. Town of Pittston: Municipal Home Rule\u27s Narrow Escape from the Morass of Implicit Preemption

In Smith v. Town of Pittston, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, upheld a municipal ordinance adopted by the town of Pittston that prohibited the spreading of septage within Pittston. The majority held that Pittston\u27s ordinance did not violate the Maine Hazardous Waste, Septage and Solid Waste Management Act (Solid Waste Management Act), which “govern[s] the disposal of garbage, sludge, septage and other waste.” The majority interpreted the “home rule” statute as granting sufficient authority to Pittston, as a municipal corporation, to enact the ordinance at issue. The dissent, on the other hand, would have held the ordinance to be incompatible with the state\u27s statutory scheme controlling the disposal of septage. An analysis of the statutory schemes controlling waste management and municipal home rule, along with rules of statutory construction, demonstrates that the majority opinion best reflects legislative intent. However, the role and fate of municipal home rule warrant a different approach to state preemption of local authority. This Note considers the background of municipal authority and the establishment of home rule in the process of ascertaining legislative intent and the overall objectives that the Legislature sought to achieve. Although in this case a statutory construction approach led the Law Court to uphold Pittston\u27s authority, it did so on narrow grounds and by a one-vote margin. The danger of home rule being undermined by implied state preemption calls for more guidance from the legislature and an amended approach to preemption cases

Who\u27s Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing a Traditional Paradigm in the Context of Specialized Domestic Violence Court Programs

The Specialized Domestic Violence Pilot Project (Pilot Project), implemented in York and Portland in July and August 2002, is the result of the collaborative efforts of the District Court system, law enforcement, prosecutors, members of the defense bar, and various community agencies offering services to victims and perpetrators. District court judges are largely responsible for overseeing the changes in court procedures and implementing the new protocols in domestic violence cases. The Pilot Project, and the changes it is making to the role that courts play in domestic violence cases, represents a significant departure from the procedures followed by traditional court programs. As a result of newly coordinated efforts and increased communication and training, the Pilot Project has the potential to alter the disposition of domestic violence cases in the State of Maine. Given the departure from traditional court models that the Pilot Project represents, and the role that the judicial branch has played in effectuating these new changes, the following questions begin to surface: Is the Pilot Project, and other similar specialized domestic violence court programs around the country, in some way representative of unorthodox judicial action? Could the newly-active role undertaken by the judicial branch to reorganize court structures be conceived of as a form of “activism” unlike that seen in conventional court settings? Finally, if such court programs are in fact examples of judicial activism, are they consequently objectionable or their outcomes subject to accusations of partiality in the same way that are other instances of so called “judicial activism”? This Comment will endeavor to explore some of these questions as they relate to the development and operation of creative judicial programs, particularly within the State of Maine. Specifically, it will focus on the role that Maine\u27s new Pilot Domestic Violence Project plays in adjudicating domestic violence cases and the extent to which the project represents, at the very least a departure from more traditional court programs and is, perhaps, also an example of “judicial activism.

Commentary: Convergences and Divergences: The United States and France In Multilateral Diplomacy

Despite the divergences that have regularly separated the United States and France, or at the very least their officials-who unfortunately influence public opinion as well-there are, in my opinion, more similarities than differences than one would believe between these two countries\u27 approaches to international relations. They both feel that they have a calling to defend the advancement of universal values in the world in order to further humanity along the road of peace, democracy, happiness, and justice. The United States, which can be considered a relatively new country, values respect for human rights, free enterprise, equal opportunity for everyone, individual freedom, religious faith, a belief in justice, and constitutional rights. The United States can also be characterized by its ambivalence towards state intervention, balanced by a feeling of national pride and that the American way of life is an objective worth defending in the United States and promoting all over the world. France is aware that it is an old country, where revolutionary ideals are mixed with a respect for tradition. France also shares a respect for human rights, a strong belief in equality and equal opportunity, and a belief in a political democracy with freedom to criticize the government. Although the French criticize the state and politicians, they look to the state for service and assistance whenever there is a problem. France and the United States have similar objectives. Although their methods of achieving those objectives may once have been similar-for instance the methods of the de Gaulle administration are similar to current United States methods-today the manner in which the two proceed in attaining these objectives places them at odds. France has become conscious that it is no longer a superpower and has adapted its diplomatic means to that situation. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the blocs, and the end of the East-West conflict, the United States has unarguably emerged as the sole world superpower. Having overcome the temptation of isolationism, its tendency has been to practice a unilateralist approach in which he who is not with me is against me. A multi-polar world is irrelevant for a nation convinced that it holds a monopoly over good. On the opposite side of good there exists only the axis of evil and its allies, or rather its accomplices, and one of America\u27s priorities has become the fight against terrorism, in which international cooperation is vital. As George W. Bush put it, I believe it is our duty to lead the world. This attitude, which can easily become arrogance, is somewhat simple to carry out in the arena of bilateral diplomacy once one accumulates demographic weight, political dynamism, military force, economic power, financial preponderance, cultural appeal, and the use of a progressively universal language. However, it is within international organizations that this policy faces obstacles because these bodies are generally founded upon the principle of sovereign equality among states and a voting procedure of one state, one vote. Therefore, the United States must compromise with often reticent, if not hostile, majorities. During the era in which the non-aligned movement represented a real force, refusing to choose between the two blocs, yet often acting as an ally of the USSR and the socialist camp, created difficulties for Western positions, especially those supported by the United States. Henry Kissinger stated that \u27\u27the non-alignment itself is also an alignment. Jean Kirkpatrick, referring to the vast differences between United States contributions to the UN budget (twenty-five percent at the time) and those of the non-aligned countries (a good number of them contributed at the minimum rate), declared: Who pays the note does not get the vote.\u27\u2

Distinguished Jurist-in-Residence Lecture: Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly

Sentencing is different from almost all functions of the government and surely different from the other functions of the judiciary. It is the moment when state power meets an individual directly. It necessarily involves issues that are distinct from those in other areas of the law. It requires a court to focus on the defendant, to craft a punishment proportionate to the offense and to the offender. It should come as no surprise that in countries across the world, common law and civil code, totalitarian and free, judges have been given great discretion in sentencing. To be sure, that power had a different resonance in the countries of the former Soviet Union, or in China, than it did in the United States. In China and in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the judicial sentencing power involved maximizing the ability of the judge to bend to the will of the Party or the Party leadership. In the United States, in contrast, it was part and parcel of a progressive penological movement, linked to the goal of rehabilitating offenders. At the same time, a sentencing system is in fact a system, impacting all of the institutions of government, not merely the judiciary, but also the legislative and executive branches, and, in the United States, the jury. It would be wrong to look only at what is essentially the “end” of the story, when the judge pronounces the sentence, and not all of the stages that precede it. Likewise, it would be wrong to assume that one can change the behavior of one player in the system without that change having an impact on all of the others. Discretion is hydraulic; you take it away from one and it flows to another. United States v. Booker could well herald a new era in American sentencing practices. But before I address what that era may look like, it is important to identify two other time periods and describe how each failed to provide meaningful sentencing reform—the era of indeterminate sentencing and the era of “mandatory” guidelines (which is, perhaps, at an end). In each case, the major institutional players—including my own institution, the courts— failed to live up to the expectations of reformers. The challenge for today is how to avoid the mistakes of the past