Mortgage Refinancing and Consumption Smoothing

This paper analyses the optimal refinancing decision of an agent whose only asset in the portfolio is the house where she lives in the context of a life-cycle model. The mortgage is modelled as an adjustable rate contract covering the remaining life of te house owner. Thus, refinancing concerns only the size of the mortgage, which can be adjusted in any period subject to a constraint on the amount that can be borrowed: the value of the new mortgage cannot exceed the latest realised price. The paper solves the model analytically and then numerically calibrates the refinancing decision.mortgages, refinancing,consumption smoothing

Mortgage refinancing in 2001 and early 2002

Over the past ten years, millions of homeowners have taken advantage of lower mortgage interest rates and higher home values and have refinanced their mortgage loans. For many, the decision to refinance was motivated by a desire to reduce their monthly mortgage payments, either by obtaining a lower interest rate or by extending the maturity of their mortgage. When they have refinanced, many homeowners have liquefied some of the equity they accumulated in their homes by borrowing more than they needed to pay off their former mortgage and cover the transaction costs of the refinancing. They have used the funds raised in so-called cash-out refinancings to make home improvements, to repay other debts, or to purchase goods and services or other assets. This article presents estimates, based on recent survey findings, of the incidence of refinancing, the changes in terms and conditions of mortgages after refinancing, the amount of funds homeowners raised in the process, and the ways in which homeowners used the funds. It also provides comparisons with previous surveys of refinancing activity and a statistical analysis of the relative importance of different determinants of refinancing and the amount of home equity liquefied during refinancing. Finally, it gives rough estimates of the effects of recent refinancing on the U.S. economy, including the effects on aggregate consumption spending.Mortgages ; Housing - Finance

The limits of market-based governance and accountability - PFI refinancing and the resurgence of the regulatory state

The refinancing of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) projects currently represents one of the most contentious aspects of Public Private Partnership in the UK. The negative publicity associated with UK PFI refinancing deals is associated with two main factors, namely evidence of massive private sector profit making in connection with past refinancing deals, and the ‘failure’ of private sector financiers to share refinancing profits with public sector organisations in line with government recommendations. This paper examines the ongoing ‘dance of non-regulation’ associated with PFI refinancing on the basis of traditional Marxist notions of ‘contradictions of capitalism’. Our analysis commences with the argument that PFI represents a prototypical case of an alliance between finance capital and the state, which has been created with the principal purpose of establishing a new source of profits for the private sector. A Marxist analysis of state-business relationships would predict such an alliance to show tendencies towards instability which could arise from a number of factors. These include, among others, the inherent lack of legitimacy of such an alliance vis a vis established policy goals and the stakeholders associated with them; a lack of a credible regulatory framework which, as a systemic prerequisite of private sector profit making, further exacerbates existing problems of legitimation; and, perhaps most importantly, the potentially self-defeating attempt by capital to maximise gains from the exploitation of the existing alliance without concern for the possibility of a political or regulatory backlash. Examining the recent history of PFI refinancing we find evidence of most of these destabilising tendencies which we expect to trigger calls for a greater regulation of PFI projects in the future

The limits of market-based governance and accountability - PFI refinancing and the resurgence of the regulatory state

The refinancing of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) projects currently represents one of the most contentious aspects of Public Private Partnership in the UK. The negative publicity associated with UK PFI refinancing deals is associated with two main factors, namely evidence of massive private sector profit making in connection with past refinancing deals, and the ‘failure’ of private sector financiers to share refinancing profits with public sector organisations in line with government recommendations. This paper examines the ongoing ‘dance of non-regulation’ associated with PFI refinancing on the basis of traditional Marxist notions of ‘contradictions of capitalism’. Our analysis commences with the argument that PFI represents a prototypical case of an alliance between finance capital and the state, which has been created with the principal purpose of establishing a new source of profits for the private sector. A Marxist analysis of state-business relationships would predict such an alliance to show tendencies towards instability which could arise from a number of factors. These include, among others, the inherent lack of legitimacy of such an alliance vis a vis established policy goals and the stakeholders associated with them; a lack of a credible regulatory framework which, as a systemic prerequisite of private sector profit making, further exacerbates existing problems of legitimation; and, perhaps most importantly, the potentially self-defeating attempt by capital to maximise gains from the exploitation of the existing alliance without concern for the possibility of a political or regulatory backlash. Examining the recent history of PFI refinancing we find evidence of most of these destabilising tendencies which we expect to trigger calls for a greater regulation of PFI projects in the future

Mortgage refinancing and the concentration of mortgage coupons

Because of the concentrated distribution of interest rates on outstanding mortgages, modest interest rate declines in 1997 and 1998 made refinancing a smart choice for a record number of homeowners. In addition, the strong economy and the age of mortgage loans likely contributed to the surge in refinancing activity.Mortgages ; Housing - Finance ; Interest rates

Financing a portfolio of projects

This paper shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with “shallow pockets” must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our paper may help to understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised

The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB

This paper employs individual bidding data to analyze the empirical performance of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank (ECB). We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables such as collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size, and experience. Panel regressions reveal that a bank’s bidding depends on bank characteristics. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. In contrast to the ECB’s main refinancing operations, we find evidence for the winner’s curse effect in LTROs. Our results indicate that LTROs do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes. JEL classification: E52, D4

The minimum liquidity deficit and the maturity structure of central banks' open market operations: lessons from the financial crisis

This paper studies the relationship between the size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs vis-à-vis the central bank and auction rates in its open market operations in times of financial market stress. In a theoretical model, it is found that marginal rates at central bank auctions may increase if the share of troubled banks becomes too high relative to the total size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs. An empirical analysis then aims at determining the size of open market operations needed to absorb large stress levels in interbank money markets and hence contain central bank auction rates. Finally, the paper analyses effects of the composition of open market operations of different maturities on auction rates. It is found that a too high share of longer-term refinancing induces a rise in auction rates which is undesirable. Therefore, the analysis suggests that there is a lower bound for the amount of liquidity provided through short-term operations. JEL Classification: G01, G10, G21Central Bank, financial crisis, money market, Open market operations

Why the effective price for money exceeds the policy rate in the ECB tenders?

The tender spread, i.e. the difference between the effective price for money in the ECB’s main refinancing operations and the prevailing policy rate, is one of the main determinants behind the evolution of the EONIA with respect to the ECB’s operational target. This study assesses the reasons for which the average tender spread did not reduce after the banks’ demand for liquidity was isolated from their interest rate expectations in March 2004. The paper offers two potential explanations for the unexpected behavior. First, following the increased precision in the ECB’s liquidity provision after the end-of- period fine tuning operations were added to the regularly applied tools, even a small bias in the liquidity supply could have resulted in a strictly positive tender spread. Second, banks’ uncertainty over their individual allotments in the tender operations may have led to a strictly positive tender spread. Furthermore, the significant growth in the refinancing volumes may have intensified the allotment uncertainty. JEL Classification: D44, E58EONIA, liquidity, main refinancing operations, tenders