Aggregate efficiency in random assignment problems

We introduce aggregate efficiency (AE) for random assignments (RA) by requiring higher expected numbers of agents be assigned to their more preferred choices. It is shown that the realizations of any aggregate efficient random assignment (AERA) must be an AE permutation matrix. While AE implies ordinally efficiency, the reverse does not hold. And there is no mechanism treating equals equally while satisfying weak strategyproofness and AE. But, a new mechanism, the reservation-1 (R1), is identified and shown to provide an improvement on grounds of AE over the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). We prove that R1 is weakly strategyproof, ordinally efficient, and weak envy--free. Moreover, the characterization of R1 displays that it is the probabilistic serial mechanism updated by a principle decreed by the Turkish parliament concerning the random assignment of new doctors: Modifying the axioms of Hasimoto, et. al. (2012) characterizing the probabilistic serial mechanism to satisfy this principle, fully characterizes R1

Improved Parameterized Algorithms for Constraint Satisfaction

For many constraint satisfaction problems, the algorithm which chooses a random assignment achieves the best possible approximation ratio. For instance, a simple random assignment for {\sc Max-E3-Sat} allows 7/8-approximation and for every \eps >0 there is no polynomial-time (7/8+\eps)-approximation unless P=NP. Another example is the {\sc Permutation CSP} of bounded arity. Given the expected fraction $\rho$ of the constraints satisfied by a random assignment (i.e. permutation), there is no (\rho+\eps)-approximation algorithm for every \eps >0, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture (UGC). In this work, we consider the following parameterization of constraint satisfaction problems. Given a set of $m$ constraints of constant arity, can we satisfy at least $\rho m +k$ constraint, where $\rho$ is the expected fraction of constraints satisfied by a random assignment? {\sc Constraint Satisfaction Problems above Average} have been posed in different forms in the literature \cite{Niedermeier2006,MahajanRamanSikdar09}. We present a faster parameterized algorithm for deciding whether $m/2+k/2$ equations can be simultaneously satisfied over ${\mathbb F}_2$. As a consequence, we obtain $O(k)$-variable bikernels for {\sc boolean CSPs} of arity $c$ for every fixed $c$, and for {\sc permutation CSPs} of arity 3. This implies linear bikernels for many problems under the "above average" parameterization, such as {\sc Max-$c$-Sat}, {\sc Set-Splitting}, {\sc Betweenness} and {\sc Max Acyclic Subgraph}. As a result, all the parameterized problems we consider in this paper admit $2^{O(k)}$-time algorithms. We also obtain non-trivial hybrid algorithms for every Max $c$-CSP: for every instance $I$, we can either approximate $I$ beyond the random assignment threshold in polynomial time, or we can find an optimal solution to $I$ in subexponential time.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper has been accepted for IPEC 201

On the variable capacity property of CC/DS-CDMA systems

A complete complementary code based direct sequence code division multiple access (CC/DS-CDMA) system has been proposed recently as a potential candidate for beyond third generation (B3G) wireless communications. This paper addresses the issues that design of efficient code assignment schemes should be based on a flexible physical layer support, which is extremely important for emerging cross-layer designs in future wireless applications. The study in this paper considers a CC/DS-CDMA system with multiple time slots, three traffic classes and two dynamic code-flock assignment schemes, namely random assignment (RA) and compact assignment (CA). Simulation results show that the CC/DS-CDMA system has variable capacity property (VCP), which is sensitively affected by different code-flock assignment schemes. In general, CA can offer lower blocking probability, whereas RA can offer a larger mean system capacity and higher throughput when offered traffic is heavy

Random Matching and assignment under dichotomous preferences

We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants gives a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate accross all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market. Our results apply to the random assignment problem as well.

Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategyproofness for the Random Assignment Problem

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for "how strategyproof" an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism.Comment: Working Pape