The Experience of an Intermediary in a Complex Initiative: The Urban Health Initiative's National Program Office

Why would a foundation use an intermediary to manage a multi-site initative? What are the important aspects of the relationships among a foundation, intermediary and local sites? How has The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's use of an intermediary played out during the life of a ten-year initiative

On the precautionary motive for savings and prudence, in an EU and a NEU framework

In this paper, we deal with the basic two-period consumption saving problem where the first and second period consumption utility, respectively v is assumed to be concave as usually. Considering the usual assumption of identify of u and v, we show that prudence is fully characterized by the convexity of u' in the EU model. More interesting we prove that for the RDEU model, prudence is fully characterized by the convexity of u' and strong pesimism. The paper ends by showing that for a strong risk averse RDEU decision maker, strict pessimism allows local weak prudence, whatever the sign of u'''.EU model, RDEU model, strong risk aversion, pessimism, prudence and local weak prudence.

Taking Prudence Seriously

Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by evaluative prudential properties, and defends the view that evaluative well-being facts generate agent-relative reasons for the relevant agent. It also investigates whether prudential discourse is normative. It is proposed that prudential discourse is normative by arguing that prudential judgements are normative judgements. The case for this is presented by analogy with moral discourse by showing that the features of moral judgements that metaethicists appeal to when articulating, explaining, and justifying the claim that moral judgements are normative are also possessed by prudential judgements. Various objections to the analogy are also considered

Proving prediction prudence

We study how to perform tests on samples of pairs of observations and predictions in order to assess whether or not the predictions are prudent. Prudence requires that that the mean of the difference of the observation-prediction pairs can be shown to be significantly negative. For safe conclusions, we suggest testing both unweighted (or equally weighted) and weighted means and explicitly taking into account the randomness of individual pairs. The test methods presented are mainly specified as bootstrap and normal approximation algorithms. The tests are general but can be applied in particular in the area of credit risk, both for regulatory and accounting purposes.Comment: 23 pages, some typos correcte

The Function of Normative Process‐Requirements

This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process‐requirements upon us. It has been argued that process‐requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process‐requirements. First, process‐requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process‐requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process‐requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process‐requirements

On Multivariate Prudence

In this paper we extend the theory of precautionary saving to the case in which uncertainty is multidimensional and we develop a matrix-measure of multivariate prudence. Furthermore, we characterize comparative prudence, decreasing and increasing prudence, the effect of uncertainty on the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, and the Drèze-Modigliani substitution effect in this multivariate setting. We also characterize the concept of multivariate downside risk aversion as a multivariate preference for harm disaggregation. We show that our definition is equivalent to a positive precautionary saving motive. We propose an alternative measure of the intensity of downside risk aversion and show that this measure is useful in understanding several economic problems that involve multivariate preferences.matrix-measure, multivariate prudence, comparative prudence, multivariate downside risk aversion, downside risk aversion, multivariate preferences

"The Degree of Precautionary Saving: A Reexamination"

Extending Dynan's methodology (1993), we show that a significant frac tion of the prudence parameter puzzle can be explained by a downward omitted variable bias. Further, the estimated prudence is substantially higher for liquidity-constrained households.

Acquiring a new discourse : using action research and sociocultural pedagogies to explore how a study group is able to support mature-aged open entry students in their first semesters at university : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand

This research explores how a study group concurrent with mature-aged open-entry students’ first semesters on the campus of a research university could support those students as they acquired an academic Discourse. It addresses a gap in both research and practice for such students who very often arrive at university without academic preparation and must find support for their transitions through generic provisions rather than from interventions designed for their own particular needs based on the findings of focused research. Many of these students struggle to engage with the ways of being and doing within higher education, particularly with its expectations for teaching and learning, its worldviews, specialised language, and approaches to writing. This study used action research to develop and trial an intervention informed by Gee’s concept of Discourse incorporating a sociocultural pedagogy. As writing is a core component of an academic Discourse, pedagogy also incorporated a scaffolded genre approach to teaching writing. In line with action research, the intervention was continually modified in response to emerging data which were gathered primarily from participant observation and transcripts of study group meetings, the researcher’s reflective journal, participant interviews, and student texts. Findings suggest that while a study group does not replace academic preparation, it may provide something necessary and complementary for mature-aged students. The group provided a space in which many participants were able to identify expectations for teaching and learning they held and, through the reflection that was a core of the action research process, adapt those to something more appropriate for an academic Discourse. In the study group, students learned and practised specific writing process skills they did not have on entry which they then applied in their writing beyond the bounds of the group. Students also began to recognise themselves as legitimate participants in higher education. This study concludes with the implication that transition for mature-aged students is a holistic process of acquiring a new Discourse by immersion in a social grouping. A study group such as the one in this research may provide an opportunity for acquiring a new Discourse

Moment characterization of higher-order risk preferences

It is often said that prudence and temperance play key roles in aversion to negative skewness and kurtosis, respectively. This paper puts a new perspective on these relationships and presents a characterization of higher-order risk preferences in terms of statistical moments. An implication is, for example, that prudence implies preference for distributions with higher skewness as defined by all odd moments. Moreover, we show that this preference is robust towards variation in kurtosis as defined by all even moments. We thus speak of the kurtosis robustness feature of prudence. Further, we show that all higher-order risk preferences of odd order imply skewness preference, but for different distributions than prudence. Similar results are presented for temperance and higher-order risk preferences of even order that can be related to kurtosis aversion and have a skewness robustness feature.decision making under risk, higher-order risk preferences, kurtosis aversion, moments, prudence, skewness preference, temperance