Promises, Promises

As host of the Olympic Games, China seeks to increase national economic and socialdevelopment and "display to the world a new image of China", and presents the Games as an opportunity to foster democracy, improve human rights and integrate China with the rest of the world. In its Olympic Action Plan promulgated in 2002, China outlined the phases of construction in the run up to the 2008 Games, and the standards to which it would hold itself in the governance and construction of venues, impact on Beijing's environment, increasing social and economic development and providing China's citizenry with greater access to information and technology.The goals and specific commitments that the government has adopted not only have implications for the smooth and successfuloperation of the Olympic Games, but also have the potential to impact on a number of China's international obligations, including its human rights obligations.Despite human rights-related commitments as diverse as transparency and accountability, access to information and freedom of the press, poverty alleviation, an improved standard of living for all people, and compensation for evictions and health issues, the record to date raises serious compliance issues

Promises Promises

In the classical general equilibrium model, agents keep all their promises, every good is traded, and competition prevents any agent from earning superior returns on investments in financial markets. In this paper I introduce the age-old problem of broken promises into the general equilibrium model, and I find that a new market dynamic emerges. Given the legal system and institutions, market forces of supply and demand will establish the collateral levels which are required to secure promises. Since physical collateral will typically be scarce, these collateral levels will be set so low that there is bound to be some default. Many kinds of promises will not be traded, because that also economizes on collateral. Scarce collateral thus creates a mechanism for determining endogenously which assets will be traded, thereby helping to resolve a long standing puzzle in general equilibrium theory. Finally, I shall show that under suitable conditions, in rational expectations equilibrium, some investors will be able to earn higher than normal returns on their investments. The legal system, in conjunction with the market, will be under constant pressure to expand the potential sources of collateral. This will lead to market innovation. I illustrate the theoretical points in this paper with some of my experiences on Wall Street as director of fixed income research at the firm of Kidder Peabody.

Expectations and promises

Discusses the Chancery Division judgment in Thorner v Curtis on a claim by an unpaid farm worker, who was led to expect that he would inherit the farm. Examines whether proprietary estoppel could be proved even if the deceased landowner made no express promise. Reviews case law on proprietary estoppel

Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signaling

Empirical experience and theory both suggest that policy reforms can be aborted or reversed if they lack sufficient credibility, One reason for such credibility problems is the legitimate doubt regarding how serious the government really is about :he reform process. This paper considers a framework in which the private sector is unable to distinguish between a genuinely reformist government and its nemesis, a government which simply feigns interest in reform because it is a precondition for foreign assistance The general conclusion is that the rate at which reforms are introduced may serve to convey the government's future intentions, and hence act as a signal of its "type". More specifically, credible policy reform may require going overboard: the government will have to go much farther than it would have chosen to in the absence of the credibility problem.

Promises & Partnership

We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What is the form and content of the communication? Which model of decision-making can capture the impact of communication? We consider free-form communication, measure beliefs (about actions and beliefs), and examine which motivational forces influence subjects. We find they harbor belief-dependent preferences that can be captured using psychological game theory. In particular, agents are influenced by guilt aversion, which suggests a theory of why and how communication influences behavior in which statements of intent and resulting expectations play a special role. This has bearing on how to understand partnerships and contracts.Promises; partnership; contract theory; behavioral economics; hidden action; moral hazard; lies; social preferences; psychological game theory; guilt aversion; reciprocity; fairness

Promises and Conflicting Obligations

This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called ‘wicked promises’? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The discussion examines both ‘natural right’ and ‘social practice’ approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make binding promises that conflict with our prior obligations. There is also consideration of the parallel case of ‘wicked commands’

The nature of libertine promises in Laclos's Les 'Liaisons Dangereuses

This article suggests that the libertines Valmont and Merteuil privilege promises because their futural orientation implies a godlike control of people and events, and because promises offer the possibility of being broken, of further pleasure to be derived from transgression. Moreover, it demonstrates how promises constitute paradoxical markers of the interlocutor's desire, rather than the speaker's sincerity; a desire that the libertines expertly exploit, although they too can fall victim to this dynamic. The article concludes with a consideration of why promises are made to be broken in Les Liaisons dangereuses, focusing on the absence of patriarchal figures in the text

Turning marketing promises into business value: The experience of an industrial SME

The article studies the value that businesses should have for their customers and shareholders. It explains how to develop such value to meet or exceed customer's expectations through the application of the promise framework. The promise model includes promises made to customers, promises kept, and promises that involve a synchronized effort from the whole firm to create and deliver value to customers

Promises, Promises: The States' Experience With Income Tax Indexing

The paper discusses five early approaches to the price (and quantity) index number problem. The five approaches are: (1) the fixed basket approach; (ii) the statistical approach; (iii) the test or axiomatic approach; (iv) the Divisia approach and (v) the economic approach. The economic approach makes use of the assumption of optimizing behavior under constraint and the approach is discussed under four subtopics: (i) basic theoretical definitions; (ii) the theory of bounds; (iii) exact index numbers and (iv) econometric estimation of preferences. The paper also discusses several topics raised by Jack Triplett in a recent paper, including: (i) the merits of the test approach to index number theory, (ii) the chain principle and alternatives to it; (iii) the substitution bias and (iv) the new good bias. Although the paper is for the most part an extensive historical survey, there are a few new results in section 8 on multilateral alternatives to the chain principle. Also in section 6.3, it is shown that the Paasche, Laspeyres and all superlative indexes will satisfy the circularity test to the first order.