Nuclear nonproliferation

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International Relations and HRD Activities of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy of the ROK

The objective of this article is to explain the HRD activities on nuclear nonproliferation and security area of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA) of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The HRD activities on nuclear security in international society have moved gradually from military dimension to the aspect of social management of conflict and threat. The paper would be developed in the following ways; First, the main concept of nuclear security in the Republic of Korea(ROK) will be touched, which could show us why and how the ROK has put its step forward into the HRD efforts. Second, the background in conjunction with international relations and its developing process how the Korea Center of Excellence (COE), named as INSA, had been set would be described. Third, the detailed efforts of the ROK to build a COE in Korea in connection with the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) will be touched with a detailed explanation on its main activities, direction and the perspective. Finally, the aspect of nuclear culture issues and lessons learned in the first year of the nuclear nonproliferation and security HRD activities of the INSA would be developed

The Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute at Texas A&M University

The Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) is a multidisciplinary organization at Texas A&M University and was the first U.S. academic institution focused on technical graduate education, research, and service related to the safeguarding of nuclear materials and the reduction of nuclear threats. NSSPI employs science, engineering, and policy expertise to: (1) conduct research and development to help detect, prevent, and reverse nuclear and radiological proliferation and guard against nuclear terrorism; (2) educate the next generation of nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation leaders; (3) analyze the interrelationships between policy and technology in the field of nuclear security; and (4) serve as a public resource for knowledge and skills to reduce nuclear threats. Since 2006, over 31 Doctoral and 73 Master degrees were awarded through NSSPI-sponsored research. Forty-one of those degrees are Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering with a specialization in Nuclear Nonproliferation and 16 were Doctorate of Philosophy degrees with a specific focus on nuclear nonproliferation. Over 200 students from both technical and policy backgrounds have taken classes provided by NSSPI at Texas A&M. The model for creating safeguards and security experts, which has in large part been replicated worldwide, was established at Texas A&M by NSSPI faculty and staff. In addition to conventional classroom lectures, NSSPI faculty have provided practical experiences; advised students on valuable research projects that have contributed substantially to the overall nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security arenas; and engaged several similar academic and research institutes around the world in activities and research for the benefit of Texas A&M students. NSSPI has had an enormous impact on the nuclear nonproliferation workforce (across the international community) in the past 8 years, and this paper is an attempt to summarize the activities accomplished by NSSPI during this time and the future direction of the program

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Reasoner: PNNL FY12 Report

Building on previous internal investments and leveraging ongoing advancements in semantic technologies, PNNL implemented a formal reasoning framework and applied it to a specific challenge in nuclear nonproliferation. The Semantic Nonproliferation Analysis Platform (SNAP) was developed as a preliminary graphical user interface to demonstrate the potential power of the underlying semantic technologies to analyze and explore facts and relationships relating to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). In developing this proof of concept prototype, the utility and relevancy of semantic technologies to the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) has been better understood

International Law of Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation: Application to Non-State Actors

International legal responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors have been many but often inconsistent, inadequate, and legally unsound. This Article argues in favor of resorting to successfully-implemented methods of dealing with similar crimes. International law has already expanded from its original statist conceptions and scope to include individuals, such as in international human rights norms and international humanitarian laws. In the latter, in particular, the law has expanded in the context of both international and non-international armed conflict. This Article argues that the advancement of law in these areas can lend much to efforts to bring nuclear terrorism within the scope of International Criminal Court, from whose jurisdiction this crime is currently excluded. This Article also recommends purposefully elevating the prohibition against possession and use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors to jus cogens, making such acts international crimes of the type that do not necessarily require state consent for prosecution by an international tribunal

Philanthropy, Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Threat Reduction

This report analyzes several case studies that illustrate the role of philanthropy in promoting nuclear nonproliferation and threat reduction and examine the evidentiary bases behind their claims of impact. The influence of social movements, activism, public opinion, and philanthropy on national security policy is notoriously difficult to measure: policymakers are reluctant to credit outsiders for fear of looking weak, while accounts of social movements are often written by participants or by people sympathetic to movements' goals. Furthermore, when sources do credit philanthropy with achieving nonproliferation or threat reduction, their assertions are most often vague or difficult to verify. Nonetheless, these sources, flawed as they are, offer evidence that philanthropy has influenced threat reduction (including nuclear nonproliferation) and highlight the need for continued research on the subject

Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice

The term dual-use characterizes technologies that can have both military and civilian applications. What is the state of current efforts to control the spread of these powerful technologies—nuclear, biological, cyber—that can simultaneously advance social and economic well-being and also be harnessed for hostile purposes? What have previous efforts to govern, for example, nuclear and biological weapons taught us about the potential for the control of these dual-use technologies? What are the implications for governance when the range of actors who could cause harm with these technologies include not just national governments but also non-state actors like terrorists? These are some of the questions addressed by Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice, the new publication released today by the Global Nuclear Future Initiative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The publication's editor is Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. Governance of Dual-Use Technologies examines the similarities and differences between the strategies used for the control of nuclear technologies and those proposed for biotechnology and information technology. The publication makes clear the challenges concomitant with dual-use governance. For example, general agreement exists internationally on the need to restrict access to technologies enabling the development of nuclear weapons. However, no similar consensus exists in the bio and information technology domains. The publication also explores the limitations of military measures like deterrence, defense, and reprisal in preventing globally available biological and information technologies from being misused. Some of the other questions explored by the publication include: What types of governance measures for these dual-use technologies have already been adopted? What objectives have those measures sought to achieve? How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance prospects? What have been the primary obstacles to effective governance, and what gaps exist in the current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? In addition to a preface from Global Nuclear Future Initiative Co-Director Robert Rosner (University of Chicago) and an introduction and conclusion from Elisa Harris, Governance of Dual-Use Technologiesincludes:On the Regulation of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology by James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)Dual-Use Threats: The Case of Biotechnology by Elisa D. Harris (University of Maryland)Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons by Herbert Lin (Stanford University