From sand to networks: a study of multi-disciplinarity

In this paper, we study empirically co-authorship networks of neighbouring scientific disciplines, and describe the system by two coupled networks. By considering a large time window, we focus on the properties of the interface between the disciplines. We also focus on the time evolution of the co-authorship network, and highlight a rich phenomenology including first order transition and cluster bouncing and merging. Finally, we present a ferro- electric-like model (CDIM), involving bond redistribution between the nodes, that reproduces qualitatively the structuring of the system in homogeneous phasesComment: submitted to europhys. let

Hit and Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, and Refusal to Deal in the Supreme Court Decision in Trinko

Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to lease parts of their local telecommunications network to any firm at “cost plus a reasonable profit” prices which could combine them at will, add retailing services and sell local telecommunication service as a rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant in local telecommunications, leased parts of Verizon’s network. Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its downstream retail rival. The Supreme Court held that Trinko’s complaint failed to state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and dismissed the complaint. I argue that Verizon had two monopolies in local telecommunications: a monopoly of the local telecommunications network, as well as a monopoly in retail local telecommunications services. The 1996 Act allowed for competition in retail services and also imposed cost-based pricing on leases of Verizon’s network. Verizon, unable to increase the lease price on its network, reverted to raising-rivals-costs strategies against its retail competitors. Thus, Verizon used its monopoly of the network infrastructure to disadvantage entrants in retail. In doing so, Verizon lost short term profits that it would have earned from leasing its network to entrants, since the 1996 Act had set the lease price at cost plus “reasonable profit.” Thus, Verizon is liable if the “sacrifice principle” is applied. According to the sacrifice principle, a defendant is liable if its conduct “involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power.”Vertical Leverage, Refusal to Deal, Monopoly, Sacrifice Principle, Trinko

Pricing of Complementary Goods and Network Effects*

We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of a complementary good provided either by it or by another firm. We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence on the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of the complementary good, i.e., the extent of the network effect. We establish an equivalence between a model of a base and a complementary good and a reduced-form model of the base good in which network effects are assumed in the consumers’ utility functions as a surrogate for the presence of direct or indirect network effects, such as complementary goods produced by other firms. We also assess and calibrate the influence on profits of the intensity of network effects and quality improvements in both goods. We evaluate the incentive that a monopolist of the base good has to improve its quality rather than that of the complementary good under different market structures. Finally, based on our results, we discuss a possible explanation of the fact that Microsoft Office has a significantly higher price than Microsoft Windows although both products have comparable market shares.calibration; monopoly; network effects; complementary goods; software; Microsoft

The Quest for Appropriate Remedies in the Microsoft Antitrust EU Cases: A Comparative Appraisal

The Microsoft cases in the United States and in Europe have been influential in determining the contours of the substantive liability standards for dominant firms in US antitrust law and in EC Competition law. The competition law remedies that were adopted, following the finding of liability, seem, however, to constitute the main measure for the “success” of the case(s). An important disagreement exists between those arguing that the remedies put in place failed to address the roots of the competition law violation identified in the liability decision and others who advance the view that the remedies were far-reaching and that their alleged failure demonstrates the weakness of the liability claim. This study evaluates these claims by examining the variety of remedies that were finally imposed in the European Microsoft cases, from a comparative perspective. The study begins with a discussion of the roots of the Microsoft issues in Europe and the consequent choice of a remedial approach by the Commission and the Court. It then explores the effectiveness of the remedies in achieving the aims that were set. The non-consideration of the structural remedy in the European case and the pros and cons of developing such a remedy in the future are briefly discussed before more emphasis is put on alternative remedies (competition and non-competition law ones) that have been suggested in the literature. The study concludes by discussing the fit between the remedy and the theory of consumer harm that led to the finding of liability and questions a total dissociation between the two. We believe that it is important to think seriously about potential remedies before litigation begins. However, we do not require an ex ante identification of an appropriate remedy by the plaintiffs, since this could lead to underenforcement or overenforcement.antitrust, remedies, Microsoft, complementarity, innovation, efficiency, monopoly, oligopoly, media player, interoperability, Internet browser

Broadband Openness Rules Are Fully Justified by Economic Research

This paper responds to arguments made in filings in the FCC’s broadband openness proceeding (GN Dkt. 09-191) and incorporates data made available since my January 14th filing in that proceeding. Newly available data confirm that there is limited competition in the broadband access marketplace. Contrary to some others’ arguments, wireless broadband access services are unlikely to act as effective economic substitutes for wireline broadband access services (whether offered by telephone companies or cable operators) and instead are likely to act as a complement. Nor will competition in the Internet backbone marketplace constrain broadband providers’ behavior in providing “last mile” broadband access services. The last mile, concentrated market structure, combined with high switching costs, provides last mile broadband network providers with the ability to engage in practices that will reduce social welfare in the absence of open broadband rules. Furthermore, the effect of open broadband rules on broadband provider revenues is likely to be small and can be either positive or negative. Unfortunately, various filings have misstated or mischaracterized the results on the economics of two-sided markets. Contrary to what some have argued, allowing broadband providers to charge third party content providers will not necessarily result in lower prices being charged to residential Internet subscribers. This is true under a robust set of assumptions. Despite some parties’ mischaracterization of the economic literature, price discrimination by broadband providers against third party applications and content providers will reduce societal welfare for numerous reasons. This reduction in societal welfare is especially acute when price discrimination is taken to the extreme of exclusive dealing between broadband providers and content providers. Antitrust and consumer protection laws are insufficient to protect societal welfare in the absence of open broadband rules.Network Neutrality, Internet, Discrimination, Prioritization, Two-Sided Market, Market Power, Termination Fee, Broadband

Why Imposing New Tolls on Third-Party Content and Applications Threatens Innovation and Will Not Improve Broadband Providers’ Investment

While some broadband providers have called Internet content and application providers free riders on their infrastructure, this is incorrect and misguided. End-users pay for their residential broadband providers for access to the Internet, and content providers pay their own ISPs for connectivity as well. However, content providers need not pay residential broadband providers’ ISPs in order to reach their customers. This feature of the Internet has been one key factor that has allowed innovation to prosper and kept barriers to entry low, as the network transport market for content and application providers functions relatively efficiently. In this paper, I consider the impact of a departure from this current system. I examine the possible impact of last-mile broadband providers’ imposing “termination fees” on third-party content providers or application providers to reach end-users. Broadband providers would engage in paid prioritization arrangements – that is, application and content providers could pay the broadband provider to have their traffic prioritized over competitors’ services. I argue that these arrangements would create inefficiency in the market and harm innovation. Because the last mile access broadband market is concentrated and consumers face switching costs, these concerns are particularly significant. Broadband providers insist that imposing these new charges will greatly improve network investment, and thus these charges are beneficial. I argue that this is not the case. Possible higher revenues from discrimination may simply be returned to shareholders and not invested. Additionally, evidence suggests networks invest more under non-discrimination requirements, and paid prioritization schemes would divert money towards managing scarcity instead of expanding capacity. Paid prioritization could even create an incentive for broadband providers to create congestion to increase the price of prioritized service.Network Neutrality, Internet, Market Power, Discrimination, Two-Sided Market, Prioritization, Broadband, Termination Fees

Real Options and the Costs of the Local Telecommunications Network

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 invites entry in the local telecommunications networks whereby entrants will lease parts of the network ("unbundled network elements") from incumbents "at cost plus reasonable profit." A crucial question in the implementation of the Act is the appropriate measure of cost. This paper examines the economic principles on which the cost calculation should be based. I conclude that the appropriate measure of cost (maximizing allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency) is forward-looking economic cost and not the historical, accounting, or embedded cost of the incumbent’s network. In calculating costs, demand and supply uncertainty, as well as the asymmetric position of incumbents and entrants should be taken into account. Close examination of the issue of uncertainty in the local telecommunications network reveals that (i) for most unbundled network elements, there is little demand uncertainty; and (ii) that those elements that face significant uncertainty, do not have sunk value. Thus, the incumbent does not face higher expected cost by investing. Moreover, the rewards of the incumbent can be higher because buyers prefer to buy services from the owner of the network. Finally, strategic considerations in oligopolistic interaction are likely to dominate any uncertainty considerations and will increase the incentive of incumbents to invest.telecommunications, regulation, cost, real options

Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis

We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers “on the other side” of the Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that generally net neutrality regulation (that imposes zero fees “on the other side” of the market) increases total industry surplus compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content and applications providers. Similarly, we find that imposing net neutrality in duopoly increases total surplus compared to duopoly competition between platforms that charge positive fees on content providers. We also discuss the incentives of duopolists to collude in setting the fees “on the other side” of the Internet while competing for Internet access customers. Additionally, we discuss how price and non-price discrimination strategies may be used once net neutrality is abolished. Finally, we discuss how the results generalize to other two-sided markets.net neutrality, two-sided markets, Internet, monopoly, duopoly, regulation, discrimination