Consumer myopia, compatibility and aftermarket monopolization

In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms compete for myopic consumers who optimize period-by-period. I develop the model in the context of aftermarket. With overlapping-generations of consumers, simultaneous product offerings in the primary market and aftermarket establishes a price floor for the primary good. This constraint prevents aftermarket rents from being dissipated by the primary market competition. Duopoly firms earn positive profits despite price competition with undifferentiated products. Nonetheless, government interventions to reinforce aftermarket competition such as a standardization requirement may lead to the partial collapse of the primary market.aftermarket, Bertrand competition, bounded rationality, standardization.

COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST MONOPOLIZATION AND THE THEORY OF CONTESTABLE MARKETS

The judiciary has relied on a firm's market share to evaluate the presence of monopoly power for a Sherman Act monopolization violation. However, an allegation that a firm's market share constitutes monopoly power may be refuted by evidence that there exists a contestable market. Contestable market theory shows that there is no monopoly power where there exists a threat of entry of other firms. This theory thereby offers agricultural cooperatives, which may have a large market share by reasons of the antitrust immunity provided by the Capper-Volstead Act, an argument to overcome allegations of a Sherman Act monopolization violation.Industrial Organization,

An account on the taxonomy and molecular diversity of a marine rock-pool dweller, Tigriopus fulvus (Copepoda, Harpacticoida)

The copepod genus Tigriopus Norman, 1869 is distributed worldwide in coastal rock pools and it is currently considered to include 14 valid species. Tigriopus fulvus (Fischer 1860), with its subspecies Tigriopus fulvus adriaticus Van Douwe 1913 and Tigriopus fulvusalgiricus Monard 1935, and Tigriopus minutus Bozic 1960 are currently reported to occur in the Mediterranean area, but the actual diversity of the genus is currently unknown. We aimed to assess the actual identity of Mediterranean Tigriopus populations and to elucidate their taxonomy and pattern of genetic diversity. In order to reach these goals, a fragment of a mitochondrial DNA gene (cytochrome c oxidase subunit I, COI) was sequenced to be used as a reference marker. Our data suggest the presence of a single species characterized by a noteworthy geographi-cally based genetic structure in the whole study area. The observed diversity pattern is tentatively ascribed here to a strong monopolization of the rock pools by the first immigrants that reached them. However, such a monopolization is periodically disrupted by local extinction events, which are frequent in the intrinsically unstable rock pool habitats. We propose the name “clockwork monopolization” for this pattern.El género de copépodos Tigriopus Norman, 1869 se distribuye en todo el mundo en charcas de rocas costeras y se considera que actualmente incluye 14 especies válidas. Tigriopus fulvus (Fischer 1860), con sus subespecies Tigriopus fulvus adriaticus Van Douwe 1913 y Tigriopus fulvus algiricus Monard 1935, y Tigriopus minutus Bozic 1960 han sido descritos para el área del Mediterráneo, pero la diversidad real del género es desconocida actualmente. El objetivo de este estudio fue evaluar la identidad real de las poblaciones mediterráneas de Tigriopus y dilucidar su taxonomía y patrón de diversidad genética. Con este fin, se secuenció un fragmento del gen de ADN mitocondrial (citocromo c oxidasa subunidad I, COI) como marcador de referencia. Los resultados sugieren la presencia de una sola especie caracterizada por una estructuración genética con una notable base geográfica en toda el área de estudio. El patrón de diversidad observado aquí se atribuye tentativamente a una fuerte monopolización de las charcas de las costas rocosas por parte de los primeros inmigrantes que las alcanzan. Sin embargo, tal monopolización se interrumpe periódicamente por los eventos de extinción local, los cuales son frecuentes en los hábitats de charcas de rocas que son intrínsecamente inestables. Aquí proponemos para este patrón el nombre de “monopolización periódica” (“clockwork monopolization”)

The Distributive Implications of Patents on Indivisible Goods

Patents raise the price and reduce consumption of the patented good, but the resulting deadweight loss is thought to be worth bearing when patent protection is required as an incentive to invention. The newly-invented good generates a residual surplus, making people better off than they would be if the good had not been invented. This well-known argument is usually framed in a context where people are identical, everybody's demand curve for the newly-invented good is the same and everybody shares to some extent in the residual surplus. However, when the newly-invented good is indivisible - like a heart transplant or the treatment of AIDS, where, in effect, a person consumes either one full unit of the good or none - the effect of a patent is to concentrate the entire benefit of the patented good upon the rich, leaving the poor no better off than if the good had not been invented.Patents, Indivisible Goods

Sexual Dimorphism in Stature (SDS), jealousy and mate retention

Previous research has investigated the manner in which absolute height impacts on jealousy and mate retention. Although relative height is also important, little information exists about the potential influence of sexual dimorphism in stature (SDS) within established relationships. The current study investigated the relationship between SDS and the satisfaction, jealousy and mate retention behaviors reported by men and women. Heterosexual men ( n = 98) and women ( n = 102) completed a questionnaire. Men in high SDS relationships reported the lowest levels of cognitive and behavioral jealousy, although the impact of SDS on relationship satisfaction was less clear. SDS was not associated with the overall use of mate retention strategies; SDS did however affect the use of three specific strategies (vigilance, monopolization of time, love and care). SDS did not affect women's relationship satisfaction, jealousy (cognitive, behavioral, or emotional) or the use of mate retention strategies (with the exception of resource display)

Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry

This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price competition with horizontal product differentiation. In contrast to the results obtained by Kamien and Zang (1990), we show that merged equilibria can appear in this game. Moreover monopolization of the industry occurs with a high number of firms.cooperative game; mergers; oligopoly

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP:

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an important opinion concerning Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempted monopolization. The opinion, written by Justice Scalia, limits the circumstances under which antitrust law will compel companies to assist their rivals