Can market failure cause political failure?

We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms

"Market Failure and Land Concentration"

Utilizing a 2002 household-level World Bank Survey for rural Turkey, this paper explores the link between concentration of land ownership and rural factor markets. We construct a unique index that measures market malfunctioning based on the neoclassical model linking land and labor endowments through factor markets to household income. We further test whether land ownership concentration affects market malfunctioning. Our empirical investigation supports the claim that factor markets are structurally limited in reducing existing inequalities as a result of land ownership concentration. Our findings show that in the presence of land ownership inequality, malfunctioning rural factor markets result in increased land concentration, increased income inequality, and inefficient resource allocation. This work fills an important empirical gap within the development literature and establishes a positive association between asset inequality and factor market failure.

Health Interventions and Risky Behaviour

This paper reviews the extent to which policy interventions can affect risky behaviours such as smoking, drinking and diet. The justification for such intervention is typically a market failure, broadly defined. The types of market failure typically encountered are discussed. First and second best interventions are examined and there is a review of the efficacy of such interventions with respect to Ireland.Risky behaviour, market failure

Public and private roles in road infrastructure: an exploration of market failure, public instruments and government failure

Starting with a 'greenfield' situation, we discuss reasons for market failure in road infrastructure provision. We show why it may not be optimal from a welfare perspective to leave road provision fully to the market and government intervention in this sector can improve welfare. Government intervention comes in different forms, such as financial intervention (taxation, subsidies), regulation (price, quality, environmental), and public provision of roads or road services. The analysis of the literature regarding government instruments allows us to establish a correspondence between different forms of market failure and instruments. Several case studies of particular road infrastructure projects are included to illustrate the use of government instruments.

Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?

We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms.occupational choice, adverse selection, property rights, assetliquidation, political failure, market failure.

Excuse and justification in the law of fair use: Transaction costs have always been part of the story

In American copyright law, the doctrine of fair use has long been problematic. Every plausible litmus test that might simplify the fair use inquiry has proven inadequate, and copyright commentators have long sought an algorithm or heuristic to lend predictability and conceptual coherence to the doctrine. Twenty years ago, I published in this Journal an article entitled Fair Use as Market Failure, which suggested that the key to understanding the protean terms of fair use could best be found in the notion of market failure. That 1982 article has been often misapplied, by both courts and commentators. I am pleased to publish in the Fiftieth Anniversary issue of this Journal a clarification of my position on market failure and fair use

Market Failure

Market failure is described and discussed. A summary of the current state of understanding is provided. Key words are: market failure, public good, externalities, rational expectations, information, monopoly, and competitive equilibrium

Conflicts of interests in the conventional and Islamic securitisation

This article is available open access through the publisher’s website.The 2007-2008 financial crisis observed the demise of the securitisation market, and this caused doubts on the viability of conventional securitisation and its underlying ethos. In the wake of such a market failure the financial industry and legal scholars have been in search of alternatives to the conventional securitisation. Some suggested that Islamic securitisation could provide an answer to this market failure. In theoretical terms the most causes of the 2007-2008 crisis can be pin downed to market failures owing to conflict of interests of conventional securitisation. It is the instances of market failures that provide a justification for the new regulation to correct misaligned incentives1. In this scenario, when one resorts to the ‘Islamic securitisation’, it simply means resorting to this new regulation in the wake of the global market failure

市場の失敗における事業戦略の可能性

The profit, an economical purpose of the company, has the role that becomes the means of the benefit of society. It can be said that CSR is theoretically an activity that invents this profit.CSR described in this text is internalization of Social Cost. This research aims to define this CSR as dynamics CSR activities from the strategy side. Past discussion of CSR research and the review of the discussion about the strategy theory and case derived the following. I took up FP Corporation as an example of CSR, I clarified that it was contribute competitive advantage and it was not an activity to which CSR obstructed the profit. . I described that the strategy that mixes the following is necessary for the judgment which societal cost is internalized, Competitive Advantage, Resource-based Approach Strategy. Blue Ocean Strategy