Lawyers on Trial: Juror Hostility to Defendants in Legal Malpractice Trials

In contrast to medical malpractice, legal malpractice is a phenomenon that has attracted little attention from empirically-oriented scholars. This paper is part of a larger study of legal malpractice claiming and litigation. Given the evidence on the frequency of legal malpractice claims, there are surprisingly few legal malpractice cases that result in jury verdicts. There are many possible explanations for this, one of which reflects the perception that lawyers are held in such low esteem by potential jurors that they risk harsh treatment by jurors when they are defendants in legal malpractice trials. Because we could find no empirical evidence that that either supported or rejected the reality of this perception, we designed a simple jury simulation experiment to test this as an hypothesis. Using three different case scenarios, each in two forms (one set within a legal malpractice framework and one outside legal malpractice), we found support for the hypothesis in only one of the three scenarios and even there the effects were at best modest. These results held up controlling for other possible factors that might influence juror responses to the case scenarios

Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?

This comment explores three avenues to pursue educational malpractice suits. First, a negligence action for malpractice. Second, a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. And finally, an action sounding in negligence for breach of statutory duty. Each avenue is explored in detail in terms of the likelihood of success. Importantly, the comment recognizes the inherent difficult of pursuing any education malpractice claim

Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance: A Primer

Analyzes the causes of and potential solutions to address malpractice crises, and discusses how medical malpractice insurance works, why premiums change, and what can be done about it

The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How No-Fault and Tort Differ

In the area of medical malpractice, no-fault has been offered as a response to the criticisms leveled against tort litigation for medical injuries. Five issues of no-fault are examined within the context of obstetrical malpractice

The Great Medical Malpractice Hoax: NPDB Data Continue to Show Medical Liability System Produces Rational Outcomes

Despite claims by business and medical lobbying interests and the Bush administration, there is no medical malpractice lawsuit crisis in America, according to this report by Public Citizen. The report dispels oft-repeated myths of dwindling doctors and spiraling insurance premiums used to support limits on the ability of injured patients to seek redress in the courts.The real problems are a lack of attention to patient safety, the high incidence of preventable medical error and the lack of accountability for a small set of doctors who account for a majority of medical malpractice payments, the report reveals. The report also presents several recommendations for Congress, state governments and hospitals to reduce health care costs and save lives.Public Citizen reviewed publicly available information from 1990 to 2005 from the federal government's National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), which contains data on malpractice payments made on behalf of doctors as well as disciplinary actions taken against them by state medical boards or hospitals. According to the analysis, the total number of malpractice payments paid on behalf of doctors, with judgments and settlements, declined 15.4 percent between 1991 and 2005, and the number of payments per 100,000 people in the country declined more than 10 percent. In addition, the average payment for a medical malpractice verdict, adjusted for inflation, dropped eight percent in the same period.The numbers show that patients do not win large jury awards for less serious claims but that payments usually correspond to the severity of injury. In 2005, less than three percent of all payments were for million-dollar verdicts and more than 64 percent of payments involved death or significant injury -- while less than one-third of one percent were for "insignificant injury.

Medical Malpractice and Physician Liability Under a Negligence Rule

A model of costly medical malpractice claims, based on Bayes Rule, is developed to examine the effects of physicians being liable for actual damage under a negligence rule. This model is consistent with empirical evidence concerning the pattern of claims. It is shown that compensating actual damage does not provide physicians with appropriate incentives to spend the second best optimal amount of time with patients or to treat the second best optimal number of patients. As a result, too much medical malpractice occurs relative to the second best social optimum.Medical Malpractice; Liability

Medical Malpractice Overseas: The Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Medical Tourism

Mirrer-Singer explores some of the legal uncertainty surrounding medical tourism specifically in ways medical tourists can seek relief in US courts for malpractice committed abroad and explains why courts probably lack jurisdiction over foreign physicians who have allegedly committed malpractice. Among other things, he discusses theories under which US firms in the medical-tourism business could be held liable for the foreign provider\u27s negligence

The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules

I explore the association between regional variations in physician behavior and the geographical scope of malpractice standards of care. I estimate a 30–50 percent reduction in the gap between state and national utilization rates of various treatments and diagnostic procedures following the adoption of a rule requiring physicians to follow national, as opposed to local, standards. These findings suggest that standardization in malpractice law may lead to greater standardization in practices and, more generally, that physicians may indeed adhere to specific liability standards. In connection with the estimated convergence in practices, I observe no associated changes in patient health

The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care

The growth of medical malpractice liability costs has the potential to affect the delivery of health care in the U.S. along two dimensions. If growth in malpractice payments results in higher malpractice insurance premiums for physicians, these premiums may affect the size and composition of the physician workforce. The growth of potential losses from malpractice liability might also encourage physicians to practice 'defensive medicine.' We use rich new data to examine the relationship between the growth of malpractice costs and the delivery of health care along both of these dimensions. We pose three questions. First, are increases in payments responsible for increases in medical malpractice premiums? Second, do increases in malpractice liability drive physicians to close their practices or not move to areas with high payments? Third, do increases in malpractice liability change the way medicine is practiced by increasing the use of certain procedures? First, we find that increases in malpractice payments made on behalf of physicians do not seem to be the driving force behind increases in premiums. Second, increases in malpractice costs (both premiums overall and the subcomponent factors) do not seem to affect the overall size of the physician workforce, although they may deter marginal entry, increase marginal exit, and reduce the rural physician workforce. Third, there is little evidence of increased use of many treatments in response to malpractice liability at the state level, although there may be some increase in screening procedures such as mammography.

Medical Malpractice: Impact of the Crisis and Effect of State Tort Reforms

Reviews research on the malpractice crisis and examines data on how volatile malpractice environments affect healthcare delivery and how state tort reforms affect premiums, frequency of claims, payouts, and physician supply. Considers policy implications