Libertarian Paternalism and the Authority Of The Autonomous Person

Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009) contend that the government is justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-being. In this paper, I argue that those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call autonomy as authority, have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument for libertarian paternalism. I draw from Joseph Raz’s (1990) idea of exclusionary reasons and Daniel Groll’s (2012) conception of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism fails to respect autonomy. I consider if soft paternalism could be called upon as a foundation for libertarian paternalism, but argue against this possibility. I conclude that an adequate defense of libertarian paternalism would need to directly attack the notion of autonomy as authority, but such an attack has yet to be mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism

The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism:Does the Hand Fit the Glove?

In recent years the concepts of ‘nudge’ and ‘libertarian paternalism’ have become popular theoretical as well as practical concepts inside as well as outside academia. But in spite of the widespread interest, confusion reigns as to what exactly is to be regarded as a nudge and how the underlying approach to behaviour change relates to libertarian paternalism. This article sets out to improve the clarity and value of the definition of nudge by reconciling it with its theoretical foundations in behavioural economics. In doing so it not only explicates the relationship between nudges and libertarian paternalism, but also clarifies how nudges relate to incentives and information, and may even be consistent with the removal of certain types of choices. In the end we are left with a revised definition of the concept of nudge that allows for consistently categorising behaviour change interventions as such and that places them relative to libertarian paternalism.</jats:p

Is Libertarian Paternalism an Oxymoron?

In this article I have attempted to discuss two points brought up by Sunstein and Thaler's new perspective on paternalism. The first is that whatever individuals do, they have to take second rank decisions, i.e. decisions that are equally attractive for them but impact others' people welfare. They then face a three alternative choice: either they do not care of the collateral consequences of their choice and act randomly, either they select the option that will make others better off, either they pick the option that will make others worst off. The authors assume they will necessarily act benevolently. I argued this statement is mistaken, and that the authors did not sufficiently distinguish the functional and the personal motivations of the planners. This leads me to define paternalism as the personal benevolence of the planners. Because they do not have any professional or moral duty towards the non-planners, they have absolutely no obligation to be benevolent. In most cases, the easiest choice is to act randomly. This incertitude about the planners' choice has dramatic consequences on non-planners: unless they know and trust the planners they cannot expect them to be paternalistic. They are subsequently less prone to blindly adopt default rules. The second point of the authors is that one can conceive a paternalistic system based on planners' benevolence that would not infringe libertarian principles. Default rules can, for instance, be combined with absolute freedom of choice. I argued that freedom of choice would not contribute to individual freedom if choices are not voluntary. The easiest they set up opting out options the less discriminating their system is, and eventually the most inefficient it will be.Libertarianism; Behavioral Economics; Paternalism; Voluntariness; Sunstein; Thaler

Evaluating Libertarian Paternalism

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate a form of soft paternalism put forth by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein known as libertarian paternalism. On their view, criteria are provided for distinguishing between justified and unjustified libertarian paternalism policy proposals. The central philosophical issue surrounding libertarian paternalism is determining when limitations on autonomy for the sake of beneficence are justified. However, the criteria given by Thaler and Sunstein are inadequate because they do not effectively overcome problematic case examples. I contend that an additional autonomy-based condition should be added to their criteria. Specifically, autonomy may trump beneficence in favor of rejection of a policy if certain crucial autonomy considerations are violated

Behavioural conditionality: Why the nudges must be stopped - an opinion piece

The use of behavioural conditionality has spread globally and is linked to the growth of behavioural economics and libertarian paternalism. This comment questions the ethics and effectiveness of this powerful trend and considers the alternative of moving towards universalism and unconditionality

Nudging, shoving and budging: behavioural economic-informed policy

In recent years, behavioural economics has gained considerable traction in the policy discourse, with a particular conceptual framework called libertarian paternalism, which informs nudge policy, dominating. Libertarian paternalism requires policies to protect individual liberty, to be focused specifically upon improving the welfare of those towards whom the intervention is targeted, and to be informed by the findings of behavioural economics. In practice, however, many of the interventions that are being advocated as nudges do not meet all of these criteria. Moreover, libertarian paternalism is not the only framework in which behavioural economics can inform policy. Coercive paternalism and behavioural regulation, frameworks that respectively underpin shove and budge policies, both use behavioural economics to inform public policy, and both face their own set of limitations. This article attempts to bring a degree of intellectual clarity to the potentially important contribution that behavioural economics can make to public policy

Public obligation and individual freedom: how to fill the gap? The case of vaccinations

How to propose a vaccination campaign between libertarian paternalism and deliberative democrac

Behavioral Economics: A Shaky Ground for Nudges

Ten years after its first publication, the excitement about “Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness” (2009) has not yet diminished. If at all, it has increased. Methodological and normative critiques continue to be published both in philosophical and economic journals (Heilmann, 2014). Nudge, by behavioural economist Thaler and legal scholar Sunstein, proposes an approach to policy making that has come to be known as libertarian paternalism. Libertarian paternalism, as Sunstein (2018) puts it, is a paternalism of means, rather than ends. The idea is that people suffer from a number of biases when making decisions. Hence, they often take a suboptimal route to reach their goals. Libertarian paternalism enables people to satisfy those goals by guiding them towards the optimal route. Just like a GPS, libertarian paternalism offers people the best means to reach the ends that they themselves set out to achieve (ibid). It increases people’s navigability by offering them the best path to follow in order to satisfy their goals. To argue for their thesis, Thaler & Sunstein (2009) draw heavily on the findings of behavioural economics and related work in psychology. However, is it really the case that these findings lend empirical and conceptual support to the assumptions on which Nudge is based? This is the question that I will engage with in this essay

Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron

Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler assert that while the idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, it is both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also respecting freedom of choice. Often people's preferences are ill-formed, and their choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people's choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. Sunstein and Thaler argue that it is also possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much choice to offer. This paper gives examplesfrom many areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection.