Institutional Independence: Lawyers and the Administrative State

The institutional structure where federal government lawyers practice is fraught with political and economic pressures that undermine the ability of lawyers to exercise independent professional judgment. A lack of candid legal advice in this space not only removes a pivotal fail-safe between legal and illegal state action but also precariously imbalances the powerful administrative state, exposing it to undue political influence. For these reasons, this Article argues that structural changes to administrative institutions must be made to support and nurture lawyers’ ability to independently determine the bounds of legality. Previous scholarship has examined the role of professional independence for lawyers generally; however, the legal academy has yet to explore the centrality of professional independence to administrative law or the structural pressures influencing its exercise. This Article joins a body of work that adopts a new institutionalist approach to professional misconduct. In doing so, this Article makes three principal contributions: (1) it outlines why institutionally sustained professional independence is essential to the federal administrative state; (2) it identifies institutional failings that impede government lawyers’ exercise of professional independent judgment; and (3) it proposes institution-based solutions to facilitate professionally independent conduct by government lawyers. By insulating government lawyers from excessive interference on core professional judgment calls, civil society may rely on these lawyers to help protect the basic structure of the rule of law

The Public Responsibility of Structured Finance Lawyers

Lawyers, increasingly, are scrutinized as to their public responsibility when companies fail, particularly where the lawyer\u27s involvement with the failed company is nontraditional and, arguably, intertwined with the failure. One of the least traditional roles of lawyers today is as counsel in structured finance transactions. This article focuses on the public responsibility of lawyers involved in these transactions

Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical Deliberators?

Regardless of its specific contents, any black letter statutory codification regulating lawyers\u27 conduct will be flawed as an instrument of ethics for lawyers. This is the central thesis of this Article. It is motivated by the idea that typical statutory prohibitions and permissions are likely to stunt sentimental responsiveness, a key feature of good ethical deliberation. Additionally, a certain technocratic mode of legal analysis heightens this tendency. Although other styles of lawyering might better engender sentimental responsiveness, statutory codes of lawyers\u27 ethics do not invite this style as readily as a welldeveloped common law of lawyers\u27 ethics would

Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued?

This article explores the concept of lawyers’ professional independence in the literature of the U.S. legal profession. It begins with some reflections on the conventional meanings of professional independence, which encompasses both the bar’s collective independence to regulate its members and individual lawyers’ independence in the context of professional representations, including independence from clients, on one hand, and independence from third parties, on the other. The article suggests that the professional conduct rules are overly preoccupied with protecting lawyers’ professional independence from the corrupting influences of other professionals. The article then turns to an aspect of professional independence that has largely dropped out of lawyers’ discourse but that deserves more attention, namely, lawyers’ independence from the courts. This includes: (1) freedom to criticize judges; (2) freedom to disobey arguably unlawful court orders; and (3) freedom to resolve certain ethical dilemmas for oneself, as a matter of professional conscience. The article maintains that as the bar has become strongly identified and allied with the judiciary, motivated by the interests in securing judicial protection from other government regulation and in securing the bar’s own institutional influence over individual lawyers, the bar has ignored this understanding and redefined professional independence consistently with a strong judicial role in regulating lawyers

Engaged Client-Centered Representation and the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship

The field of legal ethics, as we know it today, has grown out of thoughtful, systematic grounding of lawyers’ duties in a comprehensive understanding of lawyers’ roles and the situating of lawyers’ roles in underlying theories of law, morality, and justice. Unfortunately, in the process, the field of theoretical legal ethics has mostly lost track of the thing that Freedman insisted was at the heart of a lawyers’ role: the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. As I will discuss, the field of theoretical legal ethics has developed in ways that are deeply lawyer-centered rather than fundamentally client-centered. I am going to speak about how that happened. I am also going to share some of my ideas about what it would mean to ground a fundamentally client-centered conception of lawyers’ duties to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law in moral, political, and jurisprudential theory

Fred Zacharias’s Skeptical Moralism

Fred Zacharias\u27s articles, Rethinking Confidentiality, published in two parts, were a sensational start to an illustrious career. Fred conducted the first and one of the best empirical studies of confidentiality in years, surveying lawyers and clients in Tompkins County, New York, about what lawyers actually told clients about confidentiality and its exceptions, and what difference the exceptions made in whether clients withheld information from their lawyers

Asking the Right Questions

At this Symposium, we have heard about forms of law practice that raise large questions about the lawyer\u27s role. My sole theme in the present essay is that we often ask the wrong large questions. Too often, the questions about multidisciplinary practice ( MDP ), mediation and arbitration, and in-house lawyering are whether they are good for lawyers and good for clients. These are questions, I will suggest, that the market itself will decide. The right question is not whether new roles with no rules are good for lawyers and clients, but rather whether they are good for the rest of us- us being the citizenry who count on lawyers to be guardians of the law, and who market forces will not necessarily protect. All three of the new roles raise the interesting prospect of the lawyer\u27s traditional role dissolving into a different one as role boundaries blur and thin. In MDP, the prospect is that lawyers become indistinguishable from accountants, investment bankers, financial advisors, or business consultants. For in-house lawyers, the prospect is that lawyers become indistinguishable from corporate executives, or, more broadly, from clients. And for third-party neutrals, the prospect is that lawyers become very much like judges. I will not be discussing all three roles in this paper. My principal focus is on multidisciplinary practice. The role of in-house counsel is a secondary focus, and I shall not address the role of third-party neutral at all