Intuitive Intelligence

Living in the world of clever devices, using them every hour for our needs, we can`t imagine that something can change dramatically, but it exactly will. In about 20 years we can become witnesses of a new period when the people`s work could be easier, goals could be achieved faster and new horizons could be opened. In this period people and robots will exist together, working at the projects that can`t be successfully completed without each other

The Intuitive Logarithm

We introduce the intuitive method to select an analytic Abel function of an analytic function f at a non-fixpoint. Due to the complexity of this method by involving matrix inversion of increasing size there is little known about its convergence. We show its convergence in the simplest but still complicated case f(x)=bx. We show that the obtained Abel function is, as expected, the logarithm to base b, independent on its development point. As a by-product we obtain a new polynomial approximation sequence for the logarithm to base b.Comment: 12 page

Intuitive Evidence and Experimental Philosophy

In recent years, some defenders of traditional philosophical methodology have argued that certain critiques of armchair methods are mistaken in assuming that intuitions play central evidential roles in traditional philosophical methods. According to this kind of response, experimental philosophers attack a straw man; it doesn’t matter whether intuitions are reliable, because philosophers don’t use intuitions in the way assumed. Deutsch (2010), Williamson (2007), and Cappelen (2012) all defend traditional methods in something like this way. I also endorsed something like this line in Ichikawa (2014a). In this contribution, I will follow up on this sort of defence of traditional philosophical methods in three ways. In §1, I will rehearse and extend some of my reasons for challenging the idea that traditional methods depend on intuitions in an evidential role. (My reasons are very different from those discussed in (Cappelen, 2012).) I will also engage with some recent more sophisticated attempts to establish the idea that intuitions play evidential roles in philosophy, such as that of Chudnoff (2013). In §2, I will consider and argue against a dismissive response to such positions from experimental philosophers, who consider the question of philosophical reliance on intuitions to be irrelevant to the experimentalist critique. But in §3, I will argue that it would also be a mistake to conclude (as Herman Cappelen does) that the critique is rendered totally irrelevant by the denial of the evidential role of intuitions; I defend a more moderate view on which the bearing of experimental studies of philosophical intuitions is relevant for philosophical methodology, but only in a relatively limited way

Institutions for Intuitive Man

By its critics, the rational choice model is routinely accused of being unrealistic. One key objection has it that, for all nontrivial problems, calculating the best response is cognitively way too taxing, given the severe cognitive limitations of the human mind. If one confines the analysis to consciously controlled decision-making, this criticism is certainly warranted. But it ignores a second mental apparatus. Unlike conscious deliberation, this apparatus does not work serially but in parallel. It handles huge amounts of information in almost no time. It only is not consciously accessible. Only the end result is propelled back to consciousness as an intuition. It is too early to decide whether the rational choice model is ultimately even descriptively correct. But at any rate institutional analysts and institutional designers are well advised to take this powerful mechanisms seriously. In appropriate contexts, institutions should see to it that decision-makers trust their intuitions. This frequently creates a dilemma. For better performance is often not the only goal pursued by institutional intervention. Accountability, predictability and regulability are also desired. Sometimes, clever interventions are able to get them both. Arguably, the obligation to write an explicit set of reasons for a court decision is a case in point. The judge is not obliged to report the mental processes by which she has taken her decision. Justification is only ex post control. Intuitive decision-making is even more desirable if the underlying social problem is excessively complex (NP hard, to be specific), or ill-defined. Sometimes, it is enough for society to give room for intuitive decision-making. For instance, in simple social dilemmas, a combination of cheater detection and punishing sentiments does the trick. However, intuition can be misled. For instance, punishing sentiments are triggered by a hurt sense of fairness. Now in more complex social dilemmas, there are competing fairness norms, and people intuitively choose with a self-serving bias. In such contexts, institutions must step in so that clashing intuitions do not lead to social unrest.intuition, consciousness, rational choice, heuristics, ill-defined social problems, institutions

When is giving an impulse? An ERP investigation of intuitive prosocial behavior

Human prosociality is often assumed to emerge from exerting reflective control over initial, selfish impulses. However, recent findings suggest that prosocial actions can also stem from processes that are fast, automatic and intuitive. Here, we attempt to clarify when prosocial behavior may be intuitive by examining prosociality as a form of reward seeking. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we explored whether a neural signature that rapidly encodes the motivational salience of an event\u2014the P300\u2014can predict intuitive prosocial motivation. Participants allocated varying amounts of money between themselves and charities they initially labelled as high- or low-empathy targets under conditions that promoted intuitive or reflective decision making. Consistent with our predictions, P300 amplitude over centroparietal regions was greater when giving involved high-empathy targets than low-empathy targets, but only when deciding under intuitive conditions. Reflective conditions, alternatively, elicited an earlier frontocentral positivity related to response inhibition, regardless of target. Our findings suggest that during prosocial decision making, larger P300 amplitude could (i) signal intuitive prosocial motivation and (ii) predict subsequent engagement in prosocial behavior. This work offers novel insight into when prosociality may be driven by intuitive processes and the roots of such behaviors

A general and intuitive envelope theorem

We present an envelope theorem for establishing first-order conditions in decision problems involving continuous and discrete choices. Our theorem accommodates general dynamic programming problems, even with unbounded marginal utilities. And, unlike classical envelope theorems that focus only on differentiating value functions, we accommodate other endogenous functions such as default probabilities and interest rates. Our main technical ingredient is how we establish the differentiability of a function at a point: we sandwich the function between two differentiable functions from above and below. Our theory is widely applicable. In unsecured credit models, neither interest rates nor continuation values are globally differentiable. Nevertheless, we establish an Euler equation involving marginal prices and values. In adjustment cost models, we show that first-order conditions apply universally, even if optimal policies are not (S,s). Finally, we incorporate indivisible choices into a classic dynamic insurance analysis

The Essence of Intuitive Set Theory

Intuitive Set Theory (IST) is defined as the theory we get, when we add Axiom of Monotonicity and Axiom of Fusion to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. In IST, Continuum Hypothesis is a theorem, Axiom of Choice is a theorem, Skolem paradox does not appear, nonLebesgue measurable sets are not possible, and the unit interval splits into a set of infinitesimals