Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation

This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Henri Temianka (Concert Programs)

This collection contains material pertaining to the life, career, and activities of Henri Temianka, violin virtuoso, conductor, music teacher, and author. Materials include correspondence, concert programs and flyers, music scores, photographs, and books.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_ephemera/1015/thumbnail.jp

International Competition in Services

Production of services now dominates economic activity in the United States and most other nations. It is thus natural to find increasing attention on the part of U.S. policymakers to international competition in service activities. Yielding to strong pressure from the United States, members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreed in September 1986 to include services in the new "Uruguay Round" of multilateral trade negotiations. But there remains widespread skepticism regarding the prospects for these negotiations. This paper surveys the main issues and evidence relating to U.S. international competition in services. It reviews the forces that have catapulted services to the top of the agenda for the new GATT round; the conceptual issues raised by international competition in services; the growing importance of services in U.S. production and in international transactions; the relationship of services growth to "deindustrialization" of the U.S. economy; the nature and motivation of barriers to international competition in services and their relationship to nontariff distortions of merchandise trade; and the choices awaiting U.S. officials in forthcoming bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

Airport privatization and international competition

We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism wherebyprivatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) andtwo types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using thesimple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airportsare privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.

International Competition and the Unionized Sector

This paper studies the wage and employment behavior of a unionized sector that is confronted by an intensification of international competition. After developing a formal model of a monopoly union subject to majority rule, I study the response of a unionized sector operating under a seniority rule for layoffs and rehires to a trend decrease in the international price of its output. Conditions are provided to validate the casual argument that majority voting in unions and the seniority system together provide an explanation for the lack of union wage adjustment. A modified version of the model allows the job queue to deviate from a strict seniority ranking. In this context I ask, what importance can be attached to the seniority system in determining the wage response to international competition?

International competition policy and economic development

During the past half century many nations have adopted policies whose function is to discourage cartels and other restrictive practices. Industrialized nations led the movement toward pro-competition policies, but more recently, developing nations have begun to join the parade. Initial steps have also been taken toward the implementation of competition policies spanning national borders, and proposals for their extension have been made. This paper analyzes the consequences national and international competition policies would have for developing nations. Topics covered include the dependence of LDCs on cartelized commodity exports, the terms on which intermediate goods and technology are imported by LDCs, access to the markets of industrialized nations, the consequences of substituting predatory pricing standards for the criteria traditionally used to combat dumping in international trade, and the links between domestic and international market structure and the absorption of advanced technology. --

International competition law enforcement: different means, one goal?

This paper addresses one of the intricacies of international competition law enforcement, namely the diversification of legal instruments used for bilateral cooperation. To name only a few: why are memorandums of understanding, dedicated competition cooperation agreements, competition law provisions in free trade agreements, and policy dialogues used in parallel to attain bilateral cooperation on competition law enforcement? What is the added legal value of each instrument? Is their added value to be found in political considerations? The argument put forward in this paper is that a parallel can be drawn between the internal and external functions of competition law. As competition law is not a goal as such within the EU, but in general serves the optimal functioning of the Single Market, the function of international cooperation on competition law matters is not solely to be found in competition considerations, but serves other goals as well. Therefore, the fact that a number of different objectives are pursued may explain the use of several distinct instruments for cooperation on competition law issues

International Competition, Slim Firms and Wage Inequality

A country with Cournot competition and free entry experiences an increase of its market size either due to economic growth or international integration of goods markets. The implied increase in competition leads to shrinking mark-ups and forces firms to reduce overhead costs relative to output. This implies a reallocation at the aggregate level from administrative to productive activities. Relative factor rewards change and wage inequality increases. The factor losing in relative terms can even lose in real terms. From a quantitative perspective, international competition is shown to be the more plausible cause of rising wage inequality.international trade, wage inequality, foreign competition, free entry and exit