Modeling Building Block Interdependency

The Building-Block Hypothesis appeals to the notion of problem decomposition and the assembly of solutions from sub-solutions. Accordingly, there have been many varieties of GA test problems with a structure based on building-blocks. Many of these problems use deceptive fitness functions to model interdependency between the bits within a block. However, very few have any model of interdependency between building-blocks; those that do are not consistent in the type of interaction used intra-block and inter-block. This paper discusses the inadequacies of the various test problems in the literature and clarifies the concept of building-block interdependency. We formulate a principled model of hierarchical interdependency that can be applied through many levels in a consistent manner and introduce Hierarchical If-and-only-if (H-IFF) as a canonical example. We present some empirical results of GAs on H-IFF showing that if population diversity is maintained and linkage is tight then the GA is able to identify and manipulate building-blocks over many levels of assembly, as the Building-Block Hypothesis suggests

On the management of interconnected wildlife populations

Economic interdependency of wildlife or fish stocks is usually attributed to ecological interdependency, such as predator - prey and competitive relationships, or to density dependent migration of species between different areas. This paper provides another channel for economic interdependency of wildlife where density independent migration and market price interaction affect the management strategies among different landowners. Management is studied under three market conditions for selling hunting licences: price taking behaviour, monopoly market and duopoly market. Harvesting of the Scandinavian moose is used as an example. The paper provides several results on how economic interdependency works through the migration pattern. When a duopoly market is introduced, hunting license price interaction among the landowners plays an additional role in determining the optimal harvesting strategy.

Interplay between single-stranded binding proteins on RNA secondary structure

RNA protein interactions control the fate of cellular RNAs and play an important role in gene regulation. An interdependency between such interactions allows for the implementation of logic functions in gene regulation. We investigate the interplay between RNA binding partners in the context of the statistical physics of RNA secondary structure, and define a linear correlation function between the two partners as a measurement of the interdependency of their binding events. We demonstrate the emergence of a long-range power-law behavior of this linear correlation function. This suggests RNA secondary structure driven interdependency between binding sites as a general mechanism for combinatorial post-transcriptional gene regulation.Comment: 26 pages, 17 figure

Relationship of Sherlock Holmes and John Watson in Mark Gatiss's Sherlock Television Series

This thesis aims to reveal the interdependency between Sherlock Holmes and John Watson in Sherlock television series. Their interdependency can be in a form of social needs or emotional needs. To fulfill their needs, both of them need an attachment toward each other. Thus, their attachment develops into an interdependency relationship. In fulfilling their needs, both of them doing the exchange process between cost and reward form their relationship. Also, there are some reasons which made both of them develop a very close relationship. In conclusion, Sherlock and John have their own outcomes or rewards which can be achieved only in their relationship. Also, Sherlock and John, in order to fulfill their emotional or social needs they have to bear the consequenc

A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory

The standard economic model of bilateral precaution concludes that (in the absence of uncertainty, misperception, or error) all negligence-based liability rules induce socially optimal behavior by both injurers and victims. This paper generalizes the standard model to consider situations in which one party’s precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party’s effort—or cost—of taking precaution. If the injurer’s care affects the victim’s precaution costs (but not vice versa), most of the standard results continue to hold (except for strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence). If the victim’s precaution affects the injurer’s costs of care (but not vice versa), only strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence leads to the social optimum, while the other negligence-based rules lead to suboptimal outcomes. In the general case (where each party’s costs depend on both parties’ levels of precaution), none of the standard liability rules induce socially optimal behavior in both parties. The paper’s other main result concerns the possibility of self-interested, negligent behavior in equilibrium. Under negligence with a defense of contributory negligence, the only equilibrium is in the mixed strategies of both injurer and victim. This involves the parties choosing (with strictly positive probability) to behave negligently, and gives rise to the possibility of successful litigation in equilibrium, even though there is no uncertainty, misperception, or error. The paper concludes by considering the implications of these results for the design of liability rules.law and economics, and tort law

Value and Politics

A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint determination, is in its infancy.Political-economic equilibrium

Core Equivalence Theorem with Production

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such interdependency problem into account, and we prove an analog of the Debreu-Scarf theorem for replica production economies. Our theorem differs from theirs in using an additional assumption, which we argue is indispensable and is driven by the interdependency problem.

Distribution and Politics: A Brief History and Prospect

A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint determination, is in its infancy.Political-economic equilibrium