Illegal Immigration

Provides data on the number of illegal immigrants in the United States, countries of origin, areas of settlement, demographics, reasons for immigrating, economic role, and fiscal impact, as well as public attitudes and the immigration policy debate

Fear of Illegal Immigration in America: How Media Influences Its Viewers

Illegal immigration has been an ongoing social problem, leading to a great deal of variety in public opinions. Conservative media have propagated fear of illegal immigration and have influenced their viewers\u27 perception. This past year, media coverage has been used to promote ideas on illegal immigration. The different coverages were used to explain their own examples of what they thought about the current immigration issue. Due to this, people were influenced to create their own opinions based on the information broadcasted. The framing theory implies that an individual preferred media influences their perception of illegal immigration. Using Chapman\u27s survey of American fears, I analyzed how the fear of illegal immigration is related to media choices. To what extent does media influence the fear of illegal immigration, and if the fear of illegal immigration is formed only through media influence. The analysis of the responses focused on the correlation between fear and media influence. There is a significant relationship between the fear of illegal immigration and conservative media coverage. The analyses revealed that media influence is related to an increased fear of illegal immigration. The findings determined that the person\u27s media preference will shape their public opinion on illegal immigration

A Lean-Against-the-Wind Rule for Controlling Low-Skill and Illegal Immigration

This paper develops a lean-against-the-wind rule for setting low-skill immigration quota. The construction of this rule takes into account the factors governing the supply of and demand for low-skill immigrants, illegal immigration, border enforcement and the host-country's level of unemployment.Economics, low-skill immigration, immigration quota, illegal immigration, unemployment, lean-against-the-wind policy rules

Policies on illegal immigration in a federation

Illegal immigration is a major policy challenge in Europe, in particular in countries on the external border of the EU such as Italy or Spain. However, there are likely to be important eects on the rest of the EU, too, depending on the policies against illegal immigration in border countries. This paper determines optimal enforcement and amnesty policies on illegal immigration in a federation with border and non-border countries. We show that in the Nash equilibrium with positive enforcement spending in both countries, total enforcement spending is too low to maximize joint welfare. We nd that in this case a side payment can be necessary to achieve the cooperative optimum, depending on the relative size of populations in the two countries.

Policies on illegal immigration in a federation

Illegal immigration is a major policy challenge in Europe, in particular in countries on the external border of the EU such as Italy or Spain. However, there are likely to be important effects on the rest of the EU, too, depending on the policies against illegal immigration in border countries. This paper determines optimal enforcement and amnesty policies on illegal immigration in a federation with border and non-border countries. We show that in the Nash equilibrium with positive enforcement spending in both countries, total enforcement spending is too low to maximize joint welfare. In this case, we find that a side payment can be necessary to achieve the cooperative optimum, depending on the relative size of populations in the two countries.illegal immigration, enforcement, amnesty, EU cooperation

Nash equilibrium tariffs and illegal immigration: an analysis of preferential trade liberalization

We use a version of the small-union Meade model to consider the effects of interdependent import tariffs in the presence illegal immigration. First, we analyze the condition under which illegal immigration is likely to increase (or decrease) in response to reciprocal trade liberalization between the source and host nations (of illegal immigration). Next we describe the Nash equilibrium in tariffs between these nations and discus how a liberalization of tariffs starting from this Nash equilibrium is likely to affect their utility. Finally, we consider the effect of the host nation's liberalization of the import tariff (imposed on its imports from a third nation). We show that strategic considerations regarding the effect of this tariff liberalization on the Nash equilibrium tariffs can modify the traditional (trade creating/diverting) gains from such liberalization.Trade ; Immigrants

Illegal Immigration: Research and Public Policy

Volume 2 - Paper #27_27IllegalImmigrationResearchandPublic.pdf: 1054 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Illegal Immigration from Mexico and its Labor Force Implications

An interim analysis of the effect illegal immigration from Mexico on the labor force of the United States