Family Firms

We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. Specifically, we show that, in legal regimes that successfully limit the expropriation of minority shareholders, the widely held professionally managed corporation emerges as the equilibrium outcome. In legal regimes with intermediate protection, management is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as large shareholders to monitor the manager. In legal regimes with the weakest protection, the founder designates his heir to manage and ownership remains inside the family. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

Family Firms

We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder’s decision is shaped by the legal environment. Specifically, we show that, in legal regimes that successfully limit the expropriation of minority shareholders, the widely held professionally managed corporation emerges as the equilibrium outcome. In legal regimes with intermediate protection, management is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as large shareholders to monitor the manager. In legal regimes with the weakest protection, the founder designates his heir to manage and ownership remains inside the family. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with crosscountry evidence.

Why Can’t a Family Business Be More Like a Nonfamily Business? Modes of Professionalization in Family Firms

The authors survey arguments that family firms should behave more like nonfamily firms and “professionalize.” Despite the apparent advantages of this transition, many family firms fail to do so or do so only partially. The authors reflect on why this might be so, and the range of possible modes of professionalization. They derive six ideal types: (a) minimally professional family firms; (b) wealth dispensing, private family firms; (c) entrepreneurially operated family firms; (d) entrepreneurial family business groups; (e) pseudoprofessional, public family firms; and (f) hybrid professional family firms. The authors conclude with suggestions for further research that is attentive to such variation

Are family firms good employers?

Family firms employ about 60 percent of the global workforce. While it is widely assumed that they are good employers, data about their conduct is mixed. In this study, we extend stewardship and agency theories to test competing propositions about the impact of family on employment practices using data from 14,961 private Belgian firms over a 19-year period. Higher investments, lower dividend payout, and higher risk tolerance indicate that family firms are better financial stewards of their companies than nonfamily firms. However, family firms are worse organizational stewards than nonfamily firms: They offer lower compensation, invest less in employee training, and exhibit higher voluntary turnover and lower labor productivity. Further, and contrary to earlier research, we find that financial practices in private family firms do not change over time, and that the deleterious influence of family on employment practices rises with both firm age and with heightened family involvement. Together, our findings suggest that a more nuanced understanding of stewardship and agency theory is needed to understand the impact of family on the governance of private firms

Family firms and investments

Family firms are a widespread control structure in most countries, especially among smaller firms. A vast literature addresses the question of whether they are performing better or worse than comparable non family firms, with not entirely conclusive results. Here we take a different, indirect approach and test whether investment decisions in family firms are more sensitive to uncertainty than in other firms. By using a novel dataset that includess both a better definition of family firms than commonly used (through self evaluation) and a very good proxy of the uncertainty on future demand that firms face, we are able to verify that – as compared to other firms – family firms are significantly more sensitive to uncertainty: this might contribute to explain why in some situations they perform better, whereas in others they do worse. We find evidence that this greater sensitivity to uncertainty in family firms is basically due to the effects of risk aversion and capital irreversibility, where the latter appear to be associated to a greater opaqueness of family firms rather than to the degree of sunkness of fixed capital. Finally, we propose some evidence that the prevalence of family firms in Italy might be associated to long standing institutional factors, such as an inefficient law enforcement system and a low social capital.Family firms; investments; uncertainty; risk aversion; capital irreversibility

Investment Reputation Indes: Family Firms vs Non-Family firms in the UK

Family firm researchers have found a host of characteristics that are unique to family firms. These familial attributes are often taken as plausible explanations for governance and operational differences between family firms and their non-family competitors. We use these familial characteristics as well as a host of ‘non-family’ specific provisions to build an Investment Reputation Index that measures the reputation of a family firm as an investment opportunity. The results of an empirical study of 199 ‘quoted’ family firms supported the hypothesis that the investment reputation of a family firm has a positive impact on its performance. However, a similar empirical analysis using a measure of the Investment Reputation Index without the familial attributes, showed a stronger impact on performance, signifying a negative association with recognizing the familial characteristics of the firm. An empirical analysis on a matched sample of 304 family- and non-family firms revealed that the investment reputation of a family firm can only be brought into comparable terms with the reputation of a non-family firm if the familial attributes are included in the analysis. Understanding ‘How family is the family firm?’ is important from an investor’s point of view as it highlights the good practices of some family firms. An investor instead of grouping all family firms into one category can now differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ family firms with the help of the Investment Reputation Index.Corporate Governace, Family business, reputation investment index

Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data

We study compensation packages in family and non-family firms. Using French matched employer-employee data, we first show that family firms pay on average lower wages. We find that part of this wage gap is due to low wage workers sorting into family firms and high wage workers sorting into non-family firms. However, we also find evidence that company wage policies differ according to ownership status, so that the same worker is paid differently under family and non-family firm ownership. We also find evidence that family firms are characterised by lower job insecurity, as measured by dismissal rates and by the subjective risk of dismissal perceived by workers. In addition, family firms appear to rely less on dismissals – and more on hiring reductions – than non-family firms when they downsize. We show that compensating wage differentials account for a substantial part of the inverse relationship between the family/non-family gaps in wages and job security.family firms, wages, job security, compensating wage differentials, linked employer-employee data

Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms

Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.Succession, Family Firms, Inheritance Law, Growth, Investment

Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms

Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance laws affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.succession, family firms, inheritance law, growth, investment

TMT diversity and innovation ambidexterity in family firms

Purpose – Family firms that simultaneously engage in multiple levels of innovation – incremental andradical – are likely to enjoy performance advantages across generations. The purpose of this paper is to research under which management conditions (i.e. top management team (TMT) diversity in terms of generational or non-family involvement) family firms are more likely to achieve innovation ambidexterity. Also, the paper addresses the mediating role of open innovation (OI) breadth in this relationship. Design/methodology/approach – A large cross-sectional sample of 335 small- and medium-sized family firms is used. The hypotheses were tested in a mediation model. The relationship between TMT diversity andambidexterity is measured using a binominal regression analysis, the one between TMT diversity and OIbreadth using a Tobit model. Findings – Drawing on the family firm upper echelon perspective, the results indicate that TMT diversity induced through external managers and multiple generations is positively related to innovation ambidexterity. As the mediation analysis reveals, the relationship can be explained by the higherpropensity of diverse TMTs to get involved in OI breadth. The findings add to the discussion on family firm heterogeneity and its influence on different kinds of innovation. Originality/value–So far, few studies have been concerned with ambidextrous family firms. Contrary totheir reputation, this study identifies family firms as radical as well as open innovators. As such, this research takes account not only of the heterogeneity of family firms, but also of the heterogeneity of family firm innovation