Three ways of resisting essentialism about natural kinds

Essentialism about natural kinds has three tenets. The first tenet is that all and only members of a natural kind has some essential properties. The second tenet is that these essential properties play a causal role. The third tenet is that they are explanatorily relevant. I examine the prospects of questioning these tenets and point out that arguing against the first and the second tenets of kind-essentialism would involve taking parts in some of the grand debates of philosophy. But, at least if we restrict the scope of the discussion to the biological domain, the third tenet of kind-essentialism could be questioned more successfully

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2) and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments

Essentialism and Absolute Necessity

Bob Hale has argued that logical necessity is absolute necessity. Furthermore, he presents a challenge to the essentialist who tries to evade the consequences of his argument. Here I examine the direct argument he presents for his thesis. I argue that it presents no problem for the essentialist because (1) it begs the question and (2) it relies upon premises that are not entailed by essentialism. I then proceed to show how the essentialist can meet Hale’s challenge

Transworld identity as a problem for essentialism about kinds.

Essentialism about natural kinds involves talking about kinds across possible worlds. I argue that there is a non-trivial transworld identity problem here, which cannot be (dis)solved in the same way that Kripke treats the corresponding transworld identity problem for individuals. I will briefly discuss some ideas for a solution. The upshot is scepticism concerning natural-kind essentialism

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

In this article, I reconsider bio-essentialism in the study of kinship, centering on David Schneider’s influential critique that concluded that kinship was “a non-subject” (1972:51). Schneider’s critique is often taken to have shown the limitations of and problems with past views of kinship based on biology, genealogy, and reproduction, a critique that subsequently led those reworking kinship as relatedness in the new kinship studies to view their enterprise as divorced from such bio-essentialist studies. Beginning with an alternative narrative connecting kinship past and present and concluding by introducing a novel way of thinking about kinship, I have three constituent aims in this research article: (1) to reconceptualize the relationship between kinship past and kinship present; (2) to reevaluate Schneider’s critique of bio-essentialism and what this implies for the contemporary study of kinship; and (3) subsequently to redirect theoretical discussion of what kinship is. This concluding discussion introduces a general view, the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of kinds, into anthropology, providing a theoretical framework that facilitates realization of the often-touted desideratum of the integration of biological and social features of kinship. [bio-essentialism, kinship studies, homeostatic property cluster kinds, Schneider, genealogy

Teleological Essentialism

Placeholder essentialism is the view that there is a causal essence that holds category members together, though we may not know what the essence is. Sometimes the placeholder can be filled in by scientific essences, such as when we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. We challenge the view that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences. On our view, if placeholders are elaborated, they are elaborated Aristotelian essences, a telos. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments used by traditional essentialists—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), acquired traits (study 3) and inferences about offspring (study 4)—we find support for the view that essences are elaborated by a telos. And we find evidence (study 5) that teleological essences may generate category judgments

Against Imperialism in Legal Concepts

The authority of government—and that of its politicians, judges, regulators, and other specific authorities—continues to grow more imperialistic. This is partly due to the imperialism of legal concepts as facilitated by Wittgenstein’s famously non-essentialist treatment of concepts through family resemblance theory. Although non-essentialism or anti-essentialism can be highly valuable in forming religious and literary concepts, and in describing the sometimes incoherent everyday usage of concepts and terms, all legal concepts should be scientific-style essentialist concepts. Such essentialism combats the broad discretion granted and obscured by non-essentialist approaches that allow concepts to absorb contradictory elements and harmfully hold them together, thus allowing legal authorities to choose from among only those elements that suit their purposes in any given case. Instead of arguing for the total exclusion of family resemblance and similar theories from use in legal concepts, I argue for translating non-essentialist concepts into essentialist ones while still using the former’s theory forms. Precise essentialist concepts, with core and non-contradictory properties clearly delineated, are necessary for maximizing the rational and moral legitimacy of law, which coercively regulates the behavior of ordinary citizens at the command of political and legal authorities. Legal rules and commands must be as clear and consistent as reasonably possible not only for optimal rationality and morality, but also for legitimacy in the eyes of those subject to law. This is especially important in an increasingly diverse society of incompatible perspectives and decreasing conscious and unconscious adherence to the Anglo-American legal tradition