What is grandfathering?

Emissions grandfathering maintains that prior emissions increase future emission entitlements. The view forms a large part of actual emission control frameworks, but is routinely dismissed by political theorists and applied philosophers as evidently unjust. A sympathetic theoretical reconsideration of grandfathering suggests that the most plausible version is moderate, allowing that other considerations should influence emission entitlements, and be justified on instrumental grounds. The most promising instrumental justification defends moderate grandfathering on the basis that one extra unit of emission entitlements from a baseline of zero emissions increases welfare to a greater extent where it is assigned to a high emitter than where it is assigned to a low emitter. Moderate grandfathering can be combined with basic needs and ability to pay considerations to provide an attractive approach to allocating emission entitlements

Health Information and Social Security Entitlements

This study examines whether new health information, obtained through medical screening, affects entitlements to Social Security benefits. Random assignment of information is derived from a unique feature of the Continuous National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. To examine the effect of information on entitlements, the survey data are matched to administrative data from the Social Security Administration. The results suggest that new health information leads to delayed entitlements, particularly among workers near the early retirement age

Moral Property Rights in Bargaining

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms claims acquired in the past seem to create strong entitlements that shape current negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that allows us to measure the entitlements and to track them through the whole negotiation process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a “moral property right” that is influential independent of negotiators’ legal property rights.moral property rights, fairness judgements, bargaining with claims, self-serving bias

Capturing benefits from water entitlement trade in salinity affected areas: A role for trading houses?

While there is potential for substantial benefits from water entitlement trade, external effects such as salinity may mean that traders cannot capture these benefits. This paper demonstrates that by creating a trading house as a single seller of water entitlements, with trade profits distributed to buyers, it is possible to achieve an allocation of entitlements which gives a social outcome higher than that possible from atomistic competition for entitlements. Such an outcome may be comparable to an optimally set uniform charge for water entitlements, but the trading house mechanism has the advantage that it makes use of trade to generate information on the optimal level of charging in the presence of salinity.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Moderate emissions grandfathering

Emissions grandfathering holds that a history of emissions strengthens an agent’s claim for future emission entitlements. Though grandfathering appears to have been influential in actual emission control frameworks, it is rarely taken seriously by philosophers. This article presents an argument for thinking this an oversight. The core of the argument is that members of countries with higher historical emissions are typically burdened with higher costs when transitioning to a given lower level of emissions. According to several appealing views in political philosophy (utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism) they are therefore entitled to greater resources, including emission entitlements, than those in similar positions but with lower emissions. This grandfathering may play an especially important role in allocating emission entitlements among rich countries

Parliamentary remuneration and entitlements: 2014 update

Introduction: The issue of parliamentary salaries, allowances and entitlements continues to generate interest and comment. This research paper sets out major changes to the parliamentary remuneration and entitlements regime, including the authority and governing legislation and explains how different aspects of parliamentary remuneration and entitlements are regulated. Executive responsibility The responsible Ministers, with selected administered legislation, are: The Prime Minister, the Hon Tony Abbott, MP Governor-General Act 1974, Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973, Remuneration and Allowances Act 1990 The Minister for Finance, Senator the Hon Mathias Cormann Parliamentary Allowances Act 1952, Parliamentary Superannuation Act 2004, Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation Act 1948, Parliamentary Entitlements Act 1990, Ministers of State Act 1952, Members of Parliament (Life Gold Pass) Act 2002, Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984. The Special Minister of State, the Senator the Hon Michael Ronaldson has specific responsibility for administering some allowances and benefits under this legislation. Parliamentary departments The Department of the Senate and the Department of the House of Representatives pay the base salary and electorate allowance to parliamentarians and additional salary to ministers and parliamentary secretaries and Parliamentary office holders. The Parliamentary Departments also pay some other benefits such as postage. Department of Finance Ministerial and Parliamentary Services (M&PS) in the Department of Finance (Finance) provides advice on entitlements to the responsible Minister and to senators, members, office holders and their respective staff. M&PS also oversees the provision of a number of senators’ and members’ entitlements and administers the accountability mechanisms.[2

Water rights for variable supplies

The relative merits of different systems of property rights to allocate water among different extractive uses are evaluated for the case where variability of supply is important. Three systems of property rights are considered. In the first, variable supply is dealt with through the use of water entitlements defined as shares of the total quantity available. In the second, there are two types of water entitlements, one for water with a high security of supply and the other a lower security right for the residual supply. The third is a system of entitlements specified as state-contingent claims. With zero transaction costs, all systems are efficient. In the realistic situation where transaction costs matter, the system based on state-contingent claims is globally optimal, and the system with high-security and lower security entitlements is preferable to the system with share entitlements.property rights, state-contingent claims, water, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

How the EU Single Farm Payment should be modelled: lump-sum transfers, area payments or… what else?

The 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform radically changes the way the European Union (EU) supports its agricultural sector by decoupling direct payments. Production is no longer required to get the payment attached to Single Farm Payment (SFP) entitlements. However, the new scheme maintains a specific link between payments and hectares; in addition, SFP entitlements can be exchanged among farmers. These features question the way SFP entitlements should be regarded, hence modelled, i.e., as lump-sum transfers, area payments or… something else. We develop a microeconomic analytical framework which shows that the answer crucially depends on the total number of entitlements which are initially made available relative to the number of hectares, more specifically the number of cultivated hectares in a zero support regime, the number of cultivated hectares in a policy support regime trough per-hectare direct aids, and the number of cultivated or idled hectares in a policy regime where support is granted through direct aids per hectare and production is not required.European Union, Common Agricultural Policy, Single Farm Payment, modelling, area payments, lump-sum transfers