Term Default, Balloon Risk, and Credit Risk in Commercial Mortgages

Term default and balloon risk play an interactive role in the pricing of credit risk in commercial mortgages. Most commercial mortgage pricing studies assume a borrower\u27s default decision is based solely on the property value; the mortgage valuation model here also incorporates a property income trigger. The model considers both the risk of default during the term of the loan and the risk of loss at maturity (balloon risk). Monte Carlo simulation analyses reveal that pricing models based solely on property value overestimate the probability of term default and the resulting credit risk premium. Adding a property income default trigger without considering balloon risk, however, underestimates the overall credit risk premium. In essence, a double-trigger default model that incorporates balloon risk is critical for accurate assessment of the credit risk in commercial mortgages

Effect of rollover risk on default risk: evidence from bank financing

We study the effect of rollover risk on the risk of default using a comprehensive database of U.S. industrial firms during 1986–2013. Dependence on bank financing is the key driver of the impact of rollover risk on default risk. Default risk and rollover risk present a significant positive relation in firms dependent on bank financing. In contrast, rollover risk is uncorrelated with default probability in the case of firms that do not rely on bank financing. Our measure of rollover risk is the amount of long-term debt maturing in one year, weighted by total assets. In the case of a firm that depends on bank financing, an increase of one standard deviation in this measure leads to a significant increase of 3.2% in its default probability within one year. Other drivers affecting the interaction between rollover risk and default risk are whether a firm suffers from declining profitability and has poor credit. Additionally, rollover risk's impact on default probability is stronger during periods when credit market conditions are tighter

Collateral-Enhanced Default Risk

Changes in collateralization have been implicated in significant default (or near-default) events during the financial crisis, most notably with AIG. We have developed a framework for quantifying this effect based on moving between Merton-type and Black-Cox-type structural default models. Our framework leads to a single equation that emcompasses the range of possibilities, including collateralization remargining frequency (i.e. discrete observations). We show that increases in collateralization, by exposing entities to daily mark-to-market volatility, enhance default probability. This quantifies the well-known problem with collateral triggers. Furthermore our model can be used to quantify the degree to which central counterparties, whilst removing credit risk transmission, systematically increase default risk.Comment: 12 pages; 5 figure

Derivatives and Default Risk

Upstream producers that possess market power, sell forwards with a lengthy duration to regional electricity companies (REC). As part of the liberalization of the electricity market, RECs have been privatized and exposed to a possible bankruptcy threat if spot prices have fallen below their expected value. The downstream firms’ expected profit is larger, when it is less likely to be bailed out, the effect on upstream profits is ambiguous while consumers loose. Options are less welfare increasing than forwards, but the difference is minimal. In the presence of bankruptcy, options are the preferred welfare maximizing market instrument

An Extended Structural Credit Risk Model (forthcoming in the Icfai Journal of Financial Risk Management; all copyrights rest with the Icfai University Press)

This paper presents an extended structural credit risk model that pro- vides closed form solutions for fixed and floating coupon bonds and credit default swaps. This structural model is an "extended" one in the following sense. It allows for the default free term structure to be driven by the a multi-factor Gaussian model, rather than by a single factor one. Expected default occurs as a latent diffusion process first hits the default barrier, but the diffusion process is not the value of the firm's assets. Default can be "expected" or "unexpected". Liquidity risk is correlated with credit risk. It is not necessary to disentangle the risk of unexpected default from liquidity risk. A tractable and accurate recovery assumption is proposed.structural credit risk model, Vasicek model, Gaussian term structure model, bond pricing, credit default swap pricing, unexpected default, liquidity risk.

An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency

This paper uses a unique new panel data set of credit card accounts to analyze credit card delinquency and more generally personal bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models. We estimate duration models for default and assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting default. We investigate how the propensity to default has changed over time, disentangling the two leading explanations for the recent increase in default rates – a deterioration in the risk-composition of borrowers versus a reduction in the social stigma of default. Even after controlling for risk-composition and other economic fundamentals, the propensity to default significantly increased between 1995 and 1997. By contrast, increases in credit limits and other changes in risk-composition explain only a small part of the change in default rates. Standard default models appear to have missed an important time-varying default factor, consistent with the stigma effect.Personal bankruptcy; Forecasting default; Credit risk management; Consumer credit; Credit cards

A Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk

This paper presents a fiscal theory of sovereign risk and default. Under certain monetary-fiscal regimes, the risk of default, and thus the emergence of sovereign risk premia, are inevitable. The paper characterizes the equilibrium processes of the sovereign risk premium and the default rate under a number of alternative monetary policy arrangements. Under some of the policy environments considered, the expected default rate and the sovereign risk premium are zero although the government defaults regularly. Under other monetary regimes the default rate and the sovereign risk premium are serially correlated and therefore forecastable. Environments are characterized under which delaying default is counterproductive.

Derivatives and Default Risk

Upstream producers that possess market power, sell forwards with a lengthy duration to regional electricity companies (REC). As part of the liberalization of the electricity market, RECs have been privatized and exposed to a possible bankruptcy threat if spot prices have fallen below their expected value. The downstream firms’ expected profit is larger, when it is less likely to be bailed out, the effect on upstream profits is ambiguous while consumers loose. Options are less welfare increasing than forwards, but the difference is minimal. In the presence of bankruptcy, options are the preferred welfare maximizing market instrument.Forwards; Options; Default Risk; Market Efficiency

An Empirical Comparison of Default Swap Pricing Models

In this paper we compare market prices of credit default swaps with model prices. We show that a simple reduced form model with a constant recovery rate outperforms the market practice of directly comparing bonds' credit spreads to default swap premiums. We find that the model works well for investment grade credit default swaps, but only if we use swap or repo rates as proxy for default-free interest rates. This indicates that the government curve is no longer seen as the reference default-free curve. We also show that the model is insensitive to the value of the assumed recovery ratecredit default swaps, credit derivatives, credit risk, default risk, risk-neutral valuation, pricing

Debt Dilution and Maturity Structure of Sovereign Bonds

We develop a dynamic model of sovereign default and renegotiation to study how expectations of default and debt restructuring in the near future affect the ex ante maturity structure of sovereign debts. This paper argues that the average maturity is shorter when a country is approaching financial distress due to two risks: default risk and "debt dilution" risk. Long-term yield is generally higher than short-term yield to reflect the higher default risk incorporated in long-term debts. When default risk is high and long-term debt is too expensive to afford, the country near default has to rely on short-term debt. The second risk, "debt dilution" risk, is the focus of this paper. It arises because there is no explicit seniority structure among different sovereign debts, and all debt holders are legally equal and expect to get the same haircut rate in the post-default debt restructuring. Therefore, new debt issuances around crisis reduce the amount that can be recovered by existing earlier debt-holders in debt restructuring, and thus ``dilute'' existing debts. As a result, investors tend to hold short-term debt which is more likely to mature before it is "diluted" to avoid the "dilution" risk. Model features non-contingent bonds of two maturities, endogenous default and endogenous hair cut rate in a debt renegotiation after default. We show that ``debt dilution'' effect is always present and is more severe when default risk is high. When default is a likely event in the near future, both default risk and ``dilution'' risk drive the ex ante maturity of sovereign debts to be shorter. In a quantitative analysis, we try to calibrate the model to match various features of the recent crisis episode of Argentina. In particular, we try to account for the shifts in maturity structure before crisis and the volatility of long-term and short-term spreads observed in the prior default episode of ArgentinaMaturity Structure, Debt Dilution, Sovereign Default, Debt Renegotiation