Coordination structures

We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in an observation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find that coordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence is necessary and sufficient when agents are homogenous and sufficient when agents differ and their types are private. Other structures guarantee coordination when agents decide in some particular sequences or for particular payoffs. The coordination problem embodied in our game is applied to the problems of revolts and bank runs.social networks; coordination failures; multiple equilibria; revolts; bank runs

TESNA: A Tool for Detecting Coordination Problems

Detecting problems in coordination can prove to be very difficult. This is especially true in large globally distributed environments where the Software Development can quickly go out of the Project Manager’s control. In this paper we outline a methodology to analyse the socio-technical coordination structures. We also show how this can be made easier with the help of a tool called TESNA that we have developed

Coordination, Local Interactions and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation

The paper presents a local interaction model of coordination with spatially-located agents who simultaneously choose stage-game strategies and adaptively learn how to choose their neighbors. We analyze the behavior of the system when network externalities become eventually negative as neighborhood sizes increase. We show that the society can robustly reach in the long-run steady states characterized by high levels of coordination and small average neighborhood sizes. Moreover, we find that: (i) neighborhood adjustment allows for higher coordination than if interaction structures were static; and: (ii) large populations attain higher coordination provided that average initial neighborhood sizes are not too small.Learning, Coordination, Nearest-Neighbor Interactions, Endogenous Neighborhood Formation.

Coordination in Tree Adjoining Grammars: Formalization and Implementation

In this paper we show that an account for coordination can be constructed using the derivation structures in a lexicalized Tree Adjoining Grammar (LTAG). We present a notion of derivation in LTAGs that preserves the notion of fixed constituency in the LTAG lexicon while providing the flexibility needed for coordination phenomena. We also discuss the construction of a practical parser for LTAGs that can handle coordination including cases of non-constituent coordination.Comment: 6 pages, 16 Postscript figures, uses colap.sty. To appear in the proceedings of COLING 199

Syntheses, Structures, and Photoluminescence of 1-D Lanthanide Coordination Polymers

Five new lanthanide 1-D coordination polymers are reported which are formed from flexible salen type Schiff-base ligands H(2)L and H(2)L' (H(2)L = N, N(1)-ethylene bis(salicylideneimine); H(2)L' = N,N(1)-bis(3-methoxysalicylidene) ethylene-1,2-diamine). The polymeric structures are formed by bridging neutral H(2)L units in the case of {[Ln(2)L(2)(CF(3)SO(3))(H(2)L)(4)(MeOH)]center dot CF(3)SO(3)}(n) (Ln = Eu (1), Nd (2) and Er (3)), and by acetate (OAc(-)) groups in [Yb(2)(L)(2)(OAc)(2)(MeOH)(2)](n) (4) and {[Tb(3)(L')(2)(OAc)(5)]center dot Et(2)O center dot(MeOH)(0.5)}(n) (5). The structures of 1-5 were determined by single crystal X-ray crystallographic studies and the luminescence properties of 1 and 5 in MeOH solution were determined.ong Kong Baptist University FRG/06-07/II-16Hong Kong Research Grants Council HKBU 202407Robert A. Welch Foundation F-816Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board ARP 003658-0010-2006Petroleum Research FundAmerican Chemical Society 47014-AC5Chemistr

Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives

This paper examines how different unionisation structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation: (1) "Decentralisation" where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) "coordination" where one industry union sets individual wages for all firms, and (3) "centralisation" where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all firms. While firms' investment incentives are largest under "centralisation" investment incentives are non-monotone in the degree of centralisation: "Decentralisation" carries higher investment incentives than "coordination". Labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non-discrimination rules.

Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study

Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.Comment: preprint submitted to IJMP