BUREAUCRATS AS PURCHASERS OF HEALTH SERVICES: LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR FOR CONTRACTING

Contracting out of health services increasingly involves a new role for governments as purchasers of services. To date, emphasis has been on contractual outcomes and the contracting process, which may benefit from improvements in developing countries, has been understudied. This article uses evidence from wide scale NGO contracting in Pakistan and examines the performance of government purchasers in managing the contracting process; draws comparisons with NGO managed contracting; and identifies purchaser skills needed for contracting NGOs. We found that the contracting process is complex and government purchasers struggled to manage the contracting process despite the provision of well-designed contracts and guidelines. Weaknesses were seen in three areas: (i) poor capacity for managing tendering; (ii) weak public sector governance resulting in slow processes, low interest and rent seeking pressures; and (iii) mistrust between government and the NGO sector. In comparison parallel contracting ventures managed by large NGOs generally resulted in faster implementation, closer contractual relationships, drew wider participation of NGOs and often provided technical support. Our findings do not dilute the importance of government in contracting but front the case for an independent purchasing agency, for example an experienced NGO, to manage public sector contracts for community based services with the government role instead being one f larger oversight. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A Conceptual Framework for B2B Electronic Contracting

Electronic contracting aims at improving existing business relationship paradigms and at enabling new forms of contractual relationships. To successfully realize these objectives, an integral understanding of the contracting field must be established. In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for business-to-business contracting support. The framework provides a complete view over the contracting field. It allows positioning research efforts in the domain, analysing them, placing their goals into perspective, and overseeing future research topics and issues. It is the basis for drawing conclusions about basic requirements to contracting systems

On deep e-contracting

The use of electronic contracts is emerging as a way to improve the effi-ciency of contracting processes. Electronic contracts are, however, often used as a direct replacement for traditional paper contracts - which we call shallow e-contracting. Consequently, business processes in general and contracting processes in particular do not change much through the use of electronic contracts. New business scenarios caused by e-business developments, however, do require new contracting paradigms in which the use of electronic contracts becomes an essential element to obtain a radical paradigm shift in contractual business relations - which we call deep e-contracting. In this position paper, we explore these new para-digms. We link the paradigms to exchanged values described in e-contracts to obtain a mapping from business requirements. We next map the paradigms to contracting activities. Finally, we map the activities to information technology required for their automated support. Based on the paradigms and mappings, this paper provides a concise framework for the exploration of deep e-contracting.\ud

A small estimated Euro area model with rational expectations and nominal rigidities

In this paper we estimate a small model of the euro area to be used as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy strategies. We start with the relationship between output and inflation and investigate the fit of the nominal wage contracting model due to Taylor (1980)and three different versions of the relative real wage contracting model proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981)and estimated by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) for the United States. While Fuhrer and Moore reject the nominal contracting model in favor of the relative contracting model which induces more inflation persistence, we find that both models fit euro area data reasonably well. When considering France, Germany and Italy separately, however, we find that the nominal contracting model fits German data better, while the relative contracting model does quite well in countries which transitioned out of a high inflation regime such as France and Italy. We close the model by estimating an aggregate demand relationship and investigate the consequences of the different wage contracting specifications for the inflation-output variability tradeoff, when interest rates are set according to Taylor 's rule

COST OF FORWARD CONTRACTING HARD RED WINTER WHEAT

Two methods were used to estimate the cost of forward contracting hard red winter wheat. One hundred days before delivery, the estimated cost of forward contracting ranged from six cents/bu. To eight cents/bu. Thus, further evidence is provided that the cost of forward contracting grain is not zero.forward contracting, nonparametric regression, wheat, Marketing,

Contracting welfare-to-work services: use and usefulness

This paper contributes to the broad literature on public services contracting in two ways: We provide an empirical analysis of contracting decisions in the provision of welfare-to-work (WTW) services, and we explicitly model two forms of external provision of WTW services by municipalities. We estimate both the WTW-contracting decisions of Dutch municipalities and their impact on the performance, measured as the fraction of Social Assistance recipients. The two forms of external provision are (1) Contracting with other municipalities and/or (2) Contracting-out services to private providers. Our findings suggest that contracting decisions are predominantly driven by cost considerations, both for the decision to contract with other municipalities and the share of contracting out to private providers. Municipalities with low WTW budgets or facing budget constraints are more likely to contract with external parties – presumably this reduces their costs and the risk of future budget deficits. We do not find contracting decisions to affect the performance of municipalities, measured as the use, inflow or outflow out of the SA scheme. From this alone, however, we cannot conclude that both the three provision modes are equally cost-effective too, as external provision may be less costly.

Hierarchic contracting

We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents whereoutput is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agentis a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externalityis not internalised by a centralised structure where the principal contracts directly with eachagent. Instead, we find that a hierarchic structure (i.e. the delegation of "contracting rights"from the principal to the agents) internalises the externality by making agents "residualclaimants". Consequently, the second best situation can be improved upon just by changingthe contracting structure of the principal-agents relationship. The analysis is relevant to theliterature on decentralisation, outsourcing, subcontracting and intra-firm organization.Principal-multi-agent relationships, moral hazard, team production,decentralisation, hierarchies, contract design