Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium

This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con- straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub- game Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian al- locations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The main novelty of the result is twofold: (1) it holds for any number of agents; (2) it is robust to di¤erent speci�cations of the bargaining process.strategic bargaining; Walrasian Equilibrium

Eliminating Network Protocol Vulnerabilities Through Abstraction and Systems Language Design

Incorrect implementations of network protocol message specifications affect the stability, security, and cost of network system development. Most implementation defects fall into one of three categories of well defined message constraints. However, the general process of constructing network protocol stacks and systems does not capture these categorical con- straints. We introduce a systems programming language with new abstractions that capture these constraints. Safe and efficient implementations of standard message handling operations are synthesized by our compiler, and whole-program analysis is used to ensure constraints are never violated. We present language examples using the OpenFlow protocol

Concepts and Measurement of Labour Market Institutions

Institutions have a decisive importance in determin-ing how labour markets function. They place con-straints on the individual behaviour of market partic-ipants and in so doing they may direct it in a certai

Financial constraints, migration and inequality

Although the self-selection of emigrants is determined by di¤erences in the returns to education, according to the celebrated Roy model, empirical evidence suggests that migrants tend to be favorably selected. This paper argues that financial con- straints might be useful to explain this controversy. These constraints might impose positive correlations between (i) wealth and education, and (ii) wealth and migra- tion, implying a positive bias in the empirical results. We also show that high levels of migration premium and return to education in the source country explain the migration of middle-class individuals, a situation in which migration increases in- equality in the home country.migration, financial constraints, self-selection, human capital

Integer programming for building robust surgery schedules.

This paper proposes and evaluates a number of models for building robust cyclic surgery schedules. The developed models involve two types of constraints. Demand constraints ensure that each surgeon (or surgical group) obtains a specific number of operating room (OR) blocks. Capacity con- straints limit the available OR blocks on each day. Furthermore, the number of operated patients per block and the length of stay (LOS) of each operated patient are dependent on the type of surgery. Both are considered stochas- tic, following a multinomial distribution. We develop a number of MIP-based heuristics and a metaheuristic to minimize the expected total bed shortage and present computational results.Constraint; Demand; Distribution; Expected; Heuristic; Integer programming; Model; Models; Resource leveling; Surgery scheduling;

The transportation problem with exclusionary side constraints.

We consider the so-called Transportation Problem with Exclusionary Side Con- straints (TPESC), which is a generalization of the ordinary transportation problem. We determine the complexity status for each of two special cases of this problem, by proving NP-completeness, and by exhibiting a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm. For the general problem, we show that it cannot be approximated with a constant perfor- mance ratio in polynomial time (unless P=NP). These results settle the complexity status of the TPESC.

Subsidies, Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Market Imperfections

In this paper we analyze the interaction between subsidies, soft budget con- straints and financial market imperfections in a simple model of occupational choice. The basic message is that the eect of soft budget constraints has to be analyzed jointly with other possible distortions that are affecting the economy. In particu- lar in environments where there are severe forms of financial market imperfections, subsidies and soft budget constraints can ease those imperfections and reduce credit rationing problems. The "positive" effect of soft budget constraints depends also upon the degree of institutional failure of the economy.