The Effect of Workloads and Compensation on Work Motivation in Sasmita Jaya Foundation

The complexity of motivational problems has always been an obstacle to employee performance. Therefore, it is important to do research on the causal factors. To answer this problem, quantitative approaches and regression analysis are used. The population in this study were 70 employees of Sasmita Jaya Foundation and the sample technique used was census. The results prove that workload has a significant effect on work motivation with a regression coefficient of 0.569. Compensation has a significant effect on work motivation with a regression coefficient of 0.478. Simultaneous analysis prove that workload and compensation have a significant effect on work motivation with a determination coefficient of 72.5%, while the remaining 27.5% is explained by other variables outside of this stud

Keeping Up with CEO Jones: Benchmarking and Executive Compensation

This paper seeks to understand the role that peer comparisons play in the determination of executive compensation. I exploit a recent change in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulations that requires firms to disclose the peer companies used for determining the compensation of their top executives. Using a new dataset of S&P 900 companies’ choice of benchmarking firms during two fiscal periods (2007 and 2008), I investigate what determines the choice of comparison firms. I find that companies have a preference for choosing larger and higher-CEO-compensation firms as their benchmark. Though I find that companies prefer to choose as their benchmark peers with similar firm characteristics, for CEO compensation, this effect is countered by a preference for firms with higher-than-own CEO compensation. Using the complete map of firms’ choices, I implement an instrumental variable strategy that uses the characteristics of peers-of-peers to estimate the effect of others’ compensation on own compensation. For Fiscal Year 2007, I find an elasticity of 0.5

The Effect of Compensation on Employees Performance of Imperial Club Golf Tangerang District

Compensation problems have become talks between employees, and the impact of motivation and employee performance decreases. To answer this problem, analysis and research are needed, so that a solution is found. This study uses a quantitative approach with multiple linear regression analysis. The total number of employees is 50 people, so the technical sample used is the census. Furthermore, the research was carried out by testing the stages of analysis which included descriptive analysis of the questionnaire, validity test, reliability test, classic assumption test, linear regression test, correlation coefficient test and test coefficient of determination. The results of the regression analysis show that the compensation has a positive and significant effect on the performance of Imperial Club Golf employees with a regression coefficient of 0,618 and Tcount of 7,156

PENGARUH GAYA KEPEMIMPINAN, DISIPLIN KERJA, DAN KOMPENSASI TERHADAP KINERJA KARYAWAN (Studi Kasus Pada Toko Bang Ahmad Kab. Jombang)

This study aims to: (1) Understand Employee Performance, Leadership Style, Work Discipline, and Compensation at Ahmad's store. (2) Understand the direct influence of Leadership Style on Employee Performance. (3) Understand the direct influence of Work Discipline on Employee Performance. (4) Understand the direct influence of Compensation on Employee Performance. (5) Identify the Leadership Style, Work Discipline, and Compensation that have the most dominant influence. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling with a sample size of 35 Employees. The analysis tool used in this research is SPSS 25. (1) The Role of Leadership Style, Work Discipline, Compensation, and Employee Performance. (2) Leadership Style has a significant positive effect on Employee Performance. (3) Work Discipline has a significant positive effect on Employee Performance. (4) Compensation has a significant positive effect on Employee Performance. (5) Leadership Style has the most dominant influence on Employee Performance

How pensions contribute to the premium paid to experienced public school teachers

Many argue that public school systems should stop linking teachers’ salaries so closely to their years of experience. However, the effect of deferred retirement compensation on the premium paid to experienced teachers has, to date, been underappreciated. To shed more light on this issue, we calculate the total compensation earned by teachers in New York City and Philadelphia from both salary and deferred retirement compensation under each system’s currently operating defined-benefit plan. Retirement compensation in both cities is back-loaded, which substantially increases the premium paid to highly experienced teachers. In late-career years, teachers often earn a larger compensation premium from the accrual of pension benefits than from salary. We show that cash-balance retirement plans, which are less back-loaded, would substantially reduce experience premiums without reducing the total compensation for the average entering teacher.http://sites.bu.edu/marcuswinters/files/2017/09/Pensions-and-Experience-Premium.pdfAccepted manuscrip

CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures

This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.

Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-006)

This study investigates the economic, ownership and governance determinants of executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated with firm size, performance, and growth opportunities. CEO incentives are negatively associated with firm size, positively linked with firm performance and growth opportunity. Firm risk has a negative effect on pay and incentives. Compensation and CEO incentives are significantly greater in privately-controlled firms compared to state-run firms and are lower in firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important: firms with compensation committees or a greater fraction of independent directors on the board have higher executive pay and greater CEO equity incentives

Promotions, Demotions, Halo Effects and the Earnings Dynamics of American executives

This paper explores the dynamics of wage growth in corporate hierarchies. Using panel data techniques, we estimate the causal effect of current and past transitions in reporting level and past earnings growth on components of current earnings and earnings growth using a large panel of US executives. After conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity, current compensation growth is positively correlated with past promotion outcomes but negatively correlated with past compensation growth. In a flexible model of wage growth, there is an important asymmetry between the effect of a promotion and a demotion. The effect of promotion is smaller in magnitude than the effect of a demotion. The causal effect of a promotion is positive on both growth in base pay and total cash compensation but is negative on bonus growth. The effect of a demotion is negative on growth in all pay components.wage growth ; corporate hierarchies