Allocating publicly owned assets: the case of personal communications services

An examination of the rationale for the recent use of government auctions to allocate radio spectrum. Auctions are a more equitable allocation method than either comparative hearings or lotteries, will help put a dent in the federal debt, and will be fair to small firms that face capital constraints.Accounting ; Credit

Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues

Abstract of Introductory Essay An essay defines and explores the strengths and limits of the Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues, and then derives guidelines for the use of axiomatic work in papers prescribing policies. Abstract of Chapter I Given certain fundamental assumptions, it is possible to engage in economic analysis of costly interactions between the government and individuals. Such an analysis must necessarily focus upon a potential rule's effect on governmental behavior. Various models of governmental behavior are either borrowed or developed, and these models are then independently analyzed, Economic efficiency suggests that a particular immunity rule should be adopted with regard to certain models. In the case of other models, however, rigorous economic analysis is impossible; in such cases, suability is chosen over immunity on the basis of fairness and comparative utility. Based upon this analysis, three potential governmental immunity rules are formulated, and, based largely on considerations of administrative costs and fairness, the indicated rule is that the government should be suable in tort for monetary damages. Abstract of Chapter II The limitations of Multicriteria Choice Processes are analyzed by examining the Federal Communications Commission's initial broadcast license comparative hearings. A possibility theorem, developed especially for comparative hearings, shows that the FCC must use an illegal process. This fundamental problem helps to explain previous criticisms of the comparative hearings' practical defects and to separate sufficiently effective reform suggestions from ineffective proposals.</p

Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction

The Federal Communications Commission held its first auction of radio spectrum at the Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction in July 1994. The simultaneous multiple-round auction, which lasted five days, was an ascending bid auction in which all licenses were offered simultaneously. This paper describes the auction rules and how bidders prepared for the auction. The full history of bidding is presented. Several questions for auction theory are discussed. In the end, the government collected $617 million for ten licenses. The auction was viewed by all as a huge success-an excellent example of bringing economic theory to bear on practical problems of allocating scarce resources.Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Multiple-Round Auction

Character and Candor Requirements for FCC Licensees

The Communications Act explicitly makes the applicant\u27s character an element in licensing. Applications must set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station. Even in the absence of such guidance, the Commission could scarcely ignore evidence of bad character in making its ultimate determination whether a grant will serve the public convenience, interest, or necessity. The Act mentions the related problem of misrepresentation only in connection with the Commission\u27s power to revoke licenses. Misrepresentation, or lack of candor, may, nevertheless, be treated as a defect of character, or as an independent ground for finding that public interest does not call for licensing someone who deceives the licensing authority. There is, it will appear, not much question about the Commission\u27s power to demand high standards of truthfulness and candor as well as of character. There is also little doubt that, at least for the last decade, the Commission has set high standards. The questions that merit attention are rather these: 1) In what circumstances is the power exercised? 2) Is it abused, either by the Commission or by parties who bring before the Commission unwarranted charges of bad character or of deception? 3) If there are abuses, how can they be checked? It may be said at the outset, without trying to prefigure any recommendations in conclusion, that there appear to be two forms of excessive concern with character and candor. The first is a tendency of parties, in hard-fought comparative proceedings, to dredge up remote and far-fetched charges of any conceivable kind of wrongdoing. The second, in which the Commission has taken the lead, is to make questionable inquiries about radical or subversive political associations. Examples of these practices will emerge from the discussion that follows

Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Budget Committee, I am honored to appear before you today. My remarks are about the spectrum auctions in the United States. I will discuss spectrum auction successes, failures, and what I think are key issues in upcoming spectrum auctions.Auctions, Spectrum Auctions, Multiple Item Auctions