Influence functions, followers and command games

We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function,and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.influence function, follower function, lower and upper inverses, kernel, command game, command function, minimal sets generating a command game

Influence functions, followers and command games

We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.influence function;follower function;lower and upper inverses;kernel;command game;command function;minimal sets generating a command game

Measuring influence in command games

In the paper, we study a relation between command games proposed by Hu and Shapley and an influence model. We show that our framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. We define several influence functions which capture the command structure. These functions are compatible with the command games, in the sense that each commandable player for a coalition in the command game is a follower of the coalition under the command influence function. Some of the presented influence functions are equivalent to the command games, that is, they are compatible with the command games, and additionally each follower of a coalition under the command influence function is also a commandable player for that coalition in the command games. For some influence functions we define the equivalent command games. We show that not for all influence functions the compatible command games exist. Moreover, we propose a more general definition of the influence index and show that under some assumptions, some power indices, which can be used in the command games, coincide with some expressions of the weighted influence indices. Both the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index are equal to a difference between the weighted influence indices under some influence functions, and the only difference between these two power indices lies in the weights for the influence indices. An example of the Confucian model of society is broadly examined.influence function; follower; influence index; command game; commandable player; Shapley-Shubik index; Banzhaf index

Measuring influence in command games

In the paper, we study a relation between command games proposed by Hu and Shapley and an influence model. We show that our framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. We define several influence functions which capture the command structure. These functions are compatible with the command games, in the sense that each commandable player for a coalition in the command game is a follower of the coalition under the command influence function. For some influence functions we define the command games such that the influence functions are compatible with these games. We show that not for all influence functions such command games exist. Moreover, we propose a more general definition of the influence index and show that some power indices, which can be used in the command games, coincide with some expressions of the weighted influence indices. We show exact relations between an influence function and a follower function, between a command game and commandable players, and between influence functions and command games. An example of the Confucian model of society is broadly examined.Banzhaf index ; Coleman indices ; command game ; follower of a coalition ; influence function ; influence indices ; Shapley-Shubik index

Coercion, compliance and the collapse of the soviet command economy

Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Postwar evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Soviet economy was unstable. If it was not unstable, why did it collapse? A repeated game of coordination between a dictator and producers shows that a high level of coercion may yield a stable high–output equilibrium, that the command economy contains a time–consistency problem for central planners, and that a transition to a low state of coercion and performance in which everyone’s income falls may be brought about by rising monitoring costs and the dictator’s loss of reputation. The facts of the Soviet case are consistent with a collapse triggered when the dictator threw in the towel.COMMAND ; ECONOMY ; DICTATORSHIP ; INCENTIVES ; MONITORING ; SOVIET UNION ; TIME–CONSISTENCY

Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games

We present an overview of research on a certain model of influence in a social network. Each agent has to make an acceptance/rejection decision, and he has an inclination to choose either the yes-action or the no-action. The agents are embedded in a social network which models influence between them. Due to the influence, a decision of an agent may differ from his preliminary inclination. Such a transformation between the agents' inclinations and their decisions are represented by an influence function. Follower functions encode the players who constantly follow the opinion of a given unanimous coalition. We examine properties of the influence and follower functions and study the relation between them. The model of influence is also compared to the framework of command games in which a simple game is built for each agent. We study the relation between command games and influence functions. We also define influence indices and determine the relations between these indices and some well-known power indices. Furthermore, we enlarge the set of possible yes/no actions to multi-choice games and investigate the analogous tools related to influence in the multi-choice model.influence ; social network ; influence function ; command game ; follower ; voting

Heavy Hero or Digital Dummy? Multimodal Player–Avatar Relations in Final Fantasy 7

This article analyses the player-avatar relation in Final Fantasy 7, drawing on multimodality theory to analyse textual structures both in the game and in the discourse of player-interviews and fan writing. It argues that the avatar is a two-part structure, partly designed in conventional narrative terms as a protagonist of popular narrative, and partly as a vehicle for interactive game-play. The former structure is replete with the traditions and designs of Japanese popular narrative, oral formulaic narrative and contemporary superhero narratives; and is presented to the player as an offer act – a declarative narrative statement. The latter is a construct of evolving attributes and economies characteristic of roleplaying games; and is presented to the player as a demand act – a rule-based command. Though these two functions separate out in the grammar of player and fan discourse, it is their integration which provides the pleasure of gameplay and narrative engagement