Are competition and extrinsic motivation reliable predictors of academic cheating?

Previous studies suggest that extrinsic motivation and competition are reliable predictors of academic cheating. The aim of the present questionnaire study was to separate the effects of motivation- and competition-related variables on academic cheating by Hungarian high school students (N = 620, M = 264, F = 356). Structural equation modeling showed that intrinsic motivation has a negative effect, and amotivation has a positive indirect effect on self-reported academic cheating. In contrast, extrinsic motivation had no significant effect. Indirect positive influence on cheating, based on some characteristics of hypercompetition, was also found, whereas attitudes toward self-developmental competition had a mediated negative influence. Neither constructive nor destructive competitive classroom climate had a significant impact on academic dishonesty. Acceptance of cheating and guilt has significant and direct effect on self-reported cheating. In comparison with them, the effects of motivational and competition-related variables are relatively small, even negligible. These results suggest that extrinsic motivation and competition are not amongst the most reliable predictors of academic cheating behavior

On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing

We study the role of whistle-blowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a valuable prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This control game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. We then add a whistle-blowing stage, where the controller asks the loser to blow the whistle. This extended game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which only a cheating loser accuses the winner of cheating and the controller tests the winner if and only if the winner is accused of cheating. Whistle-blowing reduces the frequencies of cheating, is less costly in terms of test frequencies, and leads to a strict Pareto-improvement if punishments for cheating are sufficiently large.Principal-two-Agents; Inspection Games; Asymmetric Information; Signalling

Does competition enhance performance or cheating? A laboratory experiment

In this paper we experimentally test whether competing for a desired reward does not only affect individuals’ performance, but also their tendency to cheat. Recent doping scandals in sports as well as forgery and plagiarism scandals in academia have been partially explained by „competitive pressures“, which suggests a link between competition and cheating. In our experiment subjects conduct a task where they have the possibility to make use of illegitimate tools to better their results. We find that women react much stronger to competitive pressure by increasing their cheating activity while there is no overall sex difference in cheating. However, the effect of competition on women’s cheating behavior is entirely due to the fact that women, on average, are doing worse with respect to the assigned task. Indeed we find that it is the ability of an individual to conduct a particular task and not sex that crucially affects the reaction to competition. Poor performers significantly increase their cheating behavior under competition which may be a face-saving strategy or an attempt to retain a chance of winning.competition, tournament, piece rate, cheating, experiment

Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments

In a tournament, competitors may engage in undesirable activities, or 'cheating', in order to gain an advantage. Examples of such activities include the taking of steroids, plagiarism, and 'creative accounting'. This paper considers the problem of deterrence of these activities and finds that there exist special considerations that are not present in a traditional model of law enforcement. For example, an agent's returns to cheating depend on the cheating decisions of others, and so there may exist multiple equilibria. The problem of multiple equilibria can be reduced when the first-place prize is awarded to the person that performed best without cheating. Moreover, we show that re-awarding prizes reduces the amount of monitoring required to ensure compliance. We also demonstrate that monitoring costs can be further reduced by monitoring the winner of the tournament more than the loser, and by manipulating prizes, including through the introduction of prizes for non-winners.Enforcement; Cheating; Tournament

Cheating in Management Science (with Comments by M. K. Starr and M. J. Mahoney)

Honesty is vital to scientific work and, clearly, most scientists are honest. However, recent publicity about cases involving cheating, including cases of falsification of data and plagiarism, raises some questions: Is cheating a problem? Does it affect management science? Should anything be done

Fairness and Cheating

We present evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that individuals who believe they were treated unfairly in an interaction with another person are more likely to cheat in a subsequent unrelated game. Specifically, subjects first participated in a dictator game. They then flipped a coin in private and reported the outcome. Subjects could increase their total payoff by cheating, i.e., lying about the outcome of the coin toss. We found that subjects were more likely to cheat in reporting the outcome of the coin flip when: 1) they received either nothing or a very small transfer from the dictator; and 2) they claimed to have been treated unfairly. This is consistent with the view that experiencing a norm violation is sufficient to justify the violation of another norm at the expense of a third party. This result extends the growing literature on social norms

Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and determine whether cheating had occurred. In contrast to established theories, cheating did occur, but sparked only limited retaliation, partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents.

Explaining coexistence of nitrogen fixing and non-fixing rhizobia in legume-rhizobia mutualism using mathematical modeling

In the mutualism established between legumes and soil bacteria known as rhizobia, bacteria from soil infect plants roots and reproduce inside root nodules where they fix atmospheric N2 for plant nutrition, receiving carbohydrates in exchange. Host-plant sanctions against non N2 fixing, cheating bacterial symbionts have been proposed to act in the legume-Rhizobium symbiosis, to preserve the mutualistic relationship. Sanctions include decreased rhizobial survival in nodules occupied by cheating rhizobia. Previously, a simple population model experimentally based showed that the coexistence of fixing and cheating rhizobia strains commonly found in field conditions is possible, and that the inclusion of sanctions leads to the extinction of cheating strains in soil. Here, we extend the previous model to include other factors that could complicate the sanction scenario, like horizontal transmission of symbiotic plasmids, turning non-nodulating strains into nodulating rhizobia, and competition between fixing and cheating strains for nodulation. In agreement with previous results, we show that plant populations persist even in the presence of cheating rhizobia without incorporating any sanction against the cheater populations in the model, under the realistic assumption that plants can at least get some amount of fixed N2 from the effectively mutualistic rhizobia occupying some nodules. Inclusion of plant sanctions leads to the unrealistic extinction of cheater strains in soil. Our results agree with increasing experimental evidence and theoretical work showing that mutualisms can persist in presence of cheating partners.Fil: Moyano, Gabriel Eduardo. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Marco, Diana Elizabeth. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Cs.exactas Físicas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Knopoff, Damián Alejandro. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomia y Física. Sección Matemática; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigación y Estudios de Matemática. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigación y Estudios de Matemática; ArgentinaFil: Torres, German Ariel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Nordeste. Instituto de Modelado e Innovación Tecnológica. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas Naturales y Agrimensura. Instituto de Modelado e Innovación Tecnológica; ArgentinaFil: Turner, Cristina Vilma. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigación y Estudios de Matemática. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigación y Estudios de Matemática; Argentin