Australian Government measures to counter violent extremism: a quick guide

This guide identifies what is meant by violent extremism and outlines relevant counter-measures pursued by the Australian Government to date. Introduction Countering violent extremism was highlighted as an ‘essential element’ of efforts to deal with the ‘foreign fighters’ issue in a United Nations Security Council resolution adopted on 24 September 2014 (Resolution 2178 (2014)). On 11 January 2015, the White House announced it would host a Summit on Countering Violent Extremism on 18 February 2015 ‘to highlight domestic and international efforts to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from radicalizing, recruiting, or inspiring individuals or groups ... to commit acts of violence’. The Attorney-General told the Senate on 9 February 2015 that he would represent Australia at the Summit. Against that background, this Quick Guide identifies broadly what is meant by violent extremism and outlines relevant counter-measures pursued by the Australian Government to date

The people smugglers’ business model

While discussions continue on how best to go about breaking the people smugglers’ business model, those participating in the debate have not publicly articulated the business model to which they refer. This has significant policy implications, given that the first step in developing a response is defining the problem to be addressed. This paper examines first some of the more recent international research, and second, relevant Australian case law and the more limited body of Australian research on people smuggling, to determine whether this business model can be identified. It does not seek to evaluate the appropriateness or efficacy of specific anti-people smuggling policies that have been or are currently being pursued by Australian Governments. Key points: Since the late 1990s, people smuggling has been a key focus of political debate on irregular migration to Australia. Most recently, attention has turned to how to ‘break the people smugglers’ business model’ . While there is continuing debate about how best to achieve this objec tive, the business model being referred to remains largely unarticulated , at least publicly . E xamination of recent open source research and Australian case law reveals there is no single ‘people smugglers’ business model’ that explains how people smugglers operate , either internationally or to Australia . However, certain themes are evident, including the predominance of fluid networks over more hierarchical organisations and the flexibility, adaptability and resilience of those involved. It appears that a v ariety of business models are employed (either explicitly or implicitly) and that they are c onstantly evolving. Some basic characteristics of maritime people smuggling from Indonesia to Australia can be discerned from open source information that can be us ed to outline some of the basic components of a common business model that seems to operate. However, there appear to be many variations on different components of the model. Further, the Indonesia to Australia leg is only part of a much longer journey, an d Indonesia is not the only departure point for boats to Australia organised by people smugglers. Finally, while p olitical and popular attention has focused largely on irregular maritime arrivals, people smuggling to Australia also occurs by air. The use o f the singular terms ‘the people smugglers’ business model’ or ‘the people smuggling business model’ gives the impression of a homogeneous market for which a single measure or ‘one size fits all’ solution might exist. The reality of a variety of business m odels operating at different stages of the supply chain between source countries and destination countries, including Australia, points to the need for a more tailored and considered approach. The point s at which to intervene in order to ‘break’ a certain business model , and the most appropriate mode s of intervention , will depend on the particular characteristics of that model

Crime and law enforcement: a quick guide to key internet links

This Quick Guide provides key internet links to websites with information on crime and law enforcement arrangements and issues

Migration and Economic Growth: a 21st Century Perspective

While there is extensive literature on the determinants of migration and its microeconomic effects, the New Zealand theoretical or empirical literature specifically examining the effects of migration on economic growth is not as comprehensive. In New Zealand there has been an implicit underlying assumption that immigration is good for economic growth, as evidenced by the attempted use of immigration to resolve particular labour market problems. This paper uses the growth accounting policy framework to discuss the mechanisms through which immigration can impact economic growth. It reviews the contemporary literature with a view to identifying how immigration policy may be adjusted to improve the potential returns to growth from immigration in New Zealand.Migration, immigration, emigration, economic growth, growth accounting framework, New Zealand

Offences for disclosing information about covert operations: a quick guide

This guide provides a an overview of newly introduced offences for unauthorised disclosure of information about ‘special intelligence operations’, how they operate and the extent to which they apply to public interest disclosures. Introduction The offences for unauthorised disclosure of information about a ‘special intelligence operation’ were one of the most controversial aspects of the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 (NSLA Bill). The Bill was passed by both Houses of Parliament (with some amendments, including to the offences) and became an Act on 2 October 2014. Debate about the offences was re-ignited when Australian Labor Party front-bencher Anthony Albanese commented on them in an interview on 12 October 2014, in which he suggested they go too far and should be monitored closely. The debate remains relevant in the context of a similar offence relating to delayed notification search warrants proposed in the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, which is currently before the Senate. These offences are different to longstanding secrecy offences such as the offence in section 70 of the Crimes Act 1914, which criminalises unauthorised disclosure of official information by someone who is or was a Commonwealth officer. They apply more broadly to any person who discloses particular information, raising concerns that they may inappropriately capture legitimate reporting. This Quick Guide provides a brief factual overview of the offences, how they operate and the extent to which they apply to public interest disclosures

Counter-terrorism and national security legislation reviews: a comparative overview

This paper outlines the key reviews of Australia\u27s counter-terrorism and national security legislation, followed by a more detailed comparison of the recommendations of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and Council of Australian Governments reports with each other and, where relevant, those of earlier reviews. Introduction Following the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the subsequent United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the Australian Government, in cooperation with the states and territories, embarked on a series of significant legislative reforms to respond to the threat of terrorism. The reforms included special powers for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), a range of new offences and the introduction of a mechanism for the proscription of terrorist organisations. The London bombings in July 2005 prompted further reforms, including the introduction of the control order and preventative detention order regimes and additional police powers in relation to suspected terrorism offences. Given the extraordinary nature of the new powers granted and the reach of the new offences, which were designed to capture conduct in the early preparatory stages, the relevant legislation required that reviews be undertaken at certain junctures. In addition, the office of Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) was established in 2010 to provide ongoing oversight of Commonwealth counter-terrorism and national security laws. Accordingly, there have been several significant reviews of Australia’s counter-terrorism and national security legislation, the most recent and comprehensive being those of the INSLM and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Review Committee. The Government is now embarking on a further series of national security reforms, the first part of which is contained in the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 (the Bill), introduced in the Senate on 16 July 2014. The Bill responds to recommendations on legislation governing the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) made by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security in 2013. The Attorney-General has stated that the Bill is ‘just the first step’ and indicated that the Government would introduce further legislation to both respond to recent reviews and proactively address any other shortcomings it identified. On 5 August 2014, the Government announced it would soon be introducing further reforms to, among other things, remove sunset provisions from a range of legislation, expand the criteria for the proscription of terrorist organisations, lower the threshold for arrest without warrant for suspected terrorism offences and enable requests for the suspension of passports in certain circumstances. This Research Paper provides a brief overview of key reviews of counter-terrorism and national security legislation, followed by a more detailed comparison of the recommendations of the INSLM and COAG reports with each other and, where relevant, those of earlier reviews. It also provides information on how governments have responded to review recommendations

National security: a quick guide to key internet links

This Quick Guide provides key internet links to websites with information on national security arrangements and issues

'Yep, I'm Gay': Understanding Agential Identity

What’s important about ‘coming out’? Why do we wear business suits or Star Trek pins? Part of the answer, we think, has to do with what we call agential identity. Social metaphysics has given us tools for understanding what it is to be socially positioned as a member of a particular group and what it means to self-identify with a group. But there is little exploration of the general relationship between self-identity and social position. We take up this exploration, developing an account of agential identity—the self-identities we make available to others. Agential identities are the bridge between what we take ourselves to be and what others take us to be. Understanding agential identity not only fills an important gap in the literature, but also helps us explain politically important phenomena concerning discrimination, malicious identities, passing, and code-switching. These phenomena, we argue, cannot be understood solely in terms of self-identity or social position

Development of the cat-owner relationship scale (CORS)

Characteristics of the human-animal bond can be influenced by both owner-related and pet-related factors, which likely differ between species. Three studies adapted the Monash Dog-Owner Relationship Scale (MDORS) to permit assessment of human-cat interactions as perceived by the cat's owner. In Study 1293 female cat owners completed a modified version of the MDORS, where 'dog' was replaced with 'cat' for all items. Responses were compared with a matched sample of female dog owners. A partial least squares discriminant analysis revealed systematic differences between cat and dog owners in the Dog (Cat)-Owner Interaction subscale (MDORS subscale 1), but not for Perceived Emotional Closeness or Perceived Costs (Subscales 2 and 3). Study 2 involved analysis of free-text descriptions of cat-owner interactions provided by 61 female cat owners. Text mining identified key words which were used to create additional questions for a new Cat-Owner Interaction subscale. In Study 3, the resulting cat-owner relationship scale (CORS) was tested in a group of 570 cat owners. The main psychometric properties of the scale, including internal consistency and factor structure, were evaluated. We propose that this scale can be used to accurately assess owner perceptions of their relationship with their cat. A modified scale, combining items from the CORS and MDORS (a C/DORS), is also provided for when researchers would find it desirable to compare human-cat and human-dog interactions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Essential dimension of simple algebras in positive characteristic

Let $p$ be a prime integer, $1\leq s\leq r$ integers, $F$ a field of characteristic $p$. Let \cat{Dec}_{p^r} denote the class of the tensor product of $r$ $p$-symbols and \cat{Alg}_{p^r,p^s} denote the class of central simple algebras of degree $p^r$ and exponent dividing $p^s$. For any integers $s<r$, we find a lower bound for the essential $p$-dimension of \cat{Alg}_{p^r,p^s}. Furthermore, we compute upper bounds for \cat{Dec}_{p^r} and \cat{Alg}_{8,2} over $\ch(F)=p$ and $\ch(F)=2$, respectively. As a result, we show \ed_{2}(\cat{Alg}_{4,2})=\ed(\cat{Alg}_{4,2})=\ed_{2}(\gGL_{4}/\gmu_{2})=\ed(\gGL_{4}/\gmu_{2})=3 and 3\leq \ed(\cat{Alg}_{8,2})=\ed(\gGL_{8}/\gmu_{2})\leq 10 over a field of characteristic 2.Comment: Any comments are welcom