23,174 research outputs found
A Theory of Bank Capital
Banks can create liquidity because their deposits are fragile and prone to runs. Increased uncertainty can make deposits excessively fragile in which case there is a role for outside bank capital. Greater bank capital reduces liquidity creation by the bank but enables the bank to survive more often and avoid distress. A more subtle effect is that banks with different amounts of capital extract different amounts of repayment from borrowers. The optimal bank capital structure trades off the effects of bank capital on liquidity creation, the expected costs of bank distress, and the ease of forcing borrower repayment. The model can account for phenomena such as the decline in average bank capital in the United States over the last two centuries. It points to overlooked side-effects of policies such as regulatory capital requirements and deposit insurance.
Simulation-based stress testing of banksâ regulatory capital adequacy
Banksâ holding of reasonable capital buffers in excess of minimum requirements could alleviate the procyclicality problem potentially exacerbated by the rating-sensitive capital charges of Basel II. Determining the required buffer size is an important risk management issue for banks, which the Basle Committee (2002) suggests should be approached via stress testing. We present here a simulation-based approach to stress testing of capital adequacy where rating transitions are conditioned on business-cycle phase and business-cycle dynamics are taken into account. Our approach is an extension of the standard credit portfolio analysis in that we simulate actual bank capital and minimum capital requirements simultaneously. Actual bank capital (absent mark-to-market accounting) is driven by bank income and default losses, whereas capital requirements within the Basel II framework are driven by rating transitions. The joint dynamics of these determine the necessary capital buffers, given bank managementâs specified confidence level for capital adequacy. We provide a tentative calibration of this confidence level to data on actual bank capital ratios, which enables a ceteris-paribus extrapolation of bank capital under the current regime to bank capital under Basel II.Basel II; Pillar 2; bank capital; stress tests; procyclicality
Simulation-based stress testing of banksâ regulatory capital adequacy
Banksâ holding of reasonable capital buffers in excess of minimum requirements could alleviate the procyclicality problem potentially exacerbated by the rating-sensitive capital charges of Basel II. Determining the required buffer size is an important risk management issue for banks, which the Basle Committee (2002) suggests should be approached via stress testing. We present here a simulation-based approach to stress testing of capital adequacy where rating transitions are conditioned on business-cycle phase and business-cycle dynamics are taken into account. Our approach is an extension of the standard credit portfolio analysis in that we simulate actual bank capital and minimum capital requirements simultaneously. Actual bank capital (absent mark- to-market accounting) is driven by bank income and default losses, whereas capital requirements within the Basel II framework are driven by rating transitions. The joint dynamics of these determine the necessary capital buffers, given bank managementâs specified confidence level for capital adequacy. We provide a tentative calibration of this confidence level to data on actual bank capital ratios, which enables a ceteris- paribus extrapolation of bank capital under the current regime to bank capital under Basel II.Basel II, Pillar 2, bank capital, stress tests, procyclicality
Modeling Two Macro Policy Instruments - Interest Rates and Aggregate Capital Requirements
We present a simple neoclassical model to explore how an aggregate bank-capital requirement can be used as a macroeconomic policy tool and how this additional tool interacts with monetary policy. Aggregate bank-capital requirements should be adjusted when the economy is hit by cost-push shocks but should not respond to demand shocks. Moreover, an optimal institutional structure is characterized as follows: First, monetary policy is delegated to an independent and conservative central banker. Second, setting aggregate bank-capital requirements is separated from monetary policy.central banks, banking regulation, capital requirements, optimal monetary policy
Bank capital structure and credit decisions
This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks
Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital
Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose of this short note, an addendum to âA Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,â is to describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would price the equity purchases through a competitive process.Auctions, financial auctions, financial crisis
Does Inflation and High Taxes Increase Bank Leverage?
Does the combination of inflation and high corporate taxes explain the increase in bank leverage in the 20th century? Inflation automatically increases bank debt, while high corporate taxes hinder capital accumulation. Capital ratios therefore drop, until leverage-induced returns are sufficient to uphold them at constant levels. This theory was confronted with Swedish bank data 1870â2001. Bank capital ratios dropped when inflation and corporate tax rates were high, during WWI and in 1940â1980. The theory can explain the sinking bank capital ratios during these periods, but also their relative stability since the early 1980s. High corporate taxes and inflation were estimated to account for half of the drop in Swedish bank capital ratios since WWII.Bank leverage; Capital-asset ratio; Inflation; Corporate taxes
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