Does belief have an aim?

The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense

It\u27s Been Lovely, But-

MANY\u27S THE DAY I have toted peppermint patties to a hostess, but this is the first time I have come bearing a brickbat. Before proceeding to bash the hand that feeds me, let me say hurriedly that if any hostesses, after reading this, want to come to my glass house, they are cordially invited and may bring their own stones. Without further dodging, I shall get on with this bread-and-brickbat affair..

A simple theory of promising

[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] Why do human beings make and accept promises? What human interest is served by this procedure? Many hold that promising serves what I shall call an information interest, an interest in information about what will happen. And they hold that human beings ought to keep their promises because breaches of promise threaten this interest. On this view human beings take promises seriously because we want correct information about how other human beings are going to act. Some such view is taken for granted by most philosophical accounts of promissory obligation. I agree that human beings do want such information and that they often get it by accepting promises. But I doubt that promising exists because it serves this information interest. I shall argue that promising exists because, at least when it comes to each other’s actions, human beings often have what might be called an authority interest: I often want it to be the case that I, rather than you, have the authority to determine what you do. If you promise me a lift home, this promise gives me the right to require you to drive me home; in that sense, it puts me in authority over you. So much is obvious. What I claim is that human beings often want such authority for its own sake (not just to facilitate prediction or co-ordination). I often have an interest in having the right to determine whether you’ll give me a lift, over and above any interest I have in knowing what you (or we) will actually do. And I claim that promising exists because it serves this authority interest

Beyond Strauss, lies, and the war in Iraq: Hannah Arendt's critique of neoconservatism

What are we to make of the neoconservative challenge to traditional international thought? Should we content ourselves, as many have done, to return to classical realism in response? Rather than offer another realist assessment of neoconservative foreign policy this article turns to Hannah Arendt. In a very different language, Arendt articulated a critique of the dangers of moralism in the political realm that avoids realist cynicism. She is also better placed to challenge the neoconservative vision of international affairs, ideological conviction, and their relationship to democratic society. Reading Arendt against Leo Strauss suggests that the fundamental problem with neoconservative ideology concerns its understanding of the place of philosophy in the public realm, the relationship between political thought and practice, ideas and action. She suggests why neoconservatives may be experts at selling wars but seem less adept at winning them

Equivariant embeddings of rational homology balls

We generalise theorems of Khodorovskiy and Park-Park-Shin, and give new topological proofs of those theorems, using embedded surfaces in the 4-ball and branched double covers. These theorems exhibit smooth codimension-zero embeddings of certain rational homology balls bounded by lens spaces.Comment: 27 pages, 25 figures. V2: Improved exposition incorporating referee's suggestions. Accepted for publication in Q. J. Math. V3: minor correction

Unknotting information from Heegaard Floer homology

We use Heegaard Floer homology to obtain bounds on unknotting numbers. This is a generalisation of Ozsváth and Szabó's obstruction to unknotting number one. We determine the unknotting numbers of 910, 913, 935, 938, 1053, 10101 and 10120; this completes the table of unknotting numbers for prime knots with crossing number nine or less. Our obstruction uses a refined version of Montesinos' theorem which gives a Dehn surgery description of the branched double cover of a knot

Promises and Conflicting Obligations

This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called ‘wicked promises’? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The discussion examines both ‘natural right’ and ‘social practice’ approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make binding promises that conflict with our prior obligations. There is also consideration of the parallel case of ‘wicked commands’